Abstract
In light of the advancements in cognitive science and the evolutionary psychology of religion in the past two decades, scientists and philosophers have begun to reflect on the theological and atheological implications of naturalistic—and in particular, evolutionary—explanations of religious belief and behaviour. However, philosophical naiveté is often evinced by scientists and scientific naiveté by philosophers. The aim of this article is to draw from these recent contributions, point out some common pitfalls and important insights, and suggest a way forward. This proposal avoids the genetic fallacy as well as misunderstandings of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religious belief. In the end, it may well be that the cognitive science of religion is atheologically and theologically ambiguous; traditional philosophers of religion on both sides of the debate still have work to do.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
As the extant literature focusses exclusively on the theism of the Abrahamic traditions (and indeed, more specifically Christian theism), this article will be similarly limited.
The historical veracity of this account is contested but is irrelevant for the illustrative purpose for which it is used here.
There are, it must be admitted, various ways to apply Ockham’s razor, and whether or not successful naturalistic explanations of phenomena are indeed more ontologically economical than their theological counterparts may well turn on one’s understanding of ontological economy. While defending this view of ontological economy goes beyond the scope of this article, I am assuming ‘ontological-type economy’, which suggests that we ought not posit more types or kinds of entities than are necessary. If, for example, an explanation that only requires physical entities will do, we ought not invoke non-physical entities, even if this would reduce the total number of entities, physical or otherwise.
Indeed, there is a trivial sense in which all scientific theories are explanatory (insofar as they are explanatory) in this ‘general’ way; application to any specific case requires the consideration of the multiple causal factors that are inevitably in play and this, in turn, may require the application of other theories.
References
Atran, S. (2002). In gods we trust: The evolutionary landscape of religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2004). The cognitive neuroscience of autism. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 75, 945–948.
Barrett, J. L. (2004). Why would anyone believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Barrett, J. L., & Lanman, J. A. (2008). The science of religious beliefs. Religion, 38, 109–224.
Benfey, O. T. (1958). August Kekulé and the birth of the structural theory of organic chemistry in 1858. Journal of Chemical Education, 35, 21–23.
Bering, J. M. (2002). Intuitive conceptions of dead agents’ minds: the natural foundations of afterlife beliefs as phenomenological boundary. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2, 263–308.
Bering, J. (2010). Atheism is only skin deep: Geertz and Markússon rely mistakenly on sociodemographic data as meaningful indicators of underlying cognition. Religion, 40, 166–168.
Bering, J. (2011). The God instinct: the psychology of souls, destiny, and the meaning of life. London, UK: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.
Bering, J. M., & Bjorklund, D. F. (2004). The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife is a developmental regularity. Developmental Psychology, 40, 217–233.
Bloom, P. (2004). Descartes’ baby: how the science of child development explains what makes us human. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Clark, K. J., & Barrett, J. L. (2011). Reidian religious epistemology and the cognitive science of religion. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 79, 639–675.
Craig, W. L. (1979). The kalām cosmological argument. London, UK: Macmillan.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York, NY: Penguin.
Edwards, D. (2010). How God acts: creation, redemption, and special divine action. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Fazio, R. H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: an overview. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 115–141.
Guthrie, S. E. (1993). Faces in the clouds: A new theory of religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Howard-Snyder, D., & Moser, P. K. (2001). Divine hiddenness: New essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hume, D. (2008). Dialogues and Natural history of religion. J. C. A. Gaskin, (Ed.), Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1757).
Kelemen, D. (2004). Are children ‘intuitive theists’?: reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psychological Science, 15, 295–301.
Kirkham, R. L. (1992). Theories of truth: A critical introduction. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Leech, D., & Visala, A. (2011a). The cognitive science of religion: a modified theist response. Religious Studies, 47, 301–316.
Leech, D., & Visala, A. (2011b). The cognitive science of religion: implications for theism? Zygon, 46, 47–64.
McCauley, R. N. (2011). Why religion is natural and science is not. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
McCauley, R. N., & Lawson, E. T. (2002). Bringing ritual to mind: Psychological foundations of cultural forms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Midgley, M. (2001). Science and poetry. London, UK: Routledge.
Murray, M. J., & Goldberg, A. (2009). Evolutionary accounts of religion: Explaining and explaining away. In J. Schloss & M. J. Murray (Eds.), The believing primate: Scientific, philosophical, and theological reflections on the origin of religion (pp. 179–199). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Norenzayan, A., & Hansen, I. G. (2006). Belief in supernatural agents in the face of death. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 174–187.
Norenzayan, A., & Shariff, A. (2008). The origin and evolution of religious prosociality. Science, 322, 58–62.
Oppy, G. (2006). Arguing about gods. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Peterson, M., Hasker, W., Reichenbach, B., & Basinger, D. (2003). Reason & religious belief: an introduction to the philosophy of religion (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Pyysiäinen, I. (2009). Supernatural agents: Why we believe in souls, gods, and Buddhas. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Reichenbach, H. (1938). On probability and induction. Philosophy of Science, 5, 21–45.
Swinburne, R. (1995). God. In T. Honderich (Ed.), The Oxford companion to philosophy (pp. 314-315). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2004). The existence of God (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Reed, G. M., Bower, J. E., & Gruenewald, T. L. (2000). Psychological resources, positive illusions, and health. American Psychologist, 55, 99–109.
Tremlin, T. (2006). Minds and gods: the cognitive foundations of religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Vail, K. E., III, Rothschild, Z. K., Weise, D. R., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2010). A terror management analysis of the psychological functions of religion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 84–94.
van Inwagen, P. (2009). Explaining belief in the supernatural: Some thoughts on Paul Bloom’s ‘Religious Belief as an Evolutionary Accident’. In J. Schloss & M. J. Murray (Eds.), The believing primate: Scientific, philosophical, and theological reflections on the origin of religion (pp. 128–138). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Wilkins, J., & Griffiths, P. (in press). Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains: fact, value, and religion. In G. Dawes & J. Maclaurin (Eds.), A New Science of Religion. New York, NY: Routledge.
Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, D. S., Dietrich, E., & Clark, A. B. (2003). On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology. Biology and Philosophy, 18, 669–682.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
An early version of this paper was presented to the Dept. of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand. I am grateful for their warm encouragement and critical comments.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jong, J. Explaining Religion (Away?). SOPHIA 52, 521–533 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0338-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0338-9