Abstract
Over the last decade, philosophers of education have begun taking a renewed interest in Rousseau’s educational thought. This is a welcome development as his ideas are rich with educational insights. His philosophy is not without its flaws, however. One significant flaw is his educational project for females, which is sexist in the highest degree. Rousseau argues that females should be taught to “please men…and make [men’s] lives agreeable and sweet.” The question becomes how could Rousseau make such strident claims, especially in light of his far more insightful ideas concerning the education of males. This paper attempts to make sense of Rousseau’s ideas on the education of females. While I maintain that Rousseau’s project for Sophie ought to be rejected, I argue that we should try to understand how this otherwise insightful thinker could make such surprising claims. Is it a bizarre inconsistency in his philosophical reasoning or an expression of his unabashed misogyny, as so many have claimed? I argue that it is neither. Rather, it is a product of his conception of human happiness and his belief in the irreducible role human sexual relations has in achieving and prolonging that happiness. For Rousseau, sex, love and happiness are inextricably connected, and he believes that men and women will be happiest when they inhabit certain sex roles—not because sex roles are valuable in themselves, but because only through them can either men or women hope to be happy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
While this has been the dominant view from Wolstonecraft through the late twentieth century, in the last 20 years there have been many important reassessments of Rousseau’s supposed misogyny. Some of the most compelling include Weiss (1993), Schaeffer (1998), Shell (2001), Rosenblatt (2002), all who argue cogently for non-misogynistic interpretations of Rousseau’s philosophy. And even though I disagree (below) with some of the specifics of Weiss’s and Schell’s interpretations, I agree with most of their reassessments.
For a repudiation of Rousseau’s sexual determinism see Weiss (1993, 54–74).
Other commentators have acknowledged the centrality of happiness in Rousseau’s thought (Salkever 1978, 27–45; Cooper 1999, 17–36; Todorov 2001; Reisert 2003, 114–121). Nevertheless, they neither adequately explicate the distinct senses of happiness in Rousseau’s thought, nor address the relationship between the sexes, especially regarding the role of conjugal love.
A few examples Rousseau’s texts include: Rousseau (1987, 150–151), Rousseau (2004, 96), Rousseau (1953, 246–47), Rousseau (1990b, c). For the debate regarding the significance of these passages in light of Rousseau’s seemingly inconsistent views regarding eudaimonia and happiness, see Masters (1968, 66–72), Cassirer (1989, 57–59), O’Hagan (2004, 73–85), Douglass (2010, 649–652).
See also Rousseau (1979, 314).
See also Reisert (2003, 118–119).
Schaeffer (1998) makes the interesting point that in some ways Sophie is actually given more autonomy with respect to the development of her reason regarding the degree to which Emile embodies the characteristics of an ideal husband. Sophie is given the opportunity to decide for herself regarding Emile’s virtues, whereas Emile is all but compelled to believe that Sophie is the ideal wife. As a consequence Sophie is, with respect to her evaluation of her lover, the more independent thinker. “Based on the way Rousseau conveys the details of the encounter, we cannot avoid the conclusion that [Emile’s] model woman is a more independent thinker than her model husband” (Schaeffer 1998, 615).
This does not mean, however, that Rousseau sees marriage as important only because it prevents debauchery; on the contrary, the even more important reason is that it offers “the supreme happiness of life” (Rousseau 1979, 327).
For a detailed discussion of the emotional and moral quality of happiness, see Salkever (1978, 32–41).
At this point, Emile has virtue in the first two senses outlined above: the consciousness of the “eternal law” and the desire to live in conformity with that law. However, he has not had to master countervailing passions and therefore is not virtuous in the complete sense.
Again, he has virtue only insofar as his reason apprehends the moral law and his conscience leads him to want to follow it. But he is not virtuous, because he has not learned to master countervailing passions.
For an in-depth analysis of the sexual behavior of the pre-civilized savages see Shell (2001, 279–285).
Naturally, the unfaithfulness of Sophie, and Emile’s abandonment of his family in Emile and Sophie; or the Solitaires, may lead to doubts about whether Rousseau was convinced that the marriage between Emile and Sophie was enough to protect their happiness and prevent them from licentiousness. Nevertheless, while it is true that their happiness is destroyed, it is not because of the failure of their sexual differentiation to provide sufficient warmth and desire. Sophie’s unfaithfulness was not a product of her ungoverned sexual desire for another person, but from a letting down of Emile’s guard regarding the third sense of happiness: namely the esteem of friends who share Emile and Sophie’s way of life and concern for virtue. Instead of remaining a rural family who is surrounded by individuals who share the values of hard work and simplicity, or finding a community governed by the Social Contract, Emile moves his family to Paris in order to provide Sophie with distractions which are supposed to help her get over her grief at losing her father, mother and daughter. Emile’s decision to move the family was based on an overweening sense of pity that should have motivated Emile to encourage Sophie to use her self-mastery to overcome her grief. Instead, he led her into the vicious world of city-life, which slowly wore away his and her moral resolve, so that they lost the ability to care about maintaining other aspects of their happiness. Thus, the marriage was destroyed not because sexual differentiation did not protect it, but because Emile lacked prudence. As Reisert (2003) correctly points out, what Emile was really lacking was “his tutor’s guidance” (143). (Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Friend of Virtue, 143), Interestingly, Emile himself anticipates this need better than his tutor does when he is dismayed that his tutor will leave him once he and Sophie were married (Rousseau, Emile, 480).
On the other hand, in Julie; or the New Heloise it is the lack of sexual differentiation and the sexual tension that prevents Julie from achieving happiness and ultimately causes her demise. Her love for Wolmar is rooted only in self-mastery and virtue, and is not unified with sexual and emotional desire. She is a divided self, her sexual and emotional passion is directed towards St. Preux, while her virtue and esteem is directed towards Wolmar.
Weiss, Gendered Community, 56.
Ibid, 50.
Salkever, “Rousseau and the Concept of Happiness,” 28.
J. J. Rousseau, On the Social Contract, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings, ed. D. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), 148. OC, III, 313.
References
Cassirer, Ernst. 1989. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Trans. Peter Gay. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Christenson, Ron. 1972. The political theory of male chauvinism: J. J. Rousseau’s paradigm. Midwest Quarterly 13: 291.
Compayre, Gabriel. 1921. Rousseau and Education from Nature. New York.
Cooper, Laurence. 1999. Rousseau, nature and the problem of the good life. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Dent, Nicholas. 2000. ‘Anger is a short madness’: Dealing with anger in Émile’s education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 34(2): 313–325.
Douglass, Robin. 2010. Free will and the problem of evil: Reconciling Rousseau’s divided thought. History of Political Thought, 31.
Fermon, Nicole. 1997. Domesticating passions, Chapter 3. Hanover: Dartmouth College Press.
Ferrara, Alessandro. 1992. Modernity and authenticity: A study of the social and ethical thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. New York: State University Press of New York.
Gilead, Tal. 2012. Rousseau, happiness, and the economic approach to education. Educational Theory 62(3): 267–285.
Hoagland, Sarah. 1978. On the reeducation of Sophie. In Women’s studies: An interdisciplinary collection, ed. K. Blumhagen, and D. Johnson. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Jonas, Mark. 2010. When teachers must let education hurt: Rousseau and Nietzsche on compassion and the educational value of suffering. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44(1): 45–60.
Keohane, Nannerl. 1979. But for her sex…: The domestication of Sophie. University of Ottawa Quarterly 49: 390.
Kleinau, Elke. 2012. Botany and the taming of female passion: Rousseau and contemporary educational concepts of young women. Studies in Philosophy and Education 31(5): 465–476.
Korsgaard, Ove. 2006. Giving the spirit a national form: From Rousseau’s advice to Poland to Habermas’ advice to the European Union. Educational Philosophy and Theory 38(2): 231–246.
Laverty, Megan J. 2011. Can you hear me now? Jean-Jacques Rousseau on listening education. Educational Theory 61(2): 155–169.
Lewis, Tyson E. 2012. Rousseau and the fable: Rethinking the fabulous nature of educational philosophy. Educational Theory 62(3): 323–341.
Lovlie, Lars. 2002. Rousseau’s insight. Studies in Philosophy and Education 21(4–5): 335–341.
Martin, Jane Roland. 1981. Sophie and Emile: A case study of sex bias in the history of educational thought. Harvard Educational Review 51: 357–372.
Masters, Roger. 1968. The political philosophy of Rousseau. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McEwan, Hunter. 2011. A portrait of the teacher as friend and artist: The example of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43(5): 508–520.
Michaud, Olivier. 2012. Thinking about the nature and role of authority in democratic education with Rousseau’s Emile. Educational Theory 62(3): 287–304.
Mintz, Avi. 2012. The happy and suffering student? Rousseau’s Emile and the path not taken in progressive educational thought. Educational Theory 62(3): 249–265.
Neuhouser, Frederick. 2010. Rousseau’s theodicy of self-love. Oxford.
O’Hagan, Timothy. 2004. Taking Rousseau seriously. History of Political Thought 24.
Osterwalder, Fritz. 2012. The modern religious language of education: Rousseau’s ‘Emile’. Studies in Philosophy and Education 31(5): 435–447.
Reisert, Jospeh. 2003. Jean-Jacques Rouseau: A friend of virtue. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Rosenblatt, Helena. 2002. On the “misogyny” of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The letter to d’Albert in historical context. French Historical Studies 25(1): 91–114.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1953. The Confessions. Trans. J.M. Cohen. London.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1979. Emile: Or on Education. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1987. Discourse on the origin and foundations of inequality among men. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The basic political writings, ed. D. Cress. Indianapolis.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1987. On the social contract. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The basic political writings, ed. D. Cress, Indianapolis.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1990a. Julie, or the New Heloise. In The collected works of Rousseau, ed. R. Masters, and C. Kelly. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1990b. Letter to Franquieres. In The collected works of Rousseau, ed. R. Masters, and C. Kelly. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 1990c. Rousseau: Judge of Jean-Jacques. In The collected works of Rousseau, ed. R. Masters, and C. Kelly. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 2004. Reveries of a solitary walker. London.
Salkever, Stephen. 1978. Rousseau and the concept of happiness. Polity 11(1): 27–45.
Schaeffer, Denise. 1998. Recondsidering the role of Sophie in Rousseau’s Emile. Polity 30(4): 607–626.
Schwartz, Joel. 1984. The sexual politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Chicago.
Shell, Susan Meld. 2001. Emile: Nature and the education of Sophie. In The Cambridge companion to Rousseau, ed. P. Riley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shuffelton, Amy B. 2012. Rousseau’s imaginary friend: Childhood, play, and suspicion of the imagination in Emile. Educational Theory 62(3): 305–321.
Szkudlarek, Tomasz. 2005. On nations and children: Rousseau, Poland and European. Identity, Studies in Philosophy and Education 24(1): 19–38.
Todorov, Tzvetan. 2001. Frail happiness: An essay on Rousseau. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press).
Tosato-Rigo, Danièle. 2012. In the shadow of ‘Emile’: Pedagogues, pediatricians, physical education, 1686–1762. Studies in Philosophy and Education 31(5): 449–463.
Tröhler, Daniel. 2012. Rousseau’s ‘Emile’. Studies in Philosophy and Education 31(5): 477–489.
Weiss, Penny. 1990. Sex, Freedom and Equality in Rousseau’s Emile. Polity 22(4): 603–609.
Weiss, Penny. 1993. Gendered community. New York: New York University Press.
White, Richard. 2008. Rousseau and the education of compassion. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42(1): 35–48.
Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1967. A vindication of the rights of woman. New York.
Yonah, Yossi. 1999. ‘Ubi Patria—Ibi Bene’: The scope and limits of Rousseau’s patriotic education. Studies in Philosophy and Education 18(6): 365–388.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Jonas, M.E. Rousseau on Sex-Roles, Education and Happiness. Stud Philos Educ 35, 145–161 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9472-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-015-9472-5