Abstract
The debate over moral bioenhancement has incrementally intensified since 2008, when Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas wrote two separate articles on the reasons why enhancing human moral capabilities and sensitivity through technological means was ethically desirable. In this article, we offer a critique of how Persson and Savulescu theorize about the possibility of moral bioenhancement, including the problem of weakness of will, which they see as a motivational challenge. First, we offer a working definition of moral bioenhancement and underscore some of the challenges in determining whether moral bioenhancement, as conceptualized by Persson and Savulescu, falls into the category of enhancement or constitutes a type of therapeutic intervention. Second, we provide a critical analysis of the way Persson and Savulescu pathologize human behavior in relation to what they see as the main threat to the survival of the human species: weak moral motivation. Next, we critique the claim that the use of genetic manipulation and drug treatment will increase moral motivation. We argue that Persson and Savulescu mischaracterize the nature of human moral psychology because moral motivation includes affective and cognitive dimensions. The type of interventions they envision focus almost exclusively on the former. In the final two sections, we outline three main criticisms of moral bioenhancement and offer a more robust account of moral psychology and moral development than what Persson and Savulescu recommend, through the lens of Aristotle’s work on virtue ethics. Ultimately, we argue that what Persson and Savulescu, and Douglas consider as moral bioenhancement is a misnomer because they do not fully account for the complexity of moral agency.
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Notes
On the distinction of oxytocin from “classical neurotransmitters,” see Bethlehem et al. (2013, p. 964).
The overall results concerning citalopram are, however, mixed. According to Kamarck et al. (2009, p. 184), the drug lowers hostility on the part of subjects “with initially elevated hostility scores,” as gauged by subjects’ self-assessments. Such a phenomenon is quite different from and may not lead to an augmentation of actively prosocial feelings and conduct. Further, per the findings of Crockett et al. (2010, p. 17436), citalopram heightens empathy “by boosting an already-present neural signal…rather than being the source of empathic responses.”
For discussion of biomedical enhancement within the normal range of human capacities, see Kahane and Savulescu (2015). The focus of their analysis is “forms of biomedical enhancement that are almost certainly feasible, and in fact likely to be available soon – the forms of enhancement that operate within the existing range of human capacities and dispositions. We call this normal range human enhancement” (p. 133).
The use of therapeutic language reflects the pathologizing of human behavior. Persson and Savulescu (2012, p. 107) state that “it is th[e] motivational internalization of moral doctrines that we think could be sped up by means which the scientific exploration of the genetic and neurobiological bases of our behaviour might put into our hands. We call moral enhancement by such means moral bioenhancement; possible examples of moral bioenhancement would be drug treatment and genetic engineering.”
For a critique of a neuroreductionistic approach to morality, see Jotterand (2016).
Emotion on its own can lead to behavior that is defective in various other ways, too: short-sighted from a prudential standpoint, as in giving well beyond one’s means due to a surge of pity; disproportionate to the impetus, for instance, rushing heedlessly into a burning building to rescue an important but replaceable item or becoming enraged and lashing out, rather than simply being disappointed, if someone else receives a prize that one had sought; escapism via, e.g., powerful nostalgia; and consumption by jealousy or envy, issuing in conduct that is destructive to oneself and others.
For this reason, Woodward declines to use “reason” and “cognition” interchangeably: on his account, both brain areas focused on reason and those devoted to “emotional processing…are doing ‘cognitive’ processing simply in virtue of doing information processing” (2016, p. 114n9).
For Aristotle’s bearing, by way of critique, on advocacy of vigorous cognitive enhancement, see Levin (2017).
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Jotterand, F., Levin, S.B. Moral Deficits, Moral Motivation and the Feasibility of Moral Bioenhancement. Topoi 38, 63–71 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9472-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9472-x