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Moral Realism and Teleosemantics

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Abstract

William Harms has argued that if human morality is the product ofnatural selection, moral realism will follow. The thesis that hethinks allows this bridge is teleosemantics. This argument ismistaken. Even granting both premises, forms of radical moralnon-realism remain viable, since the utterance of mistaken statements(or commands) may enhance reproductive fitness.

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Joyce, R. Moral Realism and Teleosemantics. Biology & Philosophy 16, 723–731 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012280429613

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