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The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem

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Abstract

This paper tries to show that Kim’s strategy of preventing the problem of generalization of mental causation is not successful and that his original supervenience argument can be applied to cases of nonmental macrolevel causation, with the effect that nonmental macroproperties which only supervene on, but are not identical with, configurations of microproperties turn out to be epiphenomenal after all.

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Schröder, J. The Supervenience Argument and the Generalization Problem. Erkenntnis 56, 319–328 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016335332339

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