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## THEOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL POETICS

**ABSTRACT:** The article deals with Heidegger's attitudes towards theology. Heidegger, stating that existential philosophy and theology are incompatible, advances a thesis of not objectivating poetic thinking. Whereas, Ricœur's biblical hermeneutics is based on his theory of metaphor. The lingual act here means the destruction of the old outlook for the sake of the new one. In this dramatic way cognition occurs as a meeting. The poetic thinking of the late Heidegger is also based on a meeting that covers both horizontal coexistence and vertical direction. The author raises the question whether the poetic thinking of the late Heidegger is not theological?

**KEY WORDS:** theology, existential philosophy, hermeneutics, and poetic thinking

### Preface

Theology is inseparable from exegesis of the Holy Writ. The New Testament itself, especially the Gospel of St. John, which is open to the Neo-Platonist tradition, identifies *logos* [word] with God. In this sense, the Holy Writ as God's word is accessible only by explaining it in a proper way. The proper explanation of the Holy Writ is the aim of theology, starting with Origen and Augustine. However, understanding is inseparable from the intellectual environment of the time and from the outlook that has formed within a particular society. This is how Bultman's and Tillich's existential theologies, influenced by Heidegger's concept of being there (*Dasein*) and being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*), appear in the twentieth century. Theology, as the hermeneutics of the Word, corresponds to the late Heidegger's concept of the lingual existence.

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However, Heidegger himself is inclined to separate phenomenology from theology as well as lingual *Dasein* from belief.

Similarly, philosophical poetics is lingual *par excellence*. Metaphor ruins the old world and opens the new one by emerging as *a seeing as* (Davidson), i.e. by reflecting a certain outlook. It seems that the Word appealing to Jesus Christ, similarly ruins the old and opens the new order. Where do philosophical poetics and hermeneutical theology intersect? According to Heidegger, if theology is just a conceptual basis of the Christian event, and if theological philosophy and phenomenological theology cannot exist, how can philosophical poetics be compared with theology, even if the latter is hermeneutical? Philosophical poetics could be developed by following the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the theory of metaphor of Ricœur. The first one is based on Heidegger's concept of worldly being and being-with (*Mitsein*). The second one is critical towards categorical thinking. Thus, two different questions arise: 1) can we explain the comparisons of the New Testament in a metaphorical way? 2) is it possible to separate a belief as *a seeing as* from a lingual point of view? They lead to a more general question: 3) can theology be existential, i.e. is its Christian content (positive, according to Heidegger) compatible with the worldly *Dasein*? I will develop these questions by searching for the interconnection between philosophical poetics and hermeneutical theology. In other words, theology will be taken into consideration as far as it is accessible to philosophical poetics as an openness to other (Ricœur, Gadamer), as a creative direction (Ricœur), and as a tragic meeting (Gadamer). Also, I will try to enrich philosophical poetics with some new features. Therefore, after an analysis of Heidegger's theological attitudes (chapter *Existential Philosophy and Theology*) I shall try not so much to analyse the thinking of Heidegger as to enrich philosophical poetics (chapter *Poetic Theology*).

## Existential Philosophy and Theology

While analysing the relation<sup>1</sup> between phenomenology and theology Heidegger notices that theology as a positive science differs from philosophy in all respects. What is a positive science and why is theology positive? Is being positive a scientific condition? If yes, does that mean

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<sup>1</sup>My analysis is based on Heidegger's lecture *Phenomenology and Theology* (*Phänomenologie und Theologie*), which appeared in 1927 and was supplemented in 1965. I shall not pay attention to the early lectures on religious philosophy: *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (1920/21), *Augustinus und der Neoplatonismus* (1921), *Die philosophische Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik* (1918/19).

that theology is more scientific than philosophy? Is the difference between philosophy and theology based on the different scientific level?

According to Heidegger, theology is related to the history of Christianity, it "belongs to this history of Christianity, it is upheld by it, and it forms it once again" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 51). The relation between theology and Christianity is mutual, they influence each other, and both develop on the basis of one another. However, the history of Christianity as a part of the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaft*) oversteps the boundaries of the conceptual science by influencing the culture (religious art) in a narrow sense as well as in a broad sense (religious outlook). Analysing the religious metaphor (chapter *Poetic Theology*) I will try to develop it considering the negative aspects of culture: does the religious metaphor reflect the religious structure of the culture? If yes, does it avoid the negative cultural relations?

Heidegger agrees that theology belongs not only to Christianity, as a historical phenomenon, but is related to the common culture (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52). However, he does not develop Christian cultural studies any further. He is interested in theology as far as it is nourished by and nourishes Christianity, as the primary historical event, in a conceptual way. Theology as such is a positive discipline. Its positive (being in front-*vorliegende*) content is Christianity. The relation of philosophy and Christianity is different: Christianity is not the only content or basis of philosophy, and also philosophy does not nourish Christianity. What nourishes Christianity? Heidegger answers: belief.<sup>2</sup> What is belief? Is it *a seeing as*, i.e. a certain outlook influencing and being influenced by a life art? Heidegger claims this: "belief is a mode of human *Dasein*" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52). However, belief is not temporal, not based on *Dasein*. It is manifested by the matter of faith-by Christ, the crucified God. Thus, even if it is *a seeing as* or "the mode of existence," according to Heidegger, it is not nourished by temporal *Dasein* and does not spread out freely (*ausfreienStücken*). Belief, conversely to thinking, is based on witnessing the Christian event dedicated to its participants-to the believers, the participants of the revelation. One has to believe in order to take part in the event of Christianity. Belief allows this event to occur again and again. This characterises the existential sense of belief: belief is a revival (*Wiedergeburt*). In this way belief as a mode of existence involves its participants in coexistence for the revival via a historical dimension (Christian event). In other words, it is a historical existence of the revival for the revelation. This belief is the content of theology. It has been

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<sup>2</sup> "Christlich nennen wir den Glauben" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52).

thought about and discussed by theology. Does this “positiveness” of theology mean it is scientific in character? What are the criteria of being scientific? Does a different degree of being scientific distinguish theology from philosophy?

On the contrary, after emphasising the fact that theology and philosophy are incompatible, Heidegger claims that they can be compared only as sciences. Does that mean that those two disciplines are conceptual ones? By questioning the limits of the scientific character of theology Heidegger raises another question: How far can the very specific requirements of belief based on conceptual penetration (*Durchsichtigkeit*) reach or can reach and still remain part of the belief (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 60)? Here the German philosopher is interested not only in the scientific criteria for conceptual rigour. However, the conceptuality of theology arises out of itself. As such it is a conceptual self-interpretation of existence in belief (*begriffliche-Selbstinterpretation der gläubigen Existenz*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 56) and a closed whole of the basic concepts. Does the scientific character imply an explanation of the concepts by the concepts, i.e. thinking in a circle? Heidegger’s criticism towards science is based not only on this irony. It is directed to theology as well as to philosophy and the natural sciences.

Heidegger verifies the scientific character of theology not according to its degree of conceptuality. Despite being the science of God (*Wissenschaft vom Gott*) theology is not a speculative cognition of God (*Gotteserkenntnis*). Also, it is not a discipline of the relationship of God and man or a discipline of the religious experience. As science theology is directed to an entity (*Seiende*) according to requirements of its basic concepts. So, theology as philosophy can be described as an ontic explanation based on ontology. Therefore for Heidegger scientific character is inseparable from ontological relations, from direction to an existential dimension. In this sense, viewing of natural science and technology, attempting to objectivise language and thinking, is not only dangerous because of creating an illusion that it is possible. It creates an aggressive simulacrum culture directed against the very human. I will not analyse here to what extent this aspiration to objectivise is a closed self-interpretation based on belief. Moreover, in Heidegger’s context, this viewing is not scientific because it does not have an ontological dimension. Theology, in contrast to natural science, has this dimension. All that is comparable between theology and philosophy is their relation to *Dasein*, to the human temporal being. What is the existential dimension of theology and why is it difficult to reconcile with the philosophical *Dasein*? As mentioned, the basic concepts of theology

appeal to belief and the event of revival. According to Heidegger, pre-Christian existence is overcome by belief, even if it is done in an existential ontic way (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 63). What does it mean to “overcome existence?” How is it possible to overcome existence in an existential way?

I will come back to these questions after looking at the absolute metaphors of Blumenberg. While questioning to what extent metaphors are legitimate in the philosophical language, Blumenberg claims that they are possible reminders “in the way from *mytosto logos*” (*ParadigmenzueinerMetaphorologie* 10). However, he notices that they lead to rethinking of the relation between fiction<sup>3</sup> and thought (*logos*): the absolute metaphors act as a catalyst of thought by nourishing the conceptual sphere. This “basic component” (*fundierende Bestandteil*) becomes a model of reflection and a key principle of ideas. Finally, they enable one to reach God’s cognition, which can only be symbolic. Such absolute metaphors as “a naked (*nackte*) truth,” “a light,” “the book of nature,” “a cosmic mechanism” feed “the questions, which are unanswerable in principle and which are important just for they are irremovable: we do not raise these questions but we pre-find (*vorfinden*) them raised as the base of *Dasein*” (*ParadigmenzueinerMetaphorologie* 23). In other words, these are the world-viewing components, which influence the human attitudes, aspirations, actions, interests during a certain epoch. They structure the human world covering a question that is inaccessible for theoretical discourse: “what is the world”? By filling the lacunae of theoretical discourse, absolute metaphors reflect the human way of thinking in a certain epoch and herewith they weave a cultural dress of the epoch.

Back to the Heidegger’s basic theological concepts. To overcome, according to Heidegger, is not to push away but to cover anew (*in neue Verfügungnehmen*). The basic concepts of theology overcome the pre-Christian existence by “raising it in an ontic way”, by preserving the dimensions of pre-believing (*vorgläubige*) and not believing (*ungläubige*) as the self-understanding of human *Dasein*. As *Dasein* is inseparable from being-with (*Mitsein*) and being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*), the concepts of theology, covering all these dimensions, correspond to the Blumenberg’s absolute metaphors. The concept of resurrection (according to Heidegger, revival–*Wiedergeburt*) as well as the concept of guilt by involving the believers into a new coexistence of belief “is the primary ontological and *existentiell* defining of *Dasein*

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<sup>3</sup> For more about the relationship between fiction, reality and thought see (*Tikrovèirküryba*).

(*Existenzbestimmung*)" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 64). The basic concepts of theology nourish the existential questions. Therefore Heidegger claims that theology is not "a speculative knowing of God." Also, it is not "a science of God and man in general" because the relations of *Dasein* are not to be objectivated. These are the relations of humans in the world and their coexistence with others. That is why it is neither "a discipline of religious experiences" which includes only the relationship between God and a man (woman). Theology based on its basic concepts has been developed as the history of the human existence in the world. As the temporal coexistence it nourishes the cultural process. In this way the basic concept of "sin," even if it is valid only in the community of believers, binds it with relations of worldly coexistence by constituting the certain cultural relations, by becoming, according to Blumenberg, a fig-leaf—the first cultural document, with the help of which it is possible not only to hide but to dress as well. Blumenberg ironically notes that, from time to time, truth uses culture as a dress for changing. Similarly, Gadamer while defining the main law of the theory of understanding—the horizon of hermeneutics—uses an example of dressing. He claims that dressing has been used to hinder recognition of the actor.

Who dressed like a Spanish officer of the sixteenth century and, moving around on a raft on his way to the mythical El Dorado, said: "I am the wrath of God"?<sup>4</sup> Was it the actor Klaus Kinski? If yes, what is all this masquerade for? What is this hide-and-seek of truth in art for? According to Gadamer, recognition momentarily occurs in a work of art, however, there is also the non recognition of an actor under the clothing of some hero. It is not the recognition of truth in the masquerade of culture. In this sense, the title of the work *Truth and Method* is very ironic, too. The spectator recognises something that has already quasi happened to him. However, at the same time he forgets himself. A spectator perceives this film of Herzog's as a story of getting lonely while the raft is floating to nowhere on the river of an unknown land, the storm of spears is thinning the ranks of his fellow-travellers and the music of an Indian's whistle is getting weaker. All this becomes a vision of a flying ship together with the sallies of anger, madness and genius. It does not mean that the actor Klaus Kinski is recognised here. If this recognition happened, a spectator would leave the cinema immediately. Conversely, the spectator has been drawn into the film more and more, he quasi forgets himself, and at the same time he recognises his own story of becoming lonely, and assumes the clothing offered by the film's author.

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<sup>4</sup> From Herzog's film *Aguirre, the Wrath of God*.

This is the way in which the meeting between the spectator (or the reader) and the author occurs, presupposing the understanding of an art work. Therefore Gadamer states that hermeneutics is a matter of meeting always open to other interpretations. This coexistence in the world enables the fusion of horizons and understanding in general. Gadamer means not only the fact that the theory of understanding has been developed on the basis of the perception of the art work but also that truth is to be accessed only as the creative robe of an art work. There is no direct way—a tunnel of light—to the truth. Herewith temporal existence with Other and for Other enables the consideration of the cultural robe as a condition of understanding instead of an obstacle in the way of truth's knowledge.

Back to Heidegger. Similarly, the basic concepts of theology, as far as they cover the ontological dimension and express *Dasein*, reflect the human temporal coexistence in the world. For Heidegger ontology is not an anatomy of pure existence, not a straight way to its "scientific" truth. Ontology as such should be an objectivating science, a direction. Meanwhile, ontology for Heidegger is a correction. What and how does it correct? Heidegger develops being as coexistence of *Dasein* in the world. This is his long way of ontology, which considers ontology not as direction, i.e. not as a straight and objective (in a double sense: directed towards an object and objectivating) direction but as correction that is based on an existential conception and enables human culture. According to Ricœur, metaphor, as a conscious categorical error, by distancing one from an object, brings together its author with the reader and opens the way to a new understanding of both the piece of art and of oneself (Ricœur, *La métaphore vive* 1975). Metaphors (not only absolute ones), as basic concepts of theology, reflect human perspectives, way of thinking, and mode of life.

Theology, as it seeks to be the thinking of God or a science of the relation between God and man, is being corrected by its own basic ontological concepts. It is not possible to eliminate the existential content in these concepts by not eliminating them. Therefore Heidegger claims that theology as well as philosophy is "not objectivating thinking and speaking" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 69). However, theology is like this because of the existential content of the basic concepts. In this way, when ontology corrects theology, philosophy closes with theology. But theology is distanced from philosophy as far as the former needs the correction. They are separated by the *existentiell* contradiction between believing (*Gläubigkeit*) and a free taking (*Selbstübernahme*) of *Dasein* (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 66). Although the existential region nourishes both the basic concepts of

theology and the conception of *Dasein*, it has been developed freely in philosophy, while in theology—by the directing of belief. This allows for Heidegger to state elsewhere that “philosophy decides neither for nor against the divine *Dasein*” (*Phänomenologie und Theologie* 36). Theology remains a closed exploration of sanctity if it is not lightened in the clearing of human *Dasein*. On the contrary, philosophy spreads freely as an openness of *Dasein* to another human being in the world. Theology seeks to go on the straightest way of the exploration of God. However, all that forces it to make a detour, that hinders the pure relation between God and a man (woman), that hinders theology’s becoming an objective (positive) discipline, is worldly (*existentiell*) content of the theological basic concepts. This content, actually, closes theology with philosophy.

Sartre understands the presuppositions of the existential philosophy similarly: a man (woman) enters the world first of all and only then solves questions, including theological ones. According to Sartre, existentialism treats man (woman) as a free entity whose choices constantly constitute himself (herself). Here lay both his (her) creative power (to create morality) and immense responsibility. Sartre claims that existential philosophy is atheistic not because it denies the existence of God. In doing so, it would have become, in Heidegger’s words, a positive (objectivating) science. In this sense it would be similar to theology. Existentialism supposes: “if God existed, nothing would change” (*L’existentialisme est un humanisme* 95). In other words, a man (woman) would still constitute himself (herself) with the help of worldly coexistence (Heidegger) and of free choice (Sartre). It is human misery while he (she) is not lord of his (her) being, herewith it is his (her) richness while he (she) leads his (her) *Dasein*.

If theology and existential philosophy can hardly be harmonized, if the former is a closed interpretation of its concepts and the latter is an open direction into the world and other human *Dasein*, if the former is concerned with its purely positive content and the latter adopts a non-objectivating attitude, if the former is based on belief, while the latter—on choice, if the former is a straight-lined attempt to understand God while the latter is a cultural detour, if all that unites them are undesirable relics of the former, is existential theology then possible? What is the relationship between the existential theology and hermeneutic theology as the existential interpretation of God’s word?

I will return to this question after a close look at Heidegger’s poetic objectives proposed in the supplement to his article *Phenomenology and Theology*, which was added after 37 years. In his criticism of the scientific and technological way of thinking, Heidegger notes that not all forms of thinking may be treated as objectivating. The purple of a rose in the

garden and the sway of roses in the wind are neither thought of, nor pronounced in, objectivating way. Although the statue of Apollo in a museum may be an object of natural-scientific viewing, this thinking and speaking do not see in the way it emerges and appears in its beauty as God's vision (*Anblick*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 74). The chemical examination of the statue marble would be similar to the recognizing of actors in the film *Aguirre: Wrath of God*. A spectator, however, recognizes not the dressed actor Klaus Kinski, but his own state embodied by the actor. In this way he (she) meets coexistence (Heidegger) of the film's authors by merging his (her) open worldview with their hermeneutical horizon (Gadamer). In this sense an art piece is a directed showing of that which appears for a spectator as his (her) ownership. Thinking, according to Heidegger, is a stay next to that which appears and herewith conformity (*Entsprechen*) with that, which shows itself (*sich zeigt*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 75). He adds here that poetry is not available for objectivating speaking. Now let us ask what is the meaning of 'God's vision' that presupposes the appearance of the truth of an art work? It is metaphor without any doubt. But why was a theological metaphor given here? Is literature about the relationship between theology and existential philosophy an appropriate context to discuss philosophical poetics?

### Poetic Theology

The examples of the purple of a rose in the garden and the statue of Apollo, as well the metaphor of 'God's sight', indicate the pattern of the late Heidegger's thinking. The question arises here whether theological aspects lay in the thinking of the late Heidegger. This leads to another question—what is the relationship between existential philosophy and hermeneutical theology? Being unable to cover all the works of the late Heidegger, I shall appeal here to his two works: *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* and *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit*. Herewith, I shall deal with two texts by Ricœur's devoted to biblical hermeneutics (*Stellung und Funktion der Metapher; Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik*), in which the author further develops his theory of metaphor proposed in *La métaphore vive*.

In his project of hermeneutical theology, Ricœur interprets the simile as a narrative metaphor. As a kind of interpretation of the New Testament, theology deals with such poetical forms of narrative as metaphor and simile. Elsewhere he mentions "theology of word" as inseparable from "event of a word". To interpret in the light of belief

means to “unfold in front of the text the way of being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*)” (Ricœur, *Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik* 32). In which ways does the interpreted Biblical metaphor 1) transfer us beyond the text into human being in the world, 2) how does it support or even constitute belief in the supernatural being? The first question I analysed in other contexts (Kačerauskas, *Tikrovėirkūryba*), while the second was raised in a different form by Heidegger. For him, belief, as a positive content of theology, is not allowed to unfold freely for *Dasein* that tends towards “self-expression” (*Sichsagenlassen*). This idea, which was expressed in the supplement to his article *Phenomenology and Theology*, may be perceived as a project of his late philosophy. Are the ideas expressed in the end of his lecture, concerning the difference of existential philosophy and theology, a further search for *Dasein*’s development, in other words, an auxiliary theme? Or, on the contrary, is the poetical development of *Dasein* by interpreting poetical language, for him, a project of reconciling theology and existential philosophy?

Elsewhere (Kačerauskas, *Filosofinėpoetika*) I analysed Ricœur’s theory of metaphor. He raises the extra-linguistic aspects of this poetic trope-visual (iconic), ethical and ontological. In the theological context, by understanding the Christian metaphors, these aspects require a new reasoning because in addition to human *Dasein*’s horizon, there appears a vertical strand of belief. According to Ricœur, we have a case of ‘conflict of interpretations’: where should one direct the metaphors of the New Testament—to the horizon of human temporal coexistence or to the vertical of the relationship with God? How does Ricœur solve this problem?

Ricœur sharpens the problem even more by treating The Bible as a text. As a text it is 1) a closed compositional whole that 2) is encoded to a certain genre and composition, 3) being original and having its own style. In other words, a text is a closed original world, which ignores and contradicts not only reality, but also its author. If the Word is a closed text, neither a horizontal, nor a vertical direction of understanding it is possible. In the first case, it would contradict the human world, in the second—its Divine author. In which way could the closed nature of the text be overcome? How could both the human world and ‘God’s Kingdom’ be constituted by the same text?

Ricœur applies the theory of metaphor as extravagancy of narration. Metaphor and narration belong to different levels: if the first is a structure of words, the second is a structure of sentences; if the first is not temporal, the second is temporal; if the first is a poetic figure, the second is a prosaic one. How does Ricœur cover both of them with one theory? Metaphor as a tension between usual and new attitudes towards reality

emerges as a linguistic event for him. Although it occurs in a moment, being similar to Gadamer's recognition, it is a dramatic process. Metaphor, as a strategy of absurdity, works by destroying the primary reference of the text. However, on these ruins (on a different level) the self-understanding of a reader develops as a new attitude towards the world. That is why it is an event stimulated by recognition. It is a dramatic (tense) process: only after the collapse of the old worldview does a new one form. The inner change of a hero is influenced by tragedy as the sudden crash (in a moment) of unexpected events. Here the understanding is tragic as well, since it requires self-destruction: "I, the reader, find myself through losing the self" (*Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik* 33). This is, however, a generous self-losing. It allows the reader to constitute him/herself, while reading the text. The poetic language and the use of metaphor creates a dramatic moment for a reader.

Now let us consider how the late Heidegger reads a poetic text. While interpreting Hölderlin, he notices: "where there is language, there is the world" (Heidegger, *Erläuterung zu Hölderlins Dichtung* 38). Language is for him also an event, which exceeds most human opportunities. Thinking occurs via language for him. Elsewhere Heidegger speaks about human essence as acquiescence (*Gelassenheit*) for meeting while he connects it with the truth. Here, differently than in *Phenomenology and theology* and *Being and time*, we deal with poetical thinking inseparable from ontological aspirations. By interpreting Hölderlin Heidegger uses another metaphor, "collection (*Mitt*) of destiny." Therefore poetical thinking defined by metaphors is open, end-less, as opposed to technological (positive) thinking. As such it is hard to define. Heidegger maintains that remaining has no name. For Heidegger God appears as being hidden. Similarly, poetical word "allows the appearance of the connection between God and Man" (Heidegger, *Erläuterung zu Hölderlins Dichtung* 69). In this way poetical thinking appears to us as "the horizon of transcendence." "Meeting covers us and appears for us as the horizon" (Heidegger, *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit* 55). Poetical reasoning of *Dasein* provides both the connection with God and the closeness of things. That is why the human essence for the late Heidegger is meeting.

The late Heidegger, in contrast to Ricœur, does not offer a theory of metaphor. He interprets poetic texts and the question of human *Dasein*. Poetic thinking for Ricœur; 1) opens generously human *Dasein* via 2) a linguistic event that 3) occurs while meeting with the Other. As we have seen, the metaphor for Ricœur is a dramatic event of meeting which opens for its interpreter a new world-view, i.e. a new being in the world.

Heidegger's detour is not theology, however poetical thinking means meeting that 1) opens a vertical dimension of *Dasein* and herewith 2) focuses on "God and man's connection." Is Heidegger's philosophical poetics theological?

### Conclusions

According to Heidegger, philosophy and theology are incompatible. Philosophy is directed to free the development of human coexistence in the world while theology is based on belief and must obey this "positive" direction. Theology is connected with philosophy by the existential dimension of its basic concepts. In this way ontology corrects the positive content of theology. Herewith it shows Heidegger's aim to develop ontology, while ontology is to be understood not as direction, i.e. a straight way of the exploration of being. This aim is confirmed by the supplement to the article *Phenomenology and Philosophy*, where he gives the examples of the purple of a rose in the garden and of a statue of Apollo, as well the metaphor of 'God's sight'. All this has been contrasted with "objectivating" natural sciences and positive theology. For Ricœur, metaphor emerges also as an event. It is the tension between the usual and new attitudes towards reality, the destruction of the text's primary reference. However, on these ruins the reader's self-understanding as a new viewing of the world takes place. Such dramatic self-destruction leads to new self-constitution. The same process takes place with metaphors of "God's sight." For the late Heidegger poetic metaphorical thinking contrary to the technological (positive) one is endless. The interpretation of poetic texts as a detour closes the question of human *Dasein*. For him, poetic thinking means a linguistic event, the meeting of the Other. This event opens a vertical dimension of *Dasein* and focuses on the connection of God and Man.

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