Abstract
Ever since Hegel famously objected to Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative on the grounds that they are nothing but an empty formalism, there has been continual debate about whether he was right. In this paper I argue that Hegel got things at least half-right: I argue that even if negative duties can be derived from the universalization formulations, positive duties cannot. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I set out the procedures generally accepted among Kantians for deriving positive duties from the universalization formulations. In the second, I set out the arguments from section 1 in more detail and explain why they do not work. In the third, I examine a strategy that might be used to supplement the arguments from section 2 and I argue that it goes the same way.
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Notes
GMS, AA 04: 402.07–09, emphasis omitted.
GMS, AA 04: 421.18–20, emphasis omitted.
GMS, AA 04: 424.03–10, emphasis omitted. Note that, strictly speaking, these remarks apply only to the second formulation, the law of nature formulation of the CI.
The quotations in this sentence are taken from GMS, AA 04: 424.10–11. For Kant’s remarks about perfect and imperfect duty, see GMS, AA 04: 421n. The context makes the intended equivalence clear (Kant also seems to take this distinction to be equivalent to another one, the distinction between owed duties and duties of love (mentioned at GMS, AA 04: 430n)).
These two maxims are, as readers of Kant immediately will recognize, taken from the second and fourth examples he uses to illustrate how the law of nature formulation is supposed to work (GMS, AA 04: 429.15–430.27). The first and third examples involve duties to oneself rather than duties to others (the duty not to commit suicide from self-love and the duty to promote one’s natural talents).
As with the CC/CW terminology, I believe that the universalized typified counterpart terminology first was introduced by (O’Neill, 2013, 141ff).
Ever since (Korsgaard, 1985; reprinted as chapter 3 of Korsgaard, 1996) it has been conventional to divide interpretations of the universalization formulations into three main kinds: the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation, and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. I ignore the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation in the main text above because very few commentators seem to think it is philosophically viable (they reject the teleological understanding of laws of nature on which it builds).
This opens up the possibility for maxims that fail the Practical Contradiction Interpretation of the CC test but do not fail the Logical Contradiction Interpretation of the CC test.
(Rawls, 2000, 173–175; see also chapter V section 6).
According to Seymour, “our true needs are defined by those goods which are necessary just to find satisfaction in living…[so] we can allow that our true needs include many things including health, financial and physical security, rest, recreation, freedom, privacy, and social relationships” (Seymour, 2007, 91).
For a critical survey of five commentators’ recent (all published within the last 10 years) such attempts see (Kahn, 2019).
(Herman, 2007, 255). Along the same lines, Korsgaard asserts that “in the sort of theory I am defending, responsibility in general is going to look a lot more like responsibility for omission” (Korsgaard, 2009, 175). If there is only responsibility for omission (no responsibility for commission) and if there are no positive duties (no duties of commission), then no agent ever will be responsible for failing to fulfill a duty.
GMS, AA 04: 424.15–20, my emphasis. See also GMS, AA 04: 420.08–11.
MS, AA 06: 221.25–28, my emphasis.
MS, AA 06: 452.16–22, at 18 my emphasis. Gregor translates Gegentheil as “contrary” rather than “opposite” in this passage. I think that this is mistaken (see note 26 and note 27 below).
(Paton, 1947, 142).
(Korsgaard, 1996, 63). Korsgaard repeats this in subsequent chapters of the same book (originally published as separate articles) and in two subsequent books: “
Using this formulation we discover that a maxim must be regarded as a law by discovering that the opposite maxim—the maxim of not doing the action in question—cannot be regarded as a law” (Korsgaard, 2008, 184); “
A maxim is fit to be a law...[in] the sense corresponding to obligation, if it not only can but must be a law. The way we ascertain this is by showing that the maxim of doing the opposite is unfit to be a law, and must be rejected” (Korsgaard, 2009, 16).
(Kim, 2015, 160). It should be noted that, in the passage from which the quotations above are excerpted, Kim equates “morally worthy” with “morally obligatory.” This equation is idiosyncratic and threatens to complicate matters, so I have left it out of the main text. The full passage is as follows: “
This considerations suggests that one can define the predicates “morally worth” (or “morally obligatory”), “morally unworthy” (or “morally forbidden”) and “morally neutral” (“morally permissible”) in terms of the universalizability of maxims. A maxim is morally worthy if and only if it is universalizable, but its opposite is not. For example, this is the case with respect to the maxim of rejecting false promising. A maxim is morally unworthy if and only if it is not universalizable, but its opposite is, e.g., stealing someone else’s property.
Finally, a maxim is morally neutral if and only if both it and its opposite are universalizable.”
Kant thinks that an action is morally worthy only if it is performed from duty, and (absent faulty beliefs or faulty wiring) an action can be performed from duty only if it is obligatory. So if an action is morally worthy (as Kant uses the term), then it is obligatory. But the converse of this is false: obligatory actions can be performed from motives other than duty. So Kim’s equation of these two categories is mistaken.
(Stohr, 2011, 50).
(Harrison, 1957, 52).
(Guyer, 2007, 143). However in an earlier publication Guyer adopts what I am going to call the maxim-contrary derivation: “if I must reject the maxims of letting all my talents rust or never helping anyone else, then I must accept their logical contraries, namely, maxims of cultivating at least some of my talents and helping at least some other people some of the time” (Guyer, 2006, 194).
(Stratton-Lake, 2000, 88).
Textual support for this interpretation comes from Kant’s parenthetical glosses of opposite (Gegentheil) as “contradictorie” (for example, MS, AA 06: 384.05–10, at 06: “contradictorie oppositum”; and Anth, AA 07: 230.13–19, at 17–18: “contradictorie s. logice oppositum”).
It is notable that, in addition to speaking of the Gegentheil of duty, Kant also speaks of the Widerspiel of duty. For example, he says that making the principle of one’s own happiness the determining ground of the will is “Das gerade Widerspiel” of the principle of morality (KpV, AA 05: 035.07–08, at 07); that “Das Widerspiel” of preserving one’s animal nature is willful physical death (MS, AA 06: 421.10–14, at 13); that lying is “das Widerspiel” of truthfulness (MS, AA 06: 429.04–07, at 06); and that wishing ill upon others and rejoicing when ills befall them is “das gerade Widerspiel” of neighborly love (MS, AA 06: 460.07–11, at 10).
Moreover, when Kant glosses Gegentheil as “contradictorie” (see note 26 above) he glosses Widerspiel as “contrarie.” So I think the maxim-contrary derivation’s Kantian pedigree is secure.
I note in passing that Gregor translates “Widerspiel” as “opposite” at MS, AA 06: 460.10, a translation which, in view of the foregoing, I think is misleading (see note 16 and note 26 above).
(Hernandez, 2010, 403).
(O’Neill, 2013, 166).
(O’Neill, 2013, 183).
(Freyenhagen, 2012, 56).
O’Neill defines the concept of a maxim contrary slightly differently. She says that two maxims are contraries if but only if their universalized typified counterparts are contraries (O’Neill, 2013, 162n25).
The possibility of ending someone’s deliberation by (e.g.) a blow to the head is not relevant in this context.
I adapt this example from a similar one in (Yaffe, 1999).
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Kahn, S. Why Positive Duties cannot Be Derived from Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. Philosophia 50, 1189–1206 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00429-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00429-0