This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
The hardest aspect of the illusion problem – and how to solve it
François Kammerer – Université Paris-Sorbonne
Abstract:
I Illusio is as a Theo of Co s ious ess , Keith F a kish a gues fo illusio is : the thesis
that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Illusionism, he says,
epla es the ha d p o le
ith the illusio p o le – the problem of explaining how the illusion of
phe o e alit a ises a d h it is so po e ful .
The illusion of phenomenality is indeed quite powerful. In fact, it is much more powerful than
any other illusion, in the sense that we face a very special and unique intuitive resistance when trying
to accept that phenomenality is an illusion. This is bad news for illusionists, because this means that
they cannot entirely model their explanation of the illusion of consciousness on the explanation of
other illusions. Explaining this unique intuitive resistance to illusionism may therefore constitute the
hardest aspect of the illusion problem.
However, I think that this aspect of the problem is solvable. I will outline a possible solution,
which is based on the hypothesis that our (illusory) introspective representations of phenomenal
states characterize them as having unique epistemological properties and as playing a special
epistemological role.
Introduction:
I Illusio is as a Theo of Co s ious ess , Keith F a kish argues that phenomenal
consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. I will not try to criticize his arguments here,
as I am quite convinced that some kind of illusionism must be true regarding phenomenal
consciousness. What I want to do is to examine what I take to be the most difficult challenge for
illusio ist theo ies of o s ious ess, hi h does ot e ei e a pa ti ula atte tio i F a kish’s
paper. I will explain why I think current illusionist theories of consciousness fail to meet this
challenge, and I will outline a possible solution to this problem.
1. The hardest aspect of the illusion problem
Proponents of illusionism, says Keith Frankish, replace the hard problem of consciousness
with the illusion problem (Frankish, this issue, p. 26). Instead of having to explain how and why
phenomenal consciousness arises from the physical, they only have to explain why it seems to us that
phenomenal consciousness exists, while it does not. They also have to explain why this illusion is so
powerful.
While this problem may be much more tractable than the original hard problem of
o s ious ess, I thi k that this p o le has a ha d aspe t hi h does ot e ei e a lot of atte tio
i F a kish’s pape , a d o e ge e all i the o k of p opo e ts of illusionism. This aspect consists
in the explanation of the following fact: the illusion of phenomenality is not only very powerful. It is,
in fact, much more powerful than any other illusion. It is powerful in a very distinctive way, as we face
a unique intuitive resistance when we try to accept the illusory nature of phenomenality.
Indeed, denying the existence of phenomenal states does seem crazy to many. Chalmers
writes that, in doing so, o e de ies the e ide e of ou o e pe ie e. This is the so t of thing that
can o l e do e a philosophe Chal e s,
, p.
. “ea le ites a out De ett’s
illusio is that it de ies the e iste e of the data ; a d he o es lose to alli g this ki d of
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
positio i sa e: su el o sa e pe so ould de the e iste e of feeli gs “ea le,
. Othe
examples of such statements abound.1 And anyone can easily feel the strangeness of illusionism
si pl
fo usi g o he o e pe ie e. Let’s sa that ou a e ha i g a e pe ie e of a ed ose.
Focus on you e pe ie e, a d the t to thi k: I a
ot eall ha i g a e pe ie e e do ed ith
the ualitati e feel it see s to ha e. This is si pl a illusio . Cha es a e that ou ill fi d this idea
deeply puzzling and even hard to make sense of, even if you embrace illusionism from a theoretical
point of view.
I think that this very strong intuitive resistance to illusionism has to be explained by illusionist
theories. After all, the fact that we are so strongly reluctant to give up our belief in phenomenality
characterizes the peculiar way in which we are subjected to the illusion of phenomenality. This
intuitive resistance to illusionism is therefore a part of the explanandum of illusionist theories.
Moreover, this strong intuitive resistance to illusionism, and the fact that it seems crazy, is probably
the main reason why illusionism gained so little support amongst philosophers of mind, in spite of its
numerous theoretical advantages. Explaining this strong intuitive resistance within an illusionist
framework would therefore be useful for illusionists, as it would give them some dialectical leverage
he fa ed ith a usatio of azi ess. It is t ue that ou theo see s az , ut it e plai s e
simply and naturally many things, including the very fact that it see s az .2 The problem is that, as
I will try to show, explaining this strong intuitive resistance is not easy, but quite hard. It is, in fact,
the hardest aspect of the illusion problem.
2. Why is this aspect the hardest aspect of the illusion problem?
Many proponents of illusionism, I think, would begin by saying that illusionist theories can
already explain this intuitive resistance to illusionism in a rather natural way. They would draw a
parallel with perceptual illusions. The illusion of phenomenality may arise because of some hardwired features of our introspective device, in such a way that this illusion has some degree of
cognitive impenetrability (Frankish, this issue, p. 7). It persists even in the face of opposite beliefs.
That could explain why, even if we are convinced illusionists, our intuition still pulls us away from
illusionism. Similarly, in the Müller-Lyer illusion, we are still intuitively tempted to judge that the two
lines have different lengths, even when we believe that they do not.
However, I think that the cases are very different on closer examination. The intuitive resistance
we face when we try to think that consciousness is an illusion is special, sui generis. It cannot simply
be explained by the fact that we have an on-going, perceptual-like, cognitively impenetrable
disposition to believe that we are conscious. Therefore, it cannot be explained simply by following
the model of the explanation of perceptual illusions.
The difference amounts to this: What makes us reluctant to accept illusionism is not only that we
are disposed to believe that we are conscious. It is also that we have difficulties making sense of the
hypothesis that we are not conscious while it seems to us that we are. We struggle to simply picture
what it would mean for consciousness to be an illusion. When I focus on my current experience of a
red rose, I find the idea that I do not really have this precise feeling, but only an illusion of this
feeling, not only unlikely to be true, but deeply weird, puzzling, and almost senseless.
Nothi g si ila happe s i the ase of pe eptual illusio s. Let’s i agi e, for example, that I am
falling prey to the Müller-Lyer illusion, so that I believe that the two lines are as they seem: that they
1
B a F a es ites, i a dis ussio of skepti is : I assu e that eli i ati is a out feeli gs eall is az
(Frances, 2008, p. 241). Galen Strawson writes that eliminativists who deny that there are mental states such
that the e is so ethi g it is like to e i these states do see to e out of thei i ds , a d that thei positio
is az , i a disti ti el philosophi al a “t a so ,
, p.
.
2
This is not to say that everyone would be fully satisfied by such an answer (Chalmers, 1996, p. 188-189).
However, I think that it is undeniable that a good explanation of the strong intuitive resistance to illusion would
at least give some dialectical force to the illusionist position.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
have different lengths (for example, because it is my first time looking at these lines and I have not
measured them yet). Even in this situation, I would still easily understand what it would mean for me
to be victim of an illusion in that case. The idea that the two lines are not as they seem, and that they
have in fact the same length in spite of the appearances would make perfect sense to me.
I o de to ake the o t ast e e sta ke , let’s take the e a ple of a pe eptual elief I do hold.
I do believe that I have two hands right now, on the basis of my perception of my two hands. My
perceptual disposition to believe that I have two hands is very strong, and so is my corresponding
belief. However, I have absolutely no problem entertaining and understanding the hypothesis that I
may be a one-armed person victim of a hallucination. It would be very hard to convince me that it is
the case, but the hypothesis, however far-fetched, is not at all difficult to understand or to make
sense of.
This contrast shows that the intuitive resistance to illusionism regarding consciousness is
pretty unique, and cannot simply be explained by the persistence of a very strong perceptual-like,
cognitively impenetrable disposition to believe that we are conscious. The illusion of phenomenality
is pa ti ula l po e ful; it is u h o e po e ful tha othe lassi al pe eptual illusio s, a d it is
powerful in a very distinctive way.
This is a problem for illusionist theories of consciousness. Indeed, most recent illusionist theories
of consciousness tried to model their explanation of the illusion of phenomenality on the explanation
of other illusions. But if the illusion of phenomenality has a distinctive and special force when
compared to other illusions, this means that this kind of explanation is doomed to fail. Indeed, this
ki d of e pla atio a ot a ou t fo the follo i g o t ast: e a easil ep ese t that a o phe o e al situatio , that e g asp th ough pe eptio fo e a ple, is illuso , hile e deepl
struggle to understand how it could be the case for a phenomenal situation grasped through
introspection to be illusory.3 That is why this aspect of the illusion problem – the explanation of the
unique intuitive resistance we face when we try to accept illusionism – is the hardest aspect of the
illusion problem.
3. Current illusionist theories of consciousness cannot solve the hardest aspect of the illusion
problem: case studies
Nicholas Humphrey (Frankish, this issue, p. 6; Humphrey, 2011, Chapter 2) states that the illusion
of phenomenality is comparable to the visual illusion of impossible objects. Real physical objects,
su h as the G egu d u (Frankish, this issue, p. 6), when seen under a certain perspective, can
give the illusion that we are facing an impossible object: a solid Penrose triangle. The same way, the
introspective perspective that we take on some of our neural states is what gives us the illusion that
we have phenomenal sensations, which are impossible objects (intrinsic, private entities).
The problem, from my point of view, is that we cannot explain the hardest aspect of the illusion
problem simply by following this model. Indeed, when facing a Gregundrum, we do not have any
particular intuitive resistance to entertaining the hypothesis that the apparent presence of a solid
Penrose triangle could merely be an illusion. On the contrary, this hypothesis seems perfectly
intelligible and sensible – actually, this is maybe the most natural hypothesis that comes to mind
when facing what seems to be an impossible object, such as a Penrose triangle. So, this model cannot
explain the peculiarity of the illusion of phenomenality.
“i ila l , Mi hael G azia o has a illusio ist theo of o s ious ess, the atte tio s he a
theo , that states that the brain monitors its own internal attentional processes in a schematic and
fallacious way. Instead of representing what is really there – a set of complex attentional processes –
it represents itself as being in states of awareness, where awareness is depi ted as a fluidi
su sta e , a e pe ie e , a se tie e G azia o,
, p.
; he e the falla ious i p essio
3
Here I simply remark that this contrast exists. I will give my own explanation of why it exists in section 5.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
that we are in qualitative and primitive phenomenal states. And, because this impression arises from
some features of the very architecture of the brain, any theory that goes against this impression is
judged very counter-i tuiti e. Quite i the sa e a , G azia o e plai s, Ne to ’s theo of light,
according to which white light is not pure and simple, but composed of all the other colored lights,
struck everyone as highly counter-intuitive when first formulated, because the human visual system
is hard-wired to depict white light as being simple, pure and primitive.
However, again, such a model cannot account for the unique intuitive resistance we face in the
case of illusionism regarding consciousness. Indeed, in the case of Newton, even though people were
strongly disposed to believe that white light was pure, simple and not composed, I do not think they
had any difficulty understanding what it would mean for white light to be profoundly different from
what it seemed to be. However surprising and weird this theory must have seemed to them, I do not
think they had t ou le pi tu i g hat Ne to ’s theo
ea t: that hite light is not at all like our
perception of it depicts it. This thesis may be counter-intuitive, but it is not difficult to make sense of.
But, on the other hand, we do have trouble fully grasping what it means for consciousness to be an
illusion; we do st uggle to ake se se of this idea. The efo e, G azia o’s a ou t a ot sol e the
hardest aspect of the illusion problem.
De k Pe e oo ’s illusio ist theo of o s ious ess (Frankish, this issue, p. 6-7; Pereboom, 2011)
is quite similar to the theories I just discussed. He suggests that introspection misrepresents
phenomenal properties by depicting them as having a qualitative nature that they do not have, quite
in the same way sensation represents e te al o je ts as ha i g p i iti e olo p ope ties ede i
olo s Chal e s,
; Pe e oo ,
that the do ot ha e. This h pothesis alo e is ot a le
to solve the hardest aspect of the illusion problem, for the same reasons I already mentioned.
Indeed, if this hypothesis were true, why would we have such difficulty making sense of illusionism
regarding consciousness, while illusionism regarding primitive colors seems rather unproblematic?
Indeed, the thesis according to which external objects only appear to bear primitive colors, but do
not really bear them, is quite widely accepted since Galileo and Descartes (and has been on the
philosophical market at least since Epicurus). And this thesis does not seem to be particularly difficult
to understand or to make sense of.
Pereboom, then makes an additional hypothesis: maybe illusionism about consciousness seems
u h less edi le tha a out se o da p ope ties su h as olo s, e ause e a ot he k the
accuracy of introspection, as we can that of perception, by adopting different vantage points, using
easu e e t i st u e ts, a d so fo th F a kish, this issue, p. ; Pe e oo ,
, p.
. Ho e e ,
this hypothesis does not help much. After all, a physicist could build a detector D, to detect a new
particle Z, and for a little while she may very well own only one copy of this detector, and have no
other way to detect Z. The detections of Z made with D could therefore not be checked for accuracy
using any other means. Would that mean that our physicist would have huge trouble making sense of
the hypothesis that D is in fact inaccurate? Would she find such a hypothesis extremely puzzling, and
barely intelligible? This seems quite unlikely. But this shows that the inability to check the accuracy of
a given source of information cannot explain why subjects find the idea that the information
provided by the source is illusory so puzzling and difficult to accept.
4. The Theoretical Introspection Hypothesis
Current illusionist theories of consciousness cannot solve the hardest aspect of the illusion
problem, mostly because they try to model their explanation of the illusion of phenomenality on the
e pla atio of othe lassi al , pe eptual illusio s. But the theo ies esulti g f o su h a odelli g
cannot do the job. Indeed, the illusion of phenomenality has a distinctive and unique force when
compared with other illusions – and this cries out for explanation.
I now want to outline how we could solve this difficulty. First, we have to acknowledge the
particular force of the illusion of phenomenality, and the unique predicament we find ourselves in
when we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion. By acknowledging this difficulty, we do not
weaken the illusionist position – quite the contrary, in my opinion.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
Second, we have to make a hypothesis that could account for the unique intuitive resistance
to illusionism about consciousness; for example, a hypothesis concerning introspective
representations and introspective processes, which could explain why we are so reluctant to
illusio is . I ill o p ese t a h pothesis I thi k ould do the jo . Call it the Theo eti al
I t ospe tio H pothesis TIH .4
Theoretical Introspection Hypothesis: “uppose that, as p opo e ts of the theo -theory of
self-a a e ess 5 say, introspection (including in this case phenomenal introspection) is a
theoretically informed activity, where the relevant theories are our naïve theory of mind and our
naïve epistemology. Suppose that these theories are innate and modular, that is to say,
informationally encapsulated (though they are informationally related to each other – they may for
example be implemented in the same module). Introspective representations of phenomenal states
are deeply theoretically informed by these theories.6
The TIH states that the content of these theories includes, so to speak, the following
statements:
(1) Minds can take up information about things, and then can use that information to form
beliefs about them: things appear to minds.
(2) The way minds do that is that they are affected in certain way, they have certain
experiences.
(3) The properties of experiences determine what appears to the mind. For example: an
experience of a red circle is an affection of the mind in virtue of which a red circle appears to the
mind.
(4) Take all the cases in which a certain thing T appears veridically to a subject S, and consider
what all these cases have in common regarding the way in which S is affected. What they have in
common is a state E, which is an experience of T. Something is a part of E if and only if this thing is
part of the way in which S is affected in all the cases in which T appears veridically to a subject S.
(5) Appearances can be fallacious, and a mind can be deceived by the way things appear. And
here is what happens in cases of fallacious appearances: when a subject S has a fallacious
appearance of T, S is affected exactly in the same way as in cases of veridical appearances of T,
except that T is not there. That is to say, when a subject S has a fallacious appearance of T, it is in
state E (E being, and being nothing but, what is common to the way S is affected in all the cases in
which T appears veridically to her), but T is not there.7
Of course, our naïve theory of mind/epistemology does not literally contain these
statements. Naïve theories, when we conceive of them as innate and modular, do not really consist
in statements, but in sets of capacities and inferential mechanisms. However, our naïve theory of
mind/epistemology could very well be a series of capacities and inferential mechanisms which
4
For a first suggestion of a hypothesis of this kind, in a different vocabulary and within a different framework,
see (Kammerer, 2016).
5
For a definition and a critical overview of the theory-theory of self-awareness, see (Nichols & Stich, 2003, p.
164-169)
6
Frankish quickly mentions this kind of view (Frankish, this issue, p. 24).
7
So, according to our naïve theory of mind/epistemology, minds can be deceived by appearances because, in
cases of fallacious appearances, they are affected exactly in the same way as in cases of veridical appearances.
So, what is common, in the overall experiential state of a subject, in all cases of veridical appearances of
something to a subject, must also be present in the overall experiential state of a subject undergoing a
fallacious appearance of the same thing. What explains the necessity of (5), from the point of view of our naïve
theory of mind/epistemology is, roughly, the idea that, if a mind was affected in a different way in a case of
fallacious and veridical appearances of the same thing, it would be in a position to distinguish, on the sole basis
of the appea a es, et ee falla ious a d e idi al appea a es of the sa e thi g; ut the de epti e
appea a es ould ot e ist, at least ot i the full a d si ple se se used ou aï e theo of
mind/epistemology.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
function in such a way that it would correspond to these statements. Actually, I think that it is rather
plausible, given that these statements themselves seem intuitively quite plausible.8 9
According to the TIH, phenomenal introspection is deeply theoretically informed by these
theories. Therefore, when we introspect phenomenal states, we represent ourselves as being in
states that are experiences, in the sense described by the theory: states in virtue of which things
appear to us, which are gifted with special mental and epistemological properties, so that they satisfy
the definition of experiences according to the theory: they are represented as satisfying (1-5), in
virtue of the functional/inferential role of the relevant representations.10
5. How the Theoretical Introspection Hypothesis can solve the hardest aspect of the illusion
problem
Let us suppose that the TIH is true, and that our introspective processes and representations
are theoretically determined in the way I just described. Now, let us ask the question: what happens
when we think intuitively – that is to say, within the framework of our naïve theory of
mind/epistemology – that someone is undergoing an illusion? We think that this person has a
fallacious appearance of something. In most cases, this creates no problem: there can be fallacious
appearances of many things, and therefore many things can be merely illusory, e e though e do ’t
necessarily believe that they are illusory. For example, let us take the example of an appearance of a
red rose. We think that a red rose can appear to a subject. Let us take all the cases in which a red
rose appears veridically to a subject, and consider what is common to all these cases, regarding the
way in which the subject is affected: this common element is an experience of a red rose. And when
we think that someone is undergoing an illusion of a red rose, we think that this person is having an
experience of a red rose (she is affected exactly in the same way as she is affected in all the cases of
veridical appearances of a red rose), except that there is no red rose. So far, so good.
However, in the case of consciousness, and only in the case of consciousness, something
troubling happens. When we try to think intuitively – using the mental resources of our naïve theory
of mind/epistemology – that our current experience of a red rose, for example, is purely illusory, and
that we in fact have no experience of a red rose but merely a fallacious appearance of an experience
of a red rose, we encounter a peculiar difficulty. In order to see why, let us consider what is common,
regarding the way in which subjects are affected, to all the cases of veridical appearances of an
experience of a red rose. This common element will be an experience of an experience of a red rose –
a second-order experience. But, given the principles of our naïve theory of mind/epistemology, this
state will crucially include the first-order experience it is an experience of – it will include an
experience of a red rose. Indeed, an experience of a red rose is part of what is common, regarding
the way in which subjects are affected, to all cases of veridical appearances of an experience of a red
8
This is not to say, of course, that every philosophical theory endorses these statements. Disjunctivists, for
example, notably reject (5), and (4) could probably be questioned by some theories of consciousness.
9
It should e oted that the e is a aï e a d i tuiti e o ept of appearance that does not correspond to the
concept of appearance, that I just described as being the one used by our naïve theory of mind/epistemology.
For example, we have a purely epistemic concept of appearance, such as the one we express linguistically when
e sa Ei stei ’s theo of elati it appea s to e t ue . I thi k that this o ept a e ulti atel defi ed
our naïve theory of mind/epistemology in terms of phenomenal appearances and beliefs, but I suggest simply
setting aside this issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
10
It should be noted that, from my point of view, given that (1-5) determine the content of our concepts of
phenomenal states, anyone who claims that these five points are not satisfied together my our mental
functioning cannot be a full-blown phenomenal realist, and is necessarily committed (though maybe only
implicitly) to a form of illusionism. Of course, given that this commitment would be merely implicit, we should
not expect every philosopher who denies that the functioning of our mind satisfies (1-5) to explicitly endorse
illusionism.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
rose.11 But now what happens when we try to think intuitively that we have a fallacious appearance
of an experience of a red rose? We try to think that we are in a state which is an experience of an
experience of a red rose, without having an experience of a red rose. But this is impossible, as the
experience of an experience of a red rose has to include an experience of a red rose.
Let’s su that up: when we try to think intuitively that we have a fallacious appearance of a
given experience, we try to think that we are affected exactly in the same way as we are affected in
all the cases in which it veridically appears to us that we have this given experience. But, in all these
cases of veridical appearance, the way in which we are affected crucially includes the fact that we
have this given experience. So, we cannot be affected in a way that is exactly similar to cases of
veridical appearances of the experience without having this given experience – that would lead to an
obvious contradiction, given the content of the representations provided by our naïve theory of
mind/epistemology.
So, what the TIH predicts is that, given the nature of the naïve theory of mind/epistemology
that determines our introspective representations, we are unable to think of second-order
experiences that do not include the first-order experiences they are experiences of. Therefore, we
are unable to think of a fallacious appearance of an experience. This peculiar difficulty arises in the
case of consciousness, and only in the case of consciousness. For any other thing, we have no
difficulty thinking of a fallacious appearance of this thing.
If the TIH is true, then, it means that, to the extent that we use an intuitive and naïve concept
of illusio falla ious appea a e , a illusory experience is a o t adi tio . This e plai s the u i ue
intuitive resistance we face when we try to accept illusionism, given that it explains why we cannot
fully make sense of the idea that our experiences are purely illusory, hile e do ’t ha e this
problem in the case of any other thing.
Of course, in this view, illusionism is still a perfectly coherent hypothesis. But we need to use
another concept of illusion to make it completely intelligible – not the naïve concept of illusion,
provided by our naïve theory of mind/epistemology, but rather a functional concept of illusion. For
example, we have to use a concept of illusion that states that an illusion simply consists in, say, a
state that grounds an on-going, systematic and cognitively impenetrable disposition to believe
something false. When we use such a concept of illusion, illusionism regarding consciousness is not
problematic at all, and it is quite easy to understand and to make sense of.
The TIH the efo e e plai s h de i g the e iste e of ge ui e phe o e al states is the
so t of thi g that a o l e do e a philosophe Chal e s,
, p.
: e a ohe e tl
think that consciousness is an illusion only if we use a highly abstract and theoretical concept of
illusion. But, as soon as we try to intuitively make sense of this idea, we are back using our naïve and
innate concept of illusion, and we cannot help but finding illusionism about consciousness deeply
puzzling and barely intelligible. The moment we turn away from the abstract, objective and
impersonal understanding of illusionism about consciousness (in which the illusion of phenomenality
is defined in purely functional terms), and try to consider what illusio is a ou ts to o
ea s
in an intuitive manner, we find this position to be unacceptable, preposterous and hardly intelligible.
However, it is crucial to note that this obviously does not prevent illusionism (correctly understood)
from being true.
The TIH also explains why one very common objection to illusionism regarding consciousness
relies on the idea that, in the case of consciousness, there is no appearance-reality gap, and that
11
Indeed, in all the situations in which it appears veridically to a subject that she has an experience of a red
rose, (1) She will have an experience of a red rose (by definition of the situation, which is a situation of veridical
appearance of such an experience); (2) This experience of a red rose will be part of the way in which subjects
are affected (by definition of what an experience is according to our naïve theory of mind/epistemology). So, if
we consider what is common, regarding the way in which a subject is affected, to all the situations in which it
appears veridically to the subject that she has an experience of a red rose, we will find that this common
element necessarily includes an experience of a red rose.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
therefore there can be no fallacious appearance of consciousness. Frankish (Frankish, this issue, p.
20) is right to note that, in order for such an objection to succeed, it has to presuppose a conception
of appearances that begs the question against illusionism. However, the TIH explains why this
objection nevertheless has some intuitive weight: it is because this question-begging conception of
appearances happens to be our naïve, innate and intuitive conception of appearances, provided by
our naïve theory of mind/epistemology.
Overall, I think that the TIH is able to give a solution to the hardest aspect of the illusion
problem. The fact that illusionism about consciousness is intuitively unacceptable and almost
senseless is a by-product of the simplistic structure of our naïve theory of mind/epistemology, and of
the manner in which this theory deeply determines both the content of our introspective
representations of phenomenal states and the way we intuitively conceive of fallacious appearances
of things. Illusionism about consciousness, in order to be acceptable, has to be understood while
usi g a highl a st a t a d theo eti al o eptio of illusio s a d appea a es . As soo as e
seek an intuitive grasp of illusionism, this position strikes us as absurd.12
6. Conclusion
I think that the hardest aspect of the illusion problem – i.e., the explanation of the unique
intuitive resistance we experience when facing illusionism about consciousness – cannot be solved if
we understand the origin of the illusion of phenomenality simply on the model of other classical,
perceptual illusions. This is why current illusionist theories of consciousness fail to solve this problem.
However, I think that it is possible to solve it, if we recognize the peculiarity of introspective
representations of phenomenal states. The TIH is a hypothesis that attempts to do so.
To speak broadly and metaphorically, this hypothesis states the following. Our naïve theory
of mind/epistemology provides a mental tool to think about appearances (and potentially deceiving
appearances). This mental tool consists in our capacity to represent experiences, as ways in which
minds are affected. However, this mental tool happens to be quite rough and rudimentary. Because
of the rough representational structure of this mental tool, a problem arises when we try to apply
this mental tool to itself, so to speak – that is to say, when we try to distinguish between experiences
and appearances of experiences that do not include these experiences. Such a distinction is
impossible, because of the simplistic structure of this mental tool. Therefore, we end up being
incapable of thinking intuitively of a fallacious appearance of a given experience. This explains why
illusionism about consciousness can never be intuitively acceptable or even intuitively fully
intelligible, while we have no difficulty making intuitive sense of illusionism regarding any other
entity. Of course, the TIH implies that our naïve theory of mind/epistemology is rough and simplistic,
but this should not come out as a surprise. After all, all our other naïve theories are simplistic, and
widely inaccurate.13 In fact, it would be rather surprising if one of our naïve, innate theories
happened to be perfectly accurate and satisfying.
12
I claim that the TIH can solve the hardest aspect of the illusion problem. One could then wonder if it is
sufficient to solve the full illusion problem by itself, or if we have to use additional claims regarding
phenomenal introspection. Can we explain why it seems to us that we are phenomenally conscious even
though we are not, simply by positing that our introspective representations have the kind of content they
ha e a o di g to the TIH? If e sa
es , e lai that e a e plai all the pe ulia featu es that
introspection presents phenomenal states as having (features that nothing has in reality) simply by the fact
that our introspective representations have the content described by the TIH. I think that it is in fact possible to
give such an explanation, but it would take a long argument to make a proper case for that claim. I therefore
choose to set aside this more general issue, and to focus merely on the hardest aspect of the illusion problem.
13
Our naïve physics, for example, is full or errors and approximations concerning the features of physical
o je ts. It ota l o tai s the idea that the e a e asi fo es su h as su ki g used, fo e a ple, i a
vacuum- lea e , of that the o e e t of odies is aused a ki d of i petus , et . Ha es,
;
McCloskey, 1983). The same could be said of our naïve biology.
This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
paper.
The TIH may have the details of the story wrong, but I think that the main idea behind the
hypothesis is correct: if we want to account for the unique strength of the illusion of phenomenality,
we have to understand that introspection represents phenomenal states in a way that characterizes
them as having special epistemological properties, and that in turn accounts for the difficulty we face
he e t to gi e the illusio t eat e t to phe o e al states – when we try to think of them as
purely illusory. My guess is that a fully satisfying illusionist theory of consciousness would have to say
something in the vicinity in order to solve the hardest aspect of the illusion problem.
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This is a draft, which differs substantially from the final version of the paper. The final
version of the paper presents some substantive modifications and has been published in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 124-139. Please cite only the final version of this
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