Abstract
This section investigates the versions and consequences of relativism, starting from the conclusion reached in the preceding section. First, some versions of relativism are listed, and their interrelations are studied. Then the particular problem of cultural relativism is presented as well as the various reactions it has generated. Cognitivism is one such reaction, but it is argued to be significantly different from the others. However, in providing solutions to the problem of cultural relativism, cognitivism appears to invite a more profound version of relativism: instead of cultural, and thus modifiable constraints upon cognition, our view of what there is, is restricted by our neuronal buildup.
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Kamppinen, M., Revonsuo, A. (1993). Ultimate Relativism. In: Kamppinen, M. (eds) Consciousness, Cognitive Schemata, and Relativism. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 15. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1141-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1141-8_5
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