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Attitude and the normativity of law

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Abstract

Though legal positivism remains popular, HLA Hart’s version has fallen somewhat by the wayside. This is because, according to many, the central task of a theory of law is to explain the so-called ‘normativity of law’. Hart’s theory, it is thought, is not up to the task. Some have suggested modifying the theory accordingly. This paper argues that both Hart’s theory and the normativity of law have been misunderstood. First, a popular modification of Hart’s theory is considered and rejected. It stems from a misunderstanding of Hart and his project. Second, a new understanding of the mysterious but often-mentioned ‘normativity of law’ is presented. Once we have dispelled some misunderstandings of Hart’s view and clarified the sense in which law is supposed to be normative, we see that Hart’s view, unmodified, is well suited to the task of explaining law’s normativity.

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Correspondence to Jeffrey Kaplan.

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Kaplan, J. Attitude and the normativity of law. Law and Philos 36, 469–493 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9304-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9304-6

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