¹ Moore, G. E., ‘Proof of an External World’, The Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1940), 127–50Google Scholar, and often reprinted. On Moore's argument in the history of analytic philosophy, refer to Soames, Scott, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1, The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 12–23Google Scholar

² Wisdom, J. and Austin, J. L., ‘Symposium: Other Minds’, in Logic and Reality, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XX (London: Harrison and Sons, 1946), 122–87Google Scholar; Ayer, A. J., ‘One's Knowledge of Other Minds’, Theoria 19(1–2) (1953), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Of course, the problem of other minds is just as much (or little) a problem for the realist as for the idealist, and none of the authors cited here considers the issue as belonging to idealism in particular. But I believe that the problem came into prominence in connection with idealism's doubts regarding what is external to us and remained current even after idealism was thought to have left the scene.

³ Dummett, Michael, ‘Realism’, in Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 145–165Google Scholar

⁴ Sprigge, Timothy, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984)Google Scholar advances a defense of panpsychism. Anti-realism is, of course, not to be identified with idealism simpliciter, though as Dummett, op. cit., suggests at several points, the realism-idealism divide may be seen as one variety of the type of opposition embraced by realism and anti-realism. In view of the current characterization of anti-realism as pertaining to metaontology (or ‘metametaphysics’) – the questions surrounding the status of ontological claims themselves – and not to ontology, it becomes clear that some forms of idealism (e.g., the ‘subjective idealism’ attributed to Berkeley) are realist in so much as they assert that some determinate ontological claims are warranted. But certain philosophical views that have been traditionally considered ‘idealist’, notably Kant's ‘transcendental idealism’, are plausibly treated as responding to the problems that have surfaced in recent philosophy in terms of anti-realism, and Kant's interrogation of the grounds of metaphysics clearly form the background for much of the modern and contemporary realist/anti-realist problematic. See now Chalmers, David J., Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009)Google Scholar, and, on Kant in relation to recent anti-realisms, Allais, Lucy, ‘Kant's transcendental idealism and comtemporary anti-realism’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11(4) (2003), 369–392CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Dunham, Jeremy, Grant, Iain Hamilton, and Watson, Sean, Idealism: The History of a Philosophy (Durham: Acumen, 2011)Google Scholar offers a generous survey covering a broad range of what, at one time or another, has been labelled as ‘idealism’ in Western philosophical traditions.

⁶ Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, Norman Kemp (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 244–47Google Scholar, 344–52

⁷ Dicker, Georges, Berkeley's Idealism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Dasgupta, Surendranath, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1962 [1933])Google Scholar, and Raju, P. T., Idealistic Thought of India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953)Google Scholar are perhaps the best-known examples. Bhushan, Nalini and Garfield, Jay L., eds., Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar provide pertinent selections from the writings of A. C. Mukerji, Ras Bihari Das, and Hiralal Haldar, among others.

⁹ Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi, Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002)Google Scholar, however, argues that Śaṅkara is better regarded as a ‘non-realist’ than an idealist.

¹⁰ Carter, John Ross and Palihawadana, Mahinda, trans., The Dhammapada (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13 and 89–94Google Scholar for commentary. I have modified somewhat their translation, which reads ‘Preceded by perception are mental states’.

¹¹ Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośam, ed. Śāstrī, Svāmī Dvārikādās (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970–72)Google Scholar, 567 (verse 4.1)

¹² Jain, Mahendrakumār, ed., Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, Jñānpīṭh Mūrtidevi Jain Granthamālā 34, 3^rd ed. (New Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānpīṭh, 1989)Google Scholar, 74

¹³ The secondary literature on Vasubandhu has grown quite large in recent years, and it will not be possible to refer to all of the pertinent discussions that have appeared in the space available here. Opposing perspectives on the question of idealism are developed at length in: Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun (London: Routledge, 2002)Google Scholar; and Schmithausen, Lambert, On the Problem of the External World in the Ch'eng wei shih lun, Studia Philologica Buddhica Occasional Paper Series XIII (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2005Google Scholar). It may be noted that both of these are concerned primarily with readings of Vasubandhu in the Chinese Yogācāra tradition of Xuanzang (7^th c.).

¹⁴ ‘Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhu's “Proof of Idealism”’, Idealistic Studies XVIII(1) (1988), 32–54Google Scholar

¹⁵ It is, in fact, this feature of Vasubandhu's thought that appears to me to suggest an anti-realist rather than a strictly idealist reading of him. But I will defer detailed consideration of this point for another occasion.

¹⁶ Vasubandhu, drawing on the established terminology of the Buddhist Abhidharma schools, calls these ‘time-worms’ santāna, usually translated as ‘continuum’. For the earlier Abhidharma, these continua were psycho-physical, but Vasubandhu comes to use the term for the psychic continuum alone.

¹⁷ Vasubandhu's nondualism is perhaps most clearly articulated in verse 28 of his Thirty Verse Proof of Idealism (Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ): ‘When knowledge objectifies no referent and stands in consciousness alone, then, in the absence of apprehended object, there is no subjective apprehension at all’.

¹⁸ The problem of solipsism is taken up at length by Dharmakīrti, who seeks to refute it, and Ratnakīrti (11^th c.), who accepts it as an entailment of the idealist position. Refer to ‘Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds’ in Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad, ed., Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, trans. Gupta, Harish C., Soviet Indology Series 2 (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1969), 55–92Google Scholar; and Kajiyama, Yuichi, ‘Buddhist Solipsism: A free translation of Ratnakīrti's Saṃtānāntaradūṣaṇa’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XIII/1 (1965), 435–20Google Scholar

¹⁹ Translated following the Tibetan text given in de la Vallée Poussin, Louis, Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 9 (Rprt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992)Google Scholar, commentary ad VI.46

²⁰ Thus, the sūtra is keen always to affirm, in contrast to the essentialism it attributes to the Brahmanical traditions, that ‘without beholding the insubstantiality of phenomena, there is no freedom’. Laṅkāvatārasūtram, ed. Vaidya, P. L., Buddhist Texts Series 3 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1963)Google Scholar, 27

²¹ Indian theistic philosophies, as exemplified in particular by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, were always strongly committed to both ontological and epistemological realism.

²² Though much valuable scholarship on Dignāga has appeared during the decades since it was published, Hattori, Masaaki, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Oriental Series 47 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968)Google Scholar provides a still useful introduction to this major figure.

²³ Susuma Yamaguchi, in collaboration with Meyer, Henriette, ‘Dignāga: Examen de l'objet de la connaissance (Ālambanaparīkṣā)’, in Journal Asiatique CCXIV (1929): 1–65Google Scholar; Tola, Fernando and Dragonetti, Carmen, ‘Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), 105–134Google Scholar

²⁴ For instance, Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 90 (verse 1.34ab)

²⁵ It is owing to the inclusion of perceptual objects here that I have decided against translating ālambana as ‘intentional object’, despite the evident affinities of the philosophical problems that arise in connection with both it and the Western concept, and instead have opted for ‘objective referent’.

²⁶ Dignāga summarises this in his commentary on his closing verse: ‘Depending upon that potential which is called “the eye” and an inner form, consciousness is born with the appearance of an object, the objective referent being indivisible from it. These two are mutually conditioning and their potential is without beginning. By turns, from the actualization of that potential, there is consciousness occurring with the phenomenal features of an object, and by turns the potential for those phenomenal features. Consciousness and those two, according to context, may be said to be the same or different.’ My translation.

²⁷ My translations in this section from Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta follow the Sanskrit text given in Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Rāhula, ed., Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1 (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953), 349–52Google Scholar. Verses numbers are given where applicable.

²⁸ That it was not perhaps reflects the enduring impact of Vasubandhu's arguments in regard to partless wholes, on which see my ‘Mereological Considerations’, op. cit.

²⁹ Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978

³⁰ Mookerjee, Satkari, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism: A Critical Study of Anekāntavāda (Calcutta:Bharati Mahavidyalaya, 1944)Google Scholar.

³¹ See, in particular, Shah, Nagin J., Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy, A Study, Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 11 (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1967)Google Scholar.

³² Mid second millennium developments in Indian philosophy are surveyed in Ganeri, Jonardon, The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Easly Modern India 1450-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Yaśovijaya's contributions and career are discussed there in chapter three.

³³ My translations in this section from Haribhadra and Yaśovijaya follow the Sanskrit text given in Mahārāj, Bhuvanabhānusūrīśvarajī and Śukla, Badrīnāth, eds., Śāstavārttāsamuccaya, stabaka 5–6 (Bombay: Divya Darśan Trust, 2039 Vikrama era [= 1982 c.e.])Google Scholar. Verses numbers are given where applicable.

³⁴ In the case of Buddhism, at least, the relationship between philosophy and soteriological practice has been contested in the recent literature. See my ‘“Spiritual Exercise” and Buddhist Epistemologists in India and Tibet’, in Emmanuel, Steven, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 27–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a review of the question.

³⁵ Other traditions within Indian thought also preserved aspects of the Yogācāra legacy. One notable example is Kashmir Śaivism, whose engagements with Buddhist philosophy have been examined in great detail in Ratié, Isabelle, Le Soi et l'Autre: Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la Pratyabhijñā (Leiden: Brill, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.