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In defense of modest probabilism

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Abstract

Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to Modest Probabilism meant to offer proof that Modest Probabilism is no better than its orthodox predecessor at avoiding unwarranted precision.

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Correspondence to Mark Kaplan.

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Kaplan, M. In defense of modest probabilism. Synthese 176, 41–55 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9483-2

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