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Abstract	This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontology, which is based on intentionality. The author proves that such dualism is rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible our empirical experience on the basis of subject-object relations. The author considers Parmenides' famous sentence "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" and Husserl's well-known claim "Back to things themselves!" as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional relation between Self and Other, between human being and nature/cosmos. There are the division and the rupture between subject and object in a natural attitude. Parmenides and early Husserl show the way to the truth as a wholeness without subject and object.		

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09 A B S T R A C T

10 This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontol-  
11 ogy, which is based on intentionality. The author proves that such dualism is  
12 rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible  
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16 themselves!" as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional rela-  
17 tion between Self and Other, between human being and nature/cosmos. There  
18 are the division and the rupture between subject and object in a natural attitude.  
19 Parmenides and early Husserl show the way to the truth as a wholeness without  
20 subject and object.  
21

22 The fundamental concept of Husserl's phenomenology is the concept of inten-  
23 tionality. The intentionality is a characteristic of consciousness, which defines  
24 its tendency towards objects. Consciousness does not exist with any relation to  
25 other objects.

26 Before introducing the concept of intentionality by scholastic thinkers of the  
27 Middle Ages (Brentano in the nineteenth century and Husserl in the twentieth  
28 century), the concept of will was widely used. The meaning of the last abso-  
29 lutely coincides with the meaning of the concept of intentionality. If we long  
30 for something or somebody, we want to seize an object, namely an intentional  
31 object. As well as "will" intentionality connects Self with objects, which may  
32 be found in the world. Such connection we can define as relation between Self  
33 and Other. That is why a relation is always the intentional connection, namely  
34 the "subject-object" relation.

35 It is known the reaction of Sartre and Heidegger to idealism of Husserl's  
36 transcendental phenomenology. They used the concept of intentionality for  
37 creation of their own social ontologies of "Self-Other" relation.

38 In his work *Being and Nothing* Sartre deeply analyses the "Self-Other" rela-  
39 tion. Other is always a threat for Self. Other encroaches on freedom of Self. It is  
40

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41 impossible to establish normal relationships with Others. That is why relation  
42 with Other is always doomed to struggle and hatred.

43 We find in Heidegger's *Being and Time* a modified repetition of intentional  
44 social ontology. The "Self-Other/Others" relations are unreal in everyday life.  
45 The unreal existence with Other/Others is an anonymous existence. In everyday  
46 life Self as *Dasein* always loses himself/herself and Others take away its being.  
47 The possibilities of Daseins' everyday life are determined by Others. Others  
48 are the mode of existence of common sense in the world, which lost personal  
49 identity, namely *Das Man*.

50 Thus, neither Sartre nor Heidegger could create positive social ontology of  
51 "Self-Other" relation on the basis of intentionality. The founders of philosophi-  
52 cal hermeneutics and philosophy of dialogue set this task. Here we can include  
53 the attempts of Levinas, who formulated phenomenology of face without using  
54 concept of intentionality. Levinas also ethicized Heidegger's social ontology.

55 Gadamer, Buber, Levinas, Frankl and others tried to create social ontology of  
56 "Self-Other" relation beyond intentionality. In order to create non-intentional  
57 social ontology they decompose intentional model of "Self-Other" relation.  
58 After such decomposition we find the sphere of being-between in which Self  
59 and Other meet one another. Exactly in this sphere of being-between Self  
60 perceives Other as Thou and vice versa.

61 The positive experience of philosophical hermeneutics and philosophy of  
62 dialogue, which are rooted in early Husserl's early phenomenology, when he  
63 called "back to the things themselves", lies in its dialogical principle. This  
64 principle takes its origin not from transcendental experience of pure Self, but  
65 from phenomenological experience of Self as being-between. Such experience  
66 is ultimate.

67 Is the non-intentional relation "Self-Other" relation in the sphere of being-  
68 between a new utopia? No, it is not. We deal with ultimate experience beyond  
69 everyday life, which is based on intentionality, egoism and pragmatism. As  
70 Plato and Buddha said many years ago before Buber the human being is being-  
71 between, metaphorically saying, between Heaven and Earth. Contemporary  
72 phenomenologists and existentialists might return human being to the middle  
73 position and therefore help to re-find our own identity in the globalized world.

74 In the following text we would like to present some reflections on nature  
75 of non-intentional relations. Those reflections are not presented systematically  
76 because they still remain unelaborated. We only get close to understanding of  
77 non-intentional relations between Self and Other, between Me and the world.

78 Fixation on concepts they call "knowledge". Such fixation implies the for-  
79 mation of idols. In fact, man can be devoted to certain conceptions which  
80 "explain" the world and a human being. But such explanation is only an island

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81 in boundless ocean of cognition. Gradually this island is absorbed by igno-  
 82 rance and then man falls into an abyss of uncertainty. Falling man grasps  
 83 constructed concepts. And therefore the process of cognition lasts infinitely,  
 84 the knowledge is doomed to turn into ignorance. Why does it happen? We can  
 85 expend our knowledge endlessly, but it always remains incomplete. The sphere  
 86 of ignorance is bigger than the sphere of knowledge. This incompleteness of  
 87 knowledge is connected with the fragmentation of human cognition and its  
 88 specialization. An individual always cognizes something and:

89 goes over the surfaces of things and experiences them. He brings back from them some knowledge  
 90 of their condition – an experience. He experiences what there is to things. For what they bring  
 91 to him is only a world that consists of It and It and It, of He and He and She and She and It. I  
 92 experience something.<sup>1</sup>

93 On the other hand, the human knowledge is limited and those limits are con-  
 94 nected with the innate structure of cognition of the human being. Thus, a  
 95 human being can expend the limits of his/her own cognitive structure, but  
 96 he/she always remains inside those limits. It is not enough only to expend limits  
 97 of knowledge in order to overcome the doubt.

98 Kant in his *Critics of Pure Reason* showed that human cognition depends on  
 99 certain built-in pure conceptual schemes of common sense:

100 ... the categories, without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for the production  
 101 of conceptions, but do not represent any object. This significance they derive from sensibility,  
 102 which at the same time realizes the understanding and restricts it.<sup>2</sup>

103 Such dependence of the cognitive process prevents from obtaining knowledge.  
 104 We as human beings capable of both thought and perceptual experience, but  
 105 these capacities are inextricably interrelated. Husserl's phenomenology makes  
 106 an attempt to transcend that dependence. Husserl emphasizes the importance  
 107 of contemplation, but not cognition, because we can contemplate a things'  
 108 essence. His claim "back to things themselves!" means that we should return  
 109 phenomena back to their source.

110 If the world (worlds) where I (we) live is (are) conditioned before, then  
 111 what is the mechanism of such a conditioning? The world is conditioned  
 112 as *Lebenswelt*, and it is not in my power to change it. The conditioning of  
 113 *Lebenswelt* is comprehended by contemplation. Contemplation helps man to  
 114 return to essence. When human being lost himself in the world he/she wants  
 115 to change it, because he/she cannot live in non-sense and absurdity. The condi-  
 116 tioning of the country where I was born, the conditioning of family where I was  
 117 brought up, the conditioning of the culture where I grew up, the conditioning  
 118 of the language which I learned to communicate and cognize the conditioned  
 119 world, the conditioning of events which took place and which will take place

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121 in my life, we cannot explain but through reincarnation. The conditioning of  
 122 *Lebenswelt* may be considered as task to be solved in the given incarnation  
 123 of god-self. But Husserl's transcendental Ego is not god-self. Husserl says  
 124 about contemplation of transcendental Ego, but he never said that transcenden-  
 125 tal Ego is the Other within Me. God-self is ultimate selfhood of human being.  
 126 Such ultimate selfhood is human being. The Other which reincarnates, which  
 127 is allotted to the superior capacity to contemplate. The essentials of *Lebenswelt*  
 128 come into light through contemplation (in Ukrainian the world – "svit" derives  
 129 from the word "light" – "svitlo" and therefore the world is illuminated, it is  
 130 not dark). If my eyes are light then I look at the illuminated world and see  
 131 its truth as unhiddenness – ἀλήθεια. Physical eyes turn into the eyes of god-  
 132 self, thus they grow light. The physical eyes in the contemplation can only be  
 133 light because the god-self looks through them. Then the world shines in its  
 134 clearness. But what is connection between the conditioning and clearness, illu-  
 135 mination and darkness? Without contemplation the world is not illuminated; it  
 136 is dim and unclear, but these are my eyes and my reason clouded, the reason  
 137 which did not turn into god-self's reason. The light is always essential, i.e. it  
 138 is not casual. It is immanent to the world, and when we contemplate, this light  
 139 illuminates an individual, which is indivisible from inside, not from outside  
 140 (in Ukrainian "from inside" – "z seredyny" means "from the middle").

141 The middle is the *being-in-between*. Thus, an individual illuminated from  
 142 inside or from the middle of its inner space realizes itself as being-in-between.  
 143 In the state of such illumination the visible manifests itself as the truth, which is  
 144 unhiddenness. This truth discovered by thinking, because the one who thinks is  
 145 being-in-between. According to Heidegger, *Lichtung* of being becomes evident  
 146 when truth of mine being-in-between is opened and human being is this ray.  
 147 To be in *Lichtung* of being, as being-in-between, means to be illuminated from  
 148 inside by god-self.

149 But contemplation is impossible without passionlessness. Contemplation  
 150 is based on it. Freud showed that despite technical progress of society and  
 151 growing welfare civilized person remains a savage on the emotional level.  
 152 Everything irritates him/her, he/she constantly feels offended, flies into a pas-  
 153 sion. Those passions do not allow a man to contemplate the beauty of the world  
 154 and a human being. Did not Jesus teach to be passionless saying: *But I tell*  
 155 *you not to resist an evil person. But whoever slaps you on your right cheek,*  
 156 *turn the other to him also* [Matthew 5:39]. *But I say you, love your enemies,*  
 157 *bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those*  
 158 *who spitefully use you and persecute you* [Matthew 5:44]. We can see that  
 159 passionlessness permits to stop the violence, that is, tearing the vicious cir-  
 160 cle of violence. Also Buddha says that our relationships with others are not

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161 accidental. They have a deep meaning, because are determined by karma. We  
 162 should make a good to all people who meet in our life. This is possible only in  
 163 the state of contemplation. When it is achieved then there are consciousness,  
 164 conscience and freedom. When they appear simultaneously then it is love.

165 During contemplation the representations of things are absent. We have  
 166 immediate sight/vision of things as things without any representations or  
 167 images. Contemplation is not a part of cognition. When we cognize things  
 168 then they become objects. We cognize through representations. But what is  
 169 the connection between contemplation and thinking? Undoubtedly, thinking  
 170 is thoughtless, because thoughts are representations of things. Here we fol-  
 171 low Heidegger, who said: "thinking keeps thing in its essence".<sup>3</sup> The essence  
 172 of thing is being. Thinking is not reflection. Reflection always forgets about  
 173 essence of things. In the state of contemplation we can see the essence of  
 174 things, which become obvious on the crossroad of Earth and Heaven, eternal  
 175 and temporal. That is why Heidegger searches primordial language, which can  
 176 make obvious essence of things. The things are met only at the middle way,  
 177 because a human being is a middle way. Thus, phenomenology is laying the  
 178 middle way. When Kant said about "thing in itself", he wants to say that spec-  
 179 ulative philosophy can say nothing about thing, but about an object. As soon as  
 180 a human being loses the middle, then it begins to reflect, seeing only objects,  
 181 not things. The task of phenomenology is to bring a human being into the state  
 182 of contemplation. Contemporary philosophy is speculative and analyzes only  
 183 objects, because is grounded on reflection. Its sentences are analytic. Scientific  
 184 cognition and analytic philosophy discover only objects, not things, because  
 185 they are intentional. Thus, Buber writes that:

186 In our time there predominates an analytical, reductive, and deriving look . . . This look is analyti-  
 187 cal, . . . since it treats the whole being as put together and therefore able to be taken apart – not only  
 188 the so-called unconscious which is accessible to relative objectification, but also the psychic stream  
 189 itself, which can never, in fact, be grasped as an object. This look is a reductive one because it tries  
 190 to contract the manifold person, who is nourished by the microcosmic richness of the possible, to  
 191 some schematically surveyable and recurrent structures.<sup>4</sup>

192 Beyond the reflection and analysis is thinking. Only common sense reflects,  
 193 but reason thinks. Does thinking lose common sense? Obviously, no. We only  
 194 want to say that contemporary science and philosophy are based on reflective  
 195 common sense. Probably, here is a core of its crisis. Reflective common sense  
 196 cognizes a surface of reality; it does not pose a question about the essence of  
 197 reality. Common sense is corporal, because it takes care of its own security. An  
 198 individual as a physical body with the psychic reactions on the exterior irritants  
 199 preserves himself as body. Here is the logic of common sense. Common sense  
 200 is always intentional, because it strives for objects, which it snatches away from

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201 space in order to use them. Common sense neutralizes everything that leads a  
202 human being upwards.

203 Cognition is grounded on subject-object relation, therefore it is fragmen-  
204 tal and partial. Contemplation helps to comprehend a wholeness of subject  
205 and object and its common essence. Cognition grasps only outer characteris-  
206 tics of objects. Individual is intentionally connected only with a few objects.  
207 Intentional connection is selective; it does not include all variety of objects. So  
208 intentional act of cognition is fragmental and cannot comprehend plenitude of  
209 reality. It is true that private property emerges on the basis of intentionality.  
210 Private property is the closed significative sphere. If an individual compre-  
211 hends wholeness then he/she does not have a sense to appropriate anything.  
212 Therefore intentionality alienates a man from wholeness and makes individuals  
213 fragmental. As Buber puts it:  
214

215 Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos. The purpose of setting oneself apart is to  
216 experience and use, and the purpose of that is "living" – which means dying one human life long.<sup>5</sup>  
217

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218 Phenomenological reduction looks like meditation, but meditation is the obser-  
219 vation, which includes all phenomenon of life. In the state of observation you  
220 are contemplating wholeness of being. After phenomenological reduction you  
221 become transcendental Ego, which is a spring of all senses and all phenomena.  
222 In this state Ego becomes stronger; it strengthens its power and nothing will  
223 make it to accept others. On the other hand, we can interpret transcendental Ego  
224 as an observer, which stands before the observable. In the state of transcenden-  
225 tal reduction the observable is a product of transcendental Ego. Husserl in the  
226 beginning of his philosophical activity claimed "Back to things themselves!"  
227 It is true, that in meditative state we come back to things themselves, that is,  
228 to essence. We know about Sartre's critique of Husserl's transcendental Ego in  
229 the essay *The transcendence of Ego: An existentialist theory of Consciousness*.  
230 Consciousness does not contain any ego-centered elements. It is spontaneity.  
231 If consciousness does not contain any Ego, I and Me, then it is beyond sub-  
232 ject and object, which form the intentionality; it is beyond the observer and the  
233 observable. Consciousness is non-intentional, because it encloses everything.  
234 It is an undivided field, which belongs to world (as a human being is being-  
235 in-world, then it cannot separate itself from world). As Robert Kirkpatrick and  
236 Forrest Williams put it with regard to this:  
237

238 On this view, the character of the object of any consciousness regains its independence for  
239 phenomenological investigation and becomes analyzable in its own right (as in the original  
240 phenomenological theory of intentionality).<sup>6</sup>

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241 Intentionality comes into being when takes place a division. The division  
 242 rises, when we objectify world and become egos. As formulated by William  
 243 Desmond:

244  
 245 We need equilibrium beyond objectifying science and idiosyncratic individuality. We need a certain  
 246 doubling of existential and systematic thinking. This is true task for philosophy as phenomenology  
 247 of being-between.<sup>7</sup>

248 Is there a possibility of non-intentional relations with Other? Such possibil-  
 249 ity exists, when subject-object relations are overcome. Marcel, Buber, even  
 250 Sartre try to transcend subject-object relations. It is quite difficult to explain  
 251 the nature of non-intentional relations, because they represent some kind of  
 252 wholeness. The wholeness cannot be objected. Here we have deal with mys-  
 253 tery (G. Marcel). We agree with Wittgenstein that if we cannot speak about  
 254 something, then we should be silent. Intentionality which establishes subject-  
 255 object relations are ontic, not ontological, in Heidegger's sense of word. The  
 256 ontological is more fundamental than the ontic. On the ontological level we  
 257 can contemplate phenomena themselves. The phenomenon cannot be an object  
 258 of experience. The contemplation of phenomenon is not experience, because  
 259 phenomenon is not an object. We can experience only objects. Since Francis  
 260 Bacon the contemplation is announced as passive. But contemplation as Greek  
 261 *theoria* is the highest level of human being. On contemplative or theoretical  
 262 level a human being has a pious observation of everything.

263 Wholeness becomes hidden when the observer (Me) and the observable  
 264 (object) come into being. They are united intentionally. This means, that the  
 265 observable exists due to the observer. The latter is a source of sense, because  
 266 it brings sense into the observable. The observer does not allow the observ-  
 267 able to reveal itself, to show its own sense. Due to that intentional relation  
 268 between the observer and the observable, the latter is always an object, but not  
 269 a phenomenon. Intentional relations are bipolar relations. Every pole of inten-  
 270 tional relation considers itself as separated absolute. How can a human being  
 271 stop to produce bipolar relations? Only if it stops to objectify himself/herself.  
 272 In the history of philosophy we see many attempts to come to non-objective  
 273 being, which would be unity of subject and object in Oneness, for instance,  
 274 in Plato's and Hegel's works. But speculative philosophy never comes to it,  
 275 because: "Thoughts" and "things" are names for two sorts of object, which  
 276 common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose  
 277 to each others.<sup>8</sup>

278 It is true that speculative philosophy is based on hostile opposition of the  
 279 subject-object schiasm. This hostile opposition comes from everyday life,  
 280 which is based on natural attitude. Natural attitude always accepts world as



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281 object-world and subject as oppositional pole to the object-world. It is not har-  
282 mony, but the hostile opposition of poles that reciprocally challenge each other  
283 to combat. Can we transcend opposition of poles, that is, opposition between  
284 subject and object? Can we obtain state which contains neither subject nor  
285 object? Even unity of subject and object on transcendental level remains inten-  
286 tional, as philosophers of dialogue have shown. The subject-object division is  
287 based on more fundamental division between thought and being.

288 We need new ontology beyond old subject-object ontology. This new ontol-  
289 ogy will be based on unity of thinking and being, as Parmenides said: "For it  
290 is the same thing that can be thought and that can be".<sup>9</sup> Parmenides' words  
291 appear strange nowadays, as there is no other ontology except subject-object  
292 ontology. Subject cognizes object through representations. It brings into the  
293 world its own view of the world. It is well known that Husserl set a task  
294 to avoid this subjectivation of cognition with the help of phenomenological  
295 reduction. As a result of such reduction an individual goes up to the transcen-  
296 dental level, that is, the level of Pure Me. The Pure Me is devoided of any  
297 psychic phenomena: emotions, representations, images. The Pure Me or "pure  
298 consciousness", according to Husserl, may be associated with consciousness-  
299 power, which does not include any material things (Sri Aurobindo); it may  
300 be also associated with Logos, Divine Word, the seed of which is in every  
301 heart (Annie Besant); it may be identified with unity of Atman and Brahman  
302 as ultimate liberation (Vivekananda); it can be compared to grace of "the poor  
303 in spirit" (Jesus Christ). But all these associations, comparisons and identifi-  
304 cations do not correspond to the result of phenomenological reduction. The  
305 ultimate liberation, the grace, the germination of seed in a heart in the state of  
306 phenomenological reduction is impossible. It is connected with fact that phe-  
307 nomenological reduction brings individual to Me, which maintains its power  
308 and bids for absoluteness. The Pure Me tends to become its own idol. It remains  
309 intentional in its absolute power to attach the significance to phenomena from  
310 higher, transcendental point of view.

311 Let us return to Parmenides' words: "For it is the same thing that can  
312 be thought and that can be". These words do not mean identity of thinking  
313 and being, that is, that thinking subject is correlative with being as object;  
314 Parmenides does not speak of the sameness of subject and object, he does not  
315 even speak that subject dissolves in the object. It is impossible to compre-  
316 hend the meaning of Parmenides' words in terms of subject-object ontology.  
317 Any relations between subject and object cannot reveal meaning of this sen-  
318 tence. Does it mean that we should go beyond dualistic paradigm? If we try  
319 to go beyond this subject-object ontology we go up to the transcendental level.  
320 As we have mentioned above, this will not bring any changes, because the

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321 transcendental level constitutes the pure observer, which is in the basis of  
 322 Empirical Me, that is, in the subject. The transcendental is not the abstract.  
 323 The transcendental immediately creates Empirical Me. If we speak of the ele-  
 324 ments of cognition, then the abstract element is not used in the everyday life;  
 325 For instance, "Commandments of God" are abstract and are not followed in  
 326 empirical life. An individual may be well-informed about them, but they do not  
 327 mean anything in his/her life. So the abstract element of cognition is empty.  
 328 The transcendental element is actually cognizable and gets immediate appli-  
 329 cation in empirical life and professional activity. Thus, the transcendental and  
 330 empirical are interconnected. The transcendental leads a man out of the state of  
 331 uncertainty, because it brings some direction into life, but only in the limits of  
 332 subject-object ontology. That is why the transcendental attitude is pragmatic,  
 333 that is, it is oriented towards result, which we obtain in the process of self-  
 334 maintenance of Pure Me. But this attitude of Pure Me does not overcome the  
 335 rupture between the given and the ideal. Pure Me tries to get rid of the given;  
 336 it begins to protest. The conflict between the given and the ideal causes rev-  
 337 olutions and wars in the name of ideals of Pure Me. The idealism, which is  
 338 connected directly with the transcendental level, Pure Me are not sincere but  
 339 hypocritical, because the majority of idealists who try to maintain purity of Me,  
 340 its ideals, become dictators and cruel tyrants.

341 Another situation is possible, when on the transcendental level an individual  
 342 discovers for himself/herself the preconditions of moral order, that is, certain  
 343 moral principles. A man is creature that submits to the transcendental dimen-  
 344 sion of everyday life. The transcendental dimension of everyday life forces a  
 345 man to act morally, so it is repressive. The transcendental causes are the moral  
 346 imperatives (Kant). Kant supposed that a man becomes mature, when he/she  
 347 submits to the moral imperative: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always  
 348 at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."<sup>10</sup>

349 The transcendental level establishes the moral order. Thus self-willed man  
 350 becomes a man of good will, so far as he/she overcomes the improvidence of  
 351 his/her own behaviour. When we speak about the transcendental conditioning  
 352 of life, we mean that it is constitutive for experience and makes an individual  
 353 awakened but not conscious.<sup>11</sup>

354 In order to become conscious, an individual should understand that, in fact,  
 355 neither observer nor the observable exists. Consciousness appears when think-  
 356 ing and being are together. Let me give you an example of identity of thinking  
 357 and being. In the French film "Button Rouge" a man comes into the room, in  
 358 the middle of which there is a red button. Different phantasies enter the head  
 359 of this man when he looks at the red button. He imagines that when he pushes  
 360 it, an explosion follows. He also imagines that this button may be a signal

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361 for waiter that will bring him dinner etc. Finally he decides to push the but-  
 362 ton and what happens? The button switched on the light. The individual gives  
 363 reign to his imagination in this situation bringing into it something impossi-  
 364 ble. Thus images, representations, associations, opinions separate an individual  
 365 from being. When thinking and being are together, then there is a clear vision  
 366 of the truth: a simple button for switching on the light. We have already men-  
 367 tioned that thinking is thoughtless, while thinking and being are together; in  
 368 this case thinking does not include any images, it does not make any asso-  
 369 ciations, it does not trace any analogies, it does not compare anything. And  
 370 Parmenides, not without reason, names this way – the way of truth. Because  
 371 the truth is that the red button serves for turning on the light, and that is its only  
 372 function. Otherwise, an individual goes the way of assumption, opinion.

373 We may conclude that cognition obtains knowledge, assumptions because  
 374 it is based on the subject-object ontology, which takes its origin in the tran-  
 375 scendental sphere. The transcendental sphere is a domain, which gives the  
 376 possibility of subject-object division a priori, though, in fact, there is no such  
 377 division. This sphere makes it possible to mould one's views, since it refers a  
 378 subject which views the world to an object. Pay your attention to the fact that  
 379 Kant in his works does not mention the truth; he writes only about knowledge  
 380 which is formed as a result of synthesis of a priori commonsensual schemes  
 381 and sense data. In the words of Kant:

382 Thus, the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only condi-  
 383 tions whereby our understanding receives an application to objects, and consequently significance.  
 384 Finally, therefore, the categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they serve merely  
 385 to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by means of an a priori necessary unity  
 386 (on account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original apperception); and so to  
 387 render them susceptible of a complete connection in one experience.<sup>12</sup>

388 Simultaneously, in the practical sphere the moral imperative is proclaimed  
 389 as the law of behaviour. For transcendental philosophy the truth is “thing in  
 390 itself”, that is why Kant does not mention it. But the question arises: why did  
 391 ancient Greeks consider the truth to be unhidden? Because thinking and being  
 392 are identical. So, we may conclude that man does not think and he/she is not  
 393 *Homo sapiens*. The truth is not knowledge that appears on the basis of full or  
 394 partly transcendental synthesis of commonsensual schemes and sense data. It  
 395 is this transcendental synthesis that hides the truth and prevents from the con-  
 396 templation of it. The majority of scholars consider that thinking consists of  
 397 representations, opinions and images, but it is not thinking, which is not being.  
 398 How can we name the thinking, which excludes representations, opinions and  
 399 images? It is contemplation. What can we contemplate? The truth, which is not  
 400 conditioned by anything. It merely *is* (*is* derives from *to be*).

## IS THE PHENOMENON OF NON-INTENTIONAL

401 When an individual contemplates the truth then the division between “prac-  
 402 tical” and “theoretical” knowledge does not appear. Because the truth is  
 403 simultaneously an action. Thus the truth liberates an individual from doubts,  
 404 hesitation, from the division into “theory” and “practice”. The contemplation  
 405 of truth makes an individual conscious. What is consciousness in esotericism?  
 406 The consciousness does not need the observer and the observable, that is, the  
 407 subject and the object. We can compare phenomenology and esotericism only  
 408 in those limits, in which phenomenology tries to overcome the rupture between  
 409 Self and world, tries to come back to thing themselves, that is, to the sense and  
 410 the truth, which is the same for Gods, angels and men: “What is true is abso-  
 411 lutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men,  
 412 angels or gods apprehend and judge it.”<sup>13</sup>

413 In other aspects they differ, because phenomenology stops on the transcen-  
 414 dental level, meanwhile as esotericism goes ahead, to the transcendent level,  
 415 where the strange things happen, which seem to be absurd for transcenden-  
 416 tal phenomenology and naturalistic sciences. For example, the contemplation  
 417 without the observer and the observable, the thinking and being are the same  
 418 things, the wholeness, which does not include neither subject nor object.

419 I would not like to make categorical conclusion, as there is a certain task for  
 420 an individual, the task of development. We can suppose that human being is  
 421 unfinished being. Thus the transcendental level of cognition is transitional.

422 But nobody can force an individual to develop. The phenomenology may  
 423 discover the structure of individual up to the transcendental level and shows  
 424 conditioning of our behaviour and knowledge, the mode of reflection where  
 425 there is no freedom. And if an individual wants to remain on this level this is  
 426 up to him/her. But those of us who decide to go ahead, should understand that  
 427 freedom is not given gratis; it demands the radical changes and the one, who is  
 428 afraid of them will not go further then the transcendental level.

429  
 430 *The Author is Associate Professor of Philosophy Department at National*  
 431 *University “L’viv Polytechnika”*

## NOTES

436 <sup>1</sup> Martin Buber (1970), Introduction Walter Kaufmann and trans. Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 55.

437 <sup>2</sup> Immanuel Kant, <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cprn10.txt>.

438 <sup>3</sup> Martin Heidegger (1962), trans. Macquarrie J. and Robinson E., p. 39.

439 <sup>4</sup> Martin Buber (1965), ed. Maurice Friedman and trans. Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor  
 Smith, pp. 80–81.

440 <sup>5</sup> Martin Buber (1970), Introduction Walter Kaufmann and trans. Charles Scribner’s Sons, p. 112.

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- 441 <sup>6</sup> Translator's Introduction in Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist*  
442 *Theory of Consciousness*, translated and annotated with an introduction by Forrest Williams and  
443 Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), p. 22.  
444 <sup>7</sup> William Desmond (1995), p. 45.  
445 <sup>8</sup> William James (1912), p. 1.  
446 <sup>9</sup> Parmenides, <http://www.davemckay.co.uk/philosophy/parmenides/parmenides.on.nature.php>.  
447 <sup>10</sup> Immanuel Kant, <http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt>.  
448 <sup>11</sup> We make difference between the notions of "awakeness" and "consciousness". When a man  
449 does not sleep he/she is awake, that is, he/she is able to perceive the objects of the world and  
450 himself/herself as a subject that confronts these objects. But notion of "consciousness" means the  
451 overcoming of this confrontation and the perception of wholeness which is beyond subject-object  
452 relations.  
453 <sup>12</sup> Immanuel Kant, <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cprn10.txt>.  
454 <sup>13</sup> Edmund Husserl (2000), trans. J. N. Findlay with a new Preface by Michael Dummett and  
455 edition with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran, p. 79.

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459 Desmond, W. *Being and the Between* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995).  
460 Heidegger, M. *Being and Time* (New York, Harper & Row, 1962).  
461 Husserl, E. *Logical Investigations* (London and New York, Routledge, 2 vols., Vol. 1, 2000).  
462 James, W. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York, Longmans, 1912).  
463 Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*. <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cprn10.txt>  
464 Kant I. *Critique of Practical Reason*. <http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reason.txt>  
465 Parmenides. *On Nature*. <http://www.davemckay.co.uk/philosophy/Parmenides/parmenides.on.nature.php>  
466 Sartre, J.-P. *The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness* (New York, Octagon Books, 1972).

481 **Is the Phenomenon of Non-Intentional "Self-**  
482 **Other" Relation Possible**

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