12

Lovers in the Age of the Beloveds: Classical Ottoman Divan Literature and the Dialectical Tradition

Mehmet Karabela

When we say, "God is love," we are saying something very great and true. But it would be senseless to grasp this saying in a simple-minded way as a simple definition, without analyzing what love is.

Hegel[1]

Introduction

The debate over the relationship between literature and philosophy has intensified in the past decade, with the growth of modern literary theory in the wake of deconstruction and an increasingly philosophical approach to the interpretation of the text. However, as this debate intensified in modern Western academia, there has been no large-scale application of philosophical analysis to literature, particularly Middle Eastern literatures. This chapter is an attempt to fill that gap by analyzing traditional archetypes of divan literature – *ʿāşık* (lover), *maʿşūk* (beloved), and *rakīb* (opponent) – to reveal the presence of a dialectical discourse in Ottoman love poems written between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In both style and

content divan poems display a comprehensive understanding of the post-classical Islamic philosophical conception of dialectic and argumentation theory, known as *ādāb al-baḥth wa al-munāẓara*. The focus on Ottoman love poetry and Islamic argumentation theory in this paper aims to demonstrate (a) how the love poetry that developed in Ottoman culture in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is more dialectical in form and content than Ottoman literary studies have recognized heretofore and (b) that philosophy and literature are not fully distinct entities in Middle Eastern literatures.

This short study focuses on the three main figures in Ottoman divan poetry – *ʿāşık* (lover), *maʿşūk* (beloved), and *rakīb* (rival)[2] – in order to demonstrate the existence of a dialectical discourse in which love becomes a competition between *ʿāşık* and *rakīb* for the *maʿşūk*, the object of love.[3] Such a dialectical framework is helpful for identifying conceptual oppositions in love and the use of antithetical language, such as that between *ʿāşık* and *rakīb*. Our concentration on love poems will also provide a useful starting point for future research on the relationship between literature and philosophy in Ottoman literary studies.

Debates on Philosophy and Literature

The relationship between philosophy and literature has long been contested by philosophers and poets, going as far back as Plato.[4] Over the past decade, the debate over whether philosophy and literature are one and the same or not has intensified.[5] The attempt to clarify the relationship between these two domains has become more urgent. For writers like Octavio Paz, philosophy and poetry were entirely different modes of approaching reality, while for others, like the analytic philosopher Richard Rorty, the traditional divisions between philosophy as the realm of "reason" and poetry as the realm of "emotion" were problematic.[6]

In this context there has been an increased interest in literary theory, especially in the era of a postmodernist and poststructuralist turn against the modernist view of art as irrational and philosophy a strictly rational realm.[7] As a result of deconstructionist literary criticism, the concept of "the text" has been expanded, summed up by Jacques Derrida's famous claim that "there is nothing outside the text."[8] Derrida pointed out that

modernist thinkers place philosophy above literature since they see philosophy as rational and not involved in the use of rhetorical tropes or metaphorical language. Derrida, by contrast, did not see any difference between philosophy and literature in this respect, and so he argued that literature can be used in philosophy to the same extent that philosophy can be categorized as literature.[9]

The result of these theoretical debates has been a broader application of literary theories to any kind of text, whether philosophical, historical, religious, or political, or the inverse: applying philosophical analysis to literary texts to show how philosophy can benefit from literature.[10] Some scholars have focused on the dialectical nature of literature by highlighting specific examples of the role of contradictions (thesis and antithesis) in medieval and modern literature. James A. W. Rembert showed that the question-and-answer method, which he calls the "dialectical tradition," is the one Jonathan Swift (d. 1745), for example, used in his works.[11] Rembert compares Swift's method of argument and reasoning to the Aristotelian model expressed in detail in Aristotle's *Topics*.[12]

Recently, Ksana Blank, in *Dostoevsky's Dialectics and the Problem of Sin*, analyzed the dialectical nature of Dostoevsky's works, including *Crime and Punishment*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, *The Idiot*, *Notes from Underground*, and "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man."[13] Blank borrows from ancient Greek, Chinese, and Christian dialectical traditions to show a dynamic aspect of Dostoevsky's dialectics as a philosophy of compatible contradictions. These studies found the concept of truth in literature to be based not on logic, but on dialogue and contradiction, even though the authors were very well aware of Aristotelian logic and dialectic.

Dialectical Discourse in Ottoman Divan Love Poetry

However, these developments took place exclusively in the context of European and North American academic circles.[14] In this respect, classical Ottoman literature has not been thoroughly examined, especially when compared with Western scholarship in the field to date.[15] This chapter will use traditional archetypes of divan literature as "core samples," namely, the *ʿāşık* (lover), the *maʿşūk* (beloved), and the *rakīb* (opponent), in order to show

dialectical forms in Ottoman love poems that have a clear philosophical underpinning.[16] We will see how the divan poets consciously constructed a dialectical discourse through the extensive use of binary opposition.

In Islamic argumentation theory, the objective of dialectical discourse is to test the foundations of opposite points of view.[17] According to this theory, the dialectic between the questioner (*sā'il*) and the respondent (*muʿallil*) occurs in order to find the truth (*ṣavāb*) in the argumentation and the real concern is to distinguish the strong (true) argument from the weak (false) one.[18] There are two sides in argumentation, questioner and respondent, with one side defending a thesis while the other attacks it.[19] In Ottoman divan poetry, likewise, there are two sides in love: the *ʿāşık* and his opponent the *rakīb*. Both want to win the *maʿşūk*. The *ʿāşık* makes his claim as a thesis – "I love this girl"[20] – and the *rakīb* consistently challenges until the *ʿāşık* gives up or is silenced so that the *rakīb* wins the beloved although the *rakīb* is not as ambitious as the *ʿāşık*. Nineteenth-century dictionaries, such as *Lügât-ı Nâcî* and *Kâmûs-u Türkî*, define *rakīb* as someone who loves another person's lover, or, an intruder who does not value the union of two hearts.[21] In most cases, the *rakīb* is a male who chases someone else's female lover instead of finding one of his own.

Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, in his study *Rakīb'e Dair* (On *rakīb*), mentions the great struggle and confusion over the role and meaning of the *rakīb* in the game of love. He says that until the sixteenth century, the role of *rakīb* in poetic texts was that of a protector or guardian of the girl against the pseudo-lovers (weak arguers).[22] However, from the sixteenth century on, the perception of the old *rakīb* changes: as attested in divan poetry, the *rakīb* was now seen as the enemy of lovers (*adū'/aʿdā*) or the "other" (*ghayr/aghyār*).[23] This change is accounted for in the *rakīb*'s behavior, as he begins to openly challenge the *ʿāşık* by claiming proprietorship over the *maʿşūk*.

The following examples from Ottoman divan poetry reveal this tension between the three players in love:

> *Yār içūn aghyār ile merdāne ceng itsem gerek*
> *İt gibi murdar rakīb ölmezse yār elden gider*[24]

> For my love, to fight bravely against the enemy is a must
> If the *rakīb* does not die like a dog, my lover will go [from my hands]

288

> *Bular birbirinun ışkına hayran*
> *Rakīb ortada fitne sanki şeytan*[25]

> They cherish their love for each other
> *Rakīb* is a trouble-maker between us like Satan[26]

> *Ara yirde rakīb itden çoğidi*
> *Ol iki ʿāşıka rahat yoğidi*[27]

> There were more *rakīb*s than dogs
> There was no rest for the two lovers

These poems contain a specific collection of polar opposites since dialectical discourse in these poems gives readers a clear choice between good (the *ʿāşık*) and evil (the *rakīb*). The *rakīb* is often described as a mainstay figure, who always poses a potential threat – and challenge to the lover – to the two lovers. Halīlī (d. 1485), in his *Fürkatnāme* (Book of separation), writes:

> *Bana çekdürdi cevr ile cefāyı*
> *Rakībe sürdürdi zevk ü sefāyı*[28]

> She made me suffer
> And she gave *rakīb* a good time

Analysis of the Dialectical Discourse in Poems

While early Greeks used dialectical discourse to explore the truth, divan poets used it to *declare* the truth, as evidenced by the frequent use of imperatives in their text. The truth is a foregone conclusion in the works of these poets: the *ʿāşık* deserves the girl.[29] Albeit the *ʿāşık* does not question the logic of his entitlement to the beloved, he does not question why the beloved is still more attracted to the less pure persona depicted as the *rakīb*.[30] The poet is confident that the *maʿşūk*, is in fact attracted to him, and *rakīb* is merely a well-utilized diversion. Poets often attempt to convince the reader that were there *no rakīb*, the *ʿāşık* and the *maʿşūk* would live happily ever after. As such, the *rakīb* was characterized as a mere obstacle for the absolute union of "true lovers."[31]

Since it is almost impossible to escape the threats posed by the *rakīb*, the only way to be relieved of that anxiety (*rakīb*) was to wait for his death. Necātī (d. 1509) thought that this was futile because "one dog [*rakīb*] will die, but there will be other dogs who come along soon."[32] The only way to get rid of this demon figure, the famous Ottoman poet Bākī (d. 1600) says, is to snuff him yourself instead of waiting for his death:

> *Ser-i kūyunda ger gavgā-yı uşşāk olmasın dirsen*
> *Rakīb-i kāfiri öldür ne ceng ü ne cidāl olsun*[33]

> If you want there to be no fighting among lovers
> Kill the infidel *rakīb* so that there is no war and quarrel

In this sense, divan literature also attempts to understand the nature of love by seeing it as an open-ended question between the *ʿāşık* and the *rakīb*. The *rakīb* tries to infiltrate amorous space occupied by Leylā and Mecnūn, Hüsrev and Şirin, or Vāmık and Azra.[34] Dialectic in love is distinct in the sense that it could be called "speech between two opposing emotions."

Two opposing emotions are created in the heart of the beloved (*maʿşūk*) by two real participants (*ʿāşık* and *rakīb*) to test which one is truer. The *rakīb* always questions both the lover and the beloved, and his role is to push the *ʿāşık* to define the nature of ʿ*aşk* (love), simply by token of his opposition. The point here is that the dialectic between the lover and his opponent is meant to distinguish strong, true love from weak, false love. This is akin to the tenets of Islamic argumentation theory, whose principal concern is to distinguish the strong (true) argument from the weak (false) one. In Persian poetry, among others, the words *ṣaḥīḥ* (true), *saqīm* (false), *ḥaqq* (truth), and *bāṭil* (falsity) are used to differentiate between true and false love. For *rakīb*, in the *ādāb al-baḥth wa al-munāẓara* the following terms should be of interest: *māni* (Ar. *māniʿ*, "stopper/hinderer"), *müddeʿi* (Ar. *muddaʿī*, "opponent/perpetrator") and *muʿārız* (Ar. *muʿāriḍ*, "opponent/nay-sayer") were used. Ottoman poetry has been greatly influenced by Arabic and Persian poetry in terms of rhetorical terminology.[35]

The dialectical relationship between *ʿāşık*, *maʿşūk*, and *rakīb* can also be described as a verbal battle against an opponent in which the poet makes the participants – the proponent of love (*ʿāşık*) and the questioner

290

of love (*rakīb*) – debate a thesis (love), answer objections (to the accusation of not loving), and offer evidences of their fealty. In fact, divan love poetry is more like a public debate than a convivial joinder among the participants. The term "Lover" in divan poetry highlights the real dilemma of whether the *rakīb* opposes the nonfigurative concepts of love and the figurative lover.[36] As indicated, according to the Islamic *ādāb al-baḥth wa al-munāẓara* theory, the objective of argumentation is to find the truth even in the hands of one's opponent[37] Does the *rakīb* want, then, to demonstrate the fallacy of the *ʿāşık*'s thesis (his love for the *maʿşūk*), or to demolish him and win the girl for himself? In other words, keeping in mind the terms of *ādāb al-baḥth*, is the *rakīb* trying to find the truth, or is he aiming at victory?

Although the answer is ambiguous, it makes one thing clear: dialectical discourse in divan poems refers to a philosophy of conflict rather than a reciprocal relationship between binary opposites, since the three archetypes in the game of love (*ʿāşık*, *maʿşūk*, and *rakīb*) are not in a mutual relationship but instead opposed to each other. In this respect, there are two major antimonies that can be highlighted in divan love poetry, each containing a thesis and an antithesis. The first is the antimony of love, which cannot be attained by mere mortals like the *ʿāşık*. The first, begs the question as to why one would want to take such a path, peppered with incompatibility and pain and destined for unrequited love. The second is the antinomy of truth: the *ʿāşık* is aware of the inequality that exists in the dynamics of this relationship, yet he genuinely feels that he knows how to love his beloved better than his opponent. The *ʿāşık* presents a resistance to the *rakīb* (the intervening villain), but not to the *maʿşūk*. The *ʿāşık* knows that the *maʿşūk* is happy with the *rakīb*, but justifies lying with the *maʿşūk*, and continues to place all blame on the *rakīb*. Although the *ʿāşık* questions himself, he never questions the authority of the *maʿşūk*: she has the final say.

In more illustrative terms, the *ʿāşık* is depicted as a helpless servant to the *maʿşūk*. The figure of the *maʿşūk* is likened to a sadomasochist who enjoys his pain.[38] Therefore, reconciliation is never in the cards. If we look at the *ʿāşık* and the *maʿşūk* from a Hegelian dialectical perspective, the master (the *maʿşūk*) and the slave (the *ʿāşık*) remain so inter-dependent that coexistence becomes all but the only option.[39] This in turn demands that the master be recognized by the servant; consequently the master becomes

the slave and the slave becomes the master (of the master). Furthermore, the choice between freedom and bondage is no choice at all as the slave consciously, if paradoxically, chooses bondage. The paradox in the lover's pursuit of union seems to be that domination, separation, and servitude are necessary for personal growth, but the final goal of achieving unity, nay oneness, with the *ma'ṣūk* may not be possible.[40]

Conclusion

As we have seen, Ottoman divan love poetry accommodates both literary and philosophical approaches to reading texts, validating the postmodernist view of the relationship between literature and philosophy. The tripartite nature of love (*'āşık–ma'ṣūk–rakīb)* in divan love poems raises fundamental questions about the relationship between philosophy and literature as well. If philosophy revolves around truth, intellect, and the literal use of language, and the literature focuses on fiction, emotion, and metaphorical language, then how do we interpret the divan love poems, particularly the dialectical discourse that exists among the role players? The overlap of philosophy and literature in the Ottoman intellectual history displays hybrid forms of cultural production.

The dialectical discourse in classical Ottoman literature, suggested in this study, is based on the philosophical insights of Islamic dialectic and argumentation theory. It explains how the divan poets use this philosophical genre to create a plausible structure for the reader. This dialectical discourse analysis of *'āşık, ma'ṣūk*, and the *rakīb* can better accommodate the use of the dual languages of philosophy and literature than previous scholarship in this field has allowed. Although philosophy and literature seem to be distinct, both can be exemplified in the very same text. Such combinations may have the potential to achieve more than the sum of the two parts. Philosophical approaches can account for the power of literary works that are not overtly philosophical.

This chapter shows also that Ottoman divan poets developed a dialectical understanding of love in which love ('*aşk*) creates and sustains differences between *'āşık, ma'ṣūk*, and *rakīb*. The main point in these poems is that love does not obliterate the differences, but uses them for *ma'ṣūk*'s benefit in the most effective way. In evaluating Ottoman divan love poetry and

its philosophical foundations, the future research may benefit immensely from seeking answers in theoretically based comparative literature studies about the following two questions. The first question being how does Ottoman love poetry compare with the medieval European conception of *amour courtois* (courtly love) to discern what might constitute differences or similarities between those genres? And the second question the Hegelian master-slave dialectic: how does the treatment of dialectics in Hegel allow us to widen the field of literary formats in which we look for and develop philosophical concepts in classical Ottoman literature?

Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, trans. P. C. Hodgson, R. F. Brown, and J. M. Stewart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 418.

2. These are the Turkish pronunciations of the Arabic terms *ʿāshiq*, *maʿshūq*, and *raqīb*, respectively.

3. This study will also examine some terms used in Arabic and Persian poetry, especially given that the latter influenced the Ottoman divan literature. On the enemies of love in an Arabo-Andalusian context, see Patrizia Onesta, "Lauzinger-Wāshī-Index, Gardador-Custos: The 'Enemies of Love' in Provençal, Arabo-Andalusian, and Latin Poetry," *Scripta Mediterranea* 19/20 (1998–9): 119–42.

4. On the quarrel between philosophy and literature (or poetry) in antiquity leading up to the contemporary conversations and polemics between the two disciplines, see Susan B. Levin, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Literature Revisited: Plato and the Greek Literary Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)*;* Raymond Barfield, *The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Grace Ledbetter, *Poetics before Plato: Interpretation and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Ramona Naddaff, *Exiling the Poets: The Production of Censorship in Plato's Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Colin Davis, *Critical Excess: Overreading in Derrida, Deleuze, Levinas, Žižek and Cavell* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

5. For these debates in detail, see Richard Eldridge, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Arthur C. Danto, "Philosophy as/and/of Literature," in *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*, ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 3–23; Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Borge's 'Pierre Menard': Philosophy or Literature?" in *Literary Philosophers: Borges, Calvino, Eco*, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia,

293

Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Rudolph Gasche (New York: Routledge, 2002), 85–107; William Irwin, "Philosophy and the Philosophical, Literature and the Literary, Borges and the Labyrinthine," in *Literary Philosophers*, 27–45; Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, *Truth, Fiction and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Stein Haugom Olsen, "Thematic Concepts: Where Philosophy Meets Literature," *Philosophy and Literature* 16 (1983): 75–93; Hans Peter Rickman, *Philosophy in Literature* (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996); Berel Lang, *The Anatomy of Philosophical Style: Literary Philosophy and the Philosophy of Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Martha C. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Ole Martin Skilleås, *Philosophy and Literature: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001).

6. For Paz's thought on the relationship between philosophy and poetry, see Hugo Moreno, "Octavio Paz's Poetic Reply to Hegel's Philosophical Legacy," in *Octavio Paz: Humanism and Critique*, ed. Oliver Kozlarek (Bielefeld: Verlag, 2009), 217–30. For Rorty, philosophy becomes a kind of literature, which means a philosophical text becomes a literary text – a text offering a particular philosopher's worldview. Rorty developed his ideas in his two books: *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For Rorty's views on philosophy and literature, see Lothar Bredella, "Richard Rorty on Philosophy, Literature, and Hermeneutics," in *Literature and Philosophy*, ed. Herbert Grabes, REAL: Yearbook of Research in English and American Literature 13 (Tübingen: Verlag, 1997), 103–24. Recently, philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum, Peter J. McCormick, Bernard Harrison, and Richard Wollheim have made a turnaround with a more accommodating attitude toward literature, especially the novel, to seek answers for philosophical problems since philosophy was unable to tell the whole story.

7. An increasing interest was initiated in the wake of Rorty's *The Linguistic Turn* (1967), which was largely influenced by the theories of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Later, in the 1970s, the broader disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, shaped by Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralism and the poststructuralism expounded by Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, recognized the importance of language as a structuring agent, further popularizing the notion of the linguistic turn. The power of language in historical discourse, particularly its rhetorical tropes and use of metaphors, has been clearly illustrated by Hayden White. Language has also become a central focus in the history of ideas to which Quentin Skinner's work on recent intellectual history attests. For debates over the relationship between philosophy and literature (or the linguistic turn in philosophy that challenged the foundation of philosophy), see Raman Selden and Peter Widdowson, *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 125–202.

294

8. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158.

9. For Derrida's ideas on the relationship between philosophy and literature, see the interview section in his *Acts of Literature*, edited by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 33–75. There have also been studies on Derrida's thought about the dichotomy between philosophy and literature: Mark Edmundson, *Literature against Philosophy: Plato to Derrida* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Geoffrey H. Hartman, *Saving the Text: Literature/Derrida/Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Simon Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone, eds, *Derrida's Legacies: Literature and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

10. Donald Kelley, "What Is Happening to the History of Ideas?" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990): 3–25.

11. James A. W. Rembert, *Swift and the Dialectical Tradition* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988).

12. For example, in Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, when Gulliver finishes his long discourse, his Majesty raises many doubts, queries, and objections. The nature of the king's questions and comparison of accounts and subsequent answers serve to point out the many problems in Gulliver's representation in the pursuit of finding the truth.

13. Ksana Blank, *Dostoevsky's Dialectics and the Problem of Sin* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010).

14. In the past decade, there have also been efforts to open new departments under the title "Philosophy and Literature" or "Program in Literature and Philosophy" in North American and European universities.

15. Even though the hierarchical relationships between the *maʿşūk*, *ʿāşık*, and *rakīb* have been studied in the context of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's famous "court metaphor" (*saray istiaresi*) concept by Neslihan Koç Keskin, her study mainly focuses on the impact of the political structure of the Ottoman state and not the philosophical analysis of the literature. See Neslihan Koç Keskin, "Maşûk, Âşık ve Rakip Arasındaki Hiyerarşik İlişkiler," *Turkish Studies: International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 5, no. 3 (2010): 400–20.

16. Up until now, there has not been a single study on the dialectical tradition in Ottoman literature. However, there have been two important studies that engage with different aspects of the *maʿşūk* and the *rakīb*. See Walter G. Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı, *The Age of Beloved: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); and Matthias Kappler, "The Beloved and His Otherness: Reflections on 'Ethnic' and Religious Stereotypes in Ottoman Love Poetry," in *Intercultural Aspects in and around Turkic Literatures.*

Proceedings of the International Conference Held on October 11th–12th, 2003 in Nicosia, ed. Matthias Kappler (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), 37–48. For an analysis of the archetype of the *rakīb*, see Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, *rakîbʾe Dair* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1995) and Metin Akkuş, *Nefʾî Divanı'nda Tipler ve Kişilikler* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1995).

17. On *ādābü'l-bahs veʾl-münāzara* in postclassical Islamic intellectual history within a broader context, see Mehmet Karabela, "Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-classical Islamic Intellectual History" (PhD diss., McGill University, 2011).

18. The influence of argumentation theory on the Ottoman legal system shows not only the existence of competing doctrines and opinions, but also the level and hierarchy of opinions in legal practice. There was a real contest regarding which doctrine (*mezheb*) or which answer (*cevāb*) to a question (*mesʾele*) was the *strongest* or the *best*. This was one of the reasons why Ottoman judges were required to pass their judgments according to "the soundest opinions of the Ḥanafi jurists (*eṣaḥḥ-ı akvāl*), never the weak ones." Any judgment that had been based upon weak opinions in the Ḥanafi school of law was deemed invalid, meaning that the case in question could be reheard. See Ebussuud Efendi, "Maʿrûzât" in *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri* (Istanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1992), 4:39–50.

19. Taşköprüzâde, "Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth," MS 4430, Ayasofya Collection, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, fols. 1b–2b; Taşköprüzâde, "Sharḥ," MS 4430, Ayasofya Collection, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, fols. 3b–5b. On Taşköprüzâde (d. 1561) and his theory in detail, see Karabela, "Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory," 165–9.

20. Although the gender of the *maʿṣūk* (beloved) is not clear in the divan love poetry, since the *maʿṣūk* is characterized sometimes as a female and sometimes as a male, I have chosen to present the *maʿṣūk* as female. The rationale for my choice is that poets, most of the time, provide female body figures as the idealized form of the *maʿṣūk*. However, the reader should be aware of the fact that the *maʿṣūk* lacks gender and is rather an idealized body form, which includes a slim waist, long hair, and plump lips. See Ömer Faruk Akün, "Divan Edebiyatı," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 9:416–17 and Nevin Gümüş, "Yahya Nazım Divanında Sevgiliye Ait Güzellik Unsurları ile Aşık-Maşuk-Rakip Münasebeti," *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 17 (1997): 231–48.

21. Cited in Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 1. The original definitions of *rakîb* in the two Ottoman dictionaries are as follows: (a) *Lügat-ı Nâcî*: "Diğerini men" ile kendi işini tervîc etmeğe çalışan, engel," and (b) *Kâmûs-u Türkî*: "Diğeriyle aynı şeye tâlib ve hâhişger olan, bir mahbûbeye dildâde olan aşıkların yekdiğerlerine nisbeten beheri." For the Arabic definition of *raqīb*, see Edward William Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, 3:1134.

296

22. In some cases, the *rakīb* was hired by the beloved's husband or the girl's parents for the duty of surveillance. This was an Arabic custom with roots in ancient Bedouin society; see Onesta, "Lauzinger-Wāshī-Index, Gardador-Custos," 129.

23. Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 11–15.

24. Avnī (Fātiḥ Sulṭān Meḥmet), *Divān*, ed. Kemal Edip Ünsel (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1946), 46; also cited in Ahmet Atillâ Şentürk, "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler–Rakîb," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 20 (1997), 342.

25. Akşemseddînzâde Hamdullah Hamdī (d. 1504), "Leyla ve Mecnun," İstanbul Üniversitesi Library, MS Türkçe Yazmalar 800, fols. 20a; cited in Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 22.

26. Satan was seen as the *rakīb* in divan literature due to his opposition to Adam, in the *Fall* narrative**.** It is worth mentioning here that the Muslim theologian and heresiographer Shahristānī (d. 1153), in his *Kitāb al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (The book of religion and sects), portrays Satan as a skeptic questioner (*sāʾil*) asking questions of angels and God (depicted as *mujīb* or "respondent"), providing the debate in argumentation (*munāẓara*) format. See ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī, *Kitāb al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Azhār, 1947), 12–17.

27. Akşemseddînzâde, "Leyla ve Mecnun," fols. 20a. Also cited in Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 22.

28. Halîlî, *Fürkat-Nāme*, couplet 931–2. See Orhan Kemal Tavukçu, ed., *Halîlî and His "Fürkat-nāme": Introduction, Analysis, Critical Edition, Facsimile* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

29. For these examples, see Şentürk, "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler," 395–411.

30. Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 20–4.

31. Ibid., "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler," 386–8.

32. Ibid., *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 78.

33. Cited in Şentürk, "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler," 384. The poet's full name is Maḥmūd Abdülbākī (1526–1600), and he came to be known as *Sulṭān al-Shuʿarāʾ* or "Sultan of poets" in Ottoman literature.

34. Akkuş, *Nefʾî Divanı'nda Tipler ve Kişilikler*, 31.

35. In this respect, see Julie Scott Meisami's study *Medieval Persian Court Poetry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 268–70. For some examples, see Şentürk, *Rakîbʾe Dair*, 7–21 and Şentürk, "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler," 388–96.

36. Akkuş, *Nefʾî Divanı'nda Tipler ve Kişilikler*, 24–31.

37. Taşköprüzâde, "Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth," fols. 1b–2a.

38. On the divan psychology of love, see Akün, "Divan Edebiyatı," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* 9:415–16.

39. The master-slave relationship provoked philosophical commentary from Aristotle to Derrida, who questioned it in his *Of Grammatology* and *The Politics*

of Friendship. However, no single philosopher has explored the political, historical, and psychological implications of this basic human power struggle for recognition in more depth than Hegel in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1804).

40. "Hiç neyleyeyim bu dil-i âvâreyi bilmem. Ne vuslata kâdir sana ne firkate sâbir." See Nev'î, *Divân*, ed. Mertol Tulum and M. Ali Tanyeri (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayını, 1977), 237.

Bibliography

'Abd al-Karīm al-Shahristānī. *Kitāb al-Milal wa al-Nihal*. Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Azhār, 1947.

Akkuş, Metin. *Nef'î Divanı'nda Tipler ve Kişilikler*. Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1995.

Akşemseddînzâde, Hamdullâh Hamdî. *Leyla ve Mecnun*. MS 800 Türkçe Yazmalar Collection, İstanbul Üniversitesi Library.

Akün, Ömer Faruk. "Divan Edebiyatı." In *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988–2014), 44 vols., 9:389–427.

Andrews, Walter G., and Mehmet Kalpaklı. *The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.

Avnî (Fātiḥ Sulṭān Meḥmet). *Divân*. Edited by Kemal Edip Ünsel. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1946.

Blank, Ksana. *Dostoevsky's Dialectics and the Problem of Sin*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010.

Bredella, Lothar. "Richard Rorty on Philosophy, Literature, and Hermeneutics." In *Literature and Philosophy*, ed. Herbert Grabes. REAL: Yearbook of Research in English and American Literature 13. Tübingen: Narr, 1997, 103–24.

Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

——— *Acts of Literature*. Edited by Derek Attridge. London: Routledge, 1992.

Efendi, Ebussuud. "Maʿrûzât." In *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, ed. Ahmet Akgündüz, 4 vols. Istanbul: Fey Vakfı, 1992.

Gümüş, Nevin. "Yahya Nazım Divanında Sevgiliye Ait Güzellik Unsurları ile Aşık-Maşuk-Rakip Münasebeti." *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 17 (1997): 231–48.

Halîlî. *Halîlî and His "Fürkat-nāme": Introduction, Analysis, Critical Edition, Facsimile*. Edited by Orhan Kemal Tavukçu. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Kappler, Matthias. "The Beloved and His Otherness: Reflections on 'Ethnic' and Religious Stereotypes in Ottoman Love Poetry." In *Intercultural Aspects in and around Turkic Literatures: Proceedings of the International Conference*

Held on October 11th–12th, 2003 in Nicosia, edited by Matthias Kappler. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006, 37–48.

Karabela, Mehmet. "Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-classical Islamic Intellectual History." PhD diss, McGill University, 2011.

Kelley, Donald. "What Is Happening to the History of Ideas?" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51 (1990): 3–25.

Keskin, Neslihan Koç. "Maşûk, Âşık ve Rakip Arasındaki Hiyerarşik İlişkiler." *Turkish Studies: International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 5, no. 3 (2010): 400–20.

Meisami, Julie Scott. *Medieval Persian Court Poetry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Moreno, Hugo. "Octavio Paz's Poetic Reply to Hegel's Philosophical Legacy." In *Octavio Paz: Humanism and Critique*, edited by Oliver Kozlarek, 217–30. Bielefeld: Verlag, 2009.

Nev'î. *Divân*. Edited by Mertol Tulum and M. Ali Tanyeri. Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayını, 1977.

Nussbaum, Martha C. *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Onesta, Patrizia. "Lauzinger-Wāshī-Index, Gardador-Custos: The 'Enemies of Love' in Provençal, Arabo-Andalusian, and Latin Poetry." *Scripta Mediterranea* 19/20 (1998–9): 119–42.

Rembert, James A. W. *Swift and the Dialectical Tradition*. New York: St. Martin's, 1988.

Selden, Raman, and Peter Widdowson. *A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993.

Şentürk, Ahmet Atillâ. *Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatı Tiplerinden Rakîb'e Dair*. Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1995.

——— "Klasik Osmanlı Edebiyatında Tipler – Rakîb." *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 20 (1997): 333–413.

Taşköprüzâde. *Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth*. MS 4430. Ayasofya Collection, Süleymaniye Library.

299