Abstract
In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism.
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Notes
This kind of realism, as Putnam argues, denounces traditional metaphysics and puts science in its place (Putnam 1983, 205–228). Realism of that kind can be seen as a particular kind of a more general approach. We can call it “metaphysical approach” in order to differentiate it from semantic or epistemic ones. However, the paper is not directed against metaphysical accounts of realism in general. For example, although the project of specifying the nature of the truthmakers can be equally registered as a metaphysical-ontological approach to realism, it will remain intact (for a version of this project see Baç (2003)).
This approach is supported by the following methodological point made by Devitt: any philosophical inquiry must rely primarily on results in domains in which we feel more confident about our theories. Evidential support and reliable methods are characteristics of common sense and the natural sciences. In contrast to that, sciences and philosophical accounts concerning how we, as natural systems, represent the external world are not thought to be so reliable yet. Thus, it is reasonable to begin with our ontological commitments in domains we feel more confident and then try to account for the way we actually manage to be in a position to know what we know. The metaphysical-ontological issues are (and should be taken to be) prior of any epistemological or semantic issue related to realism. For an interesting argument against Devitt’s methodological point see Gauker (2006).
As an insightful reviewer rightly noted, Devitt would not endorse this option.
When he does offer direct arguments they are about the internal inconsistency of the rival arguments.
Notice that here the term ‘metaphysical’ does not mean ‘ontological’. The metaphysical question of mind-independence may also have epistemic and semantic implications.
Khlentzos (2004) takes that VA primarily questions the justifiability of having a belief in a mind-independent reality. According to him, the importance of antirealist challenges boils down to the fact that they evince the unjustified character of holding the belief that a mind-independent structure of the world exists, even if it exists. To my mind, VA primarily questions the intelligibility of a coherent conception of a mind-independent world in the first place. In other words, it concerns first of all the status of the content of the relevant proposition and in a derivative way the justification of believing it.
Devitt’s distinction between realism and physicalism can be compatible with the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue—and the respective commitment to the fundamentality of a specific ontology—if we take realism to be connected to physical objects in general (the physical objects of common sense and the physical entities of the natural sciences) whereas physicalism consists in the stronger claim that only the entities of physics exist. The specific ontology that needs to be present in realism according to my view can be different from the one posited by physicalism. So, it is not valid, as the reviewer suggests, that keeping realism and physicalism apart one is not committed to the fundamentality of a specific ontology: one can be committed to the existence of physical objects in general and not only to the ones posited by physics. I examine that case in the next section. Notice, also, that even in the case of numbers Devitt says that if they exist they must be abstract physical entities. I think that to insist that the physical nature generally construed is the specific ontology that Devitt endorses is closer to his view than to accept that his realism is compatible with any ontology.
Of course there are domains where we cannot trace external resistance and worldly constraints to our theorizing. My concern here is about domains where we do trace these features since only these are relevant to the problem of realism.
It is obvious that by simply granting the facts (that make the relevant propositions true) as real do not block VA. A well-grounded objectivity thesis is needed. However, the point here is not that by taking the posited facts as real one is able to block VA but, rather, that Psillos’s proposal provides a way to overcome the problematic consequence we spotted, i.e. the fact that commitment to a specific ontology renders realism unwarrantly at stake in several domains. I would like to thank an insightful reviewer for helping me clarifying that point.
Compliance with the realist insight could be the basic motive for someone to adopt a line of defence of realism which is not based on ontological claims. When Devitt argues against similar approaches (1997, 23,155) he misses this point. He mistakenly assumes that all approaches of this kind have a Kantian origin; they are motivated by epistemological concerns. However, I think that a similar stance can be motivated by deep and purely realist insights.
As a careful reviewer noted, the tension between the realist insight and the ODR can be seen as an internal tension of Devitt’s account: a tension between the existence dimension (the basic claim of ODR) and the objectivity thesis which can be read as a statement of the priority of the world over our theorizing albeit in negative wording. However, it is hardly a problem for my view, as the reviewer seems to suggest, the fact that what I am issuing can be seen as an internal tension of Devitt’s account rather than a tension with it as a whole. First, remember that I have already spotted that tension (Sect. 2) arguing that Devitt’s objectivity thesis severely threatens the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. Second, my point is directed against the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue, which I take to be the basic claim of Devitt’s version of ODR, and not against any construal of Devitt’s account, especially the ones that vindicate my point against ODR. For my point can also be read as issuing that the internal tension should be resolved in favour of the objectivity thesis for it stands for a very powerful realist insight, namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. So, if one removes the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue out of Devitt’s account or argues that another—contrasting to that idea—part of it is in agreement with the realist insight then she is just restating my point rather than questioning it.
Notice that I do not presuppose that the occurrence of constraints can only be an effect of the world. There are constraints generated by other things, like social or linguistic conventions. These constraints cannot be taken to secure realism in an area. Actually, my point is that taking a realist stance in a domain requires examination of the origin of the constraints, rather than deployment of a reductive project.
I am indebted to Devitt for drawing my attention to the following construal of his account.
References
Baç, M. (2003). The ontological status of truthmakers: An alternative to tractarianism and metaphysical anti-realism. Metaphysica, 4, 5–28.
Devitt, M. (1997). Realism and truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dummett, M. (2004). Truth and the past. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ellis, B. (2005). Physical realism. Ratio, 18, 371–384.
Gauker, C. (2006). Scientific realism as an issue in semantics. In P. Greenough & M. Lynch (Eds.), Truth and realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Khlentzos, D. (2004). Naturalistic realism and the antirealist challenge. USA: MIT Press.
Psillos, S. (2005). Scientific realism and metaphysics. Ratio, 18, 385–404.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
Andreas Karitzis would like to thank Michael Devitt for his encouragement and kindness to discuss with him an early version of the paper. Special thanks to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The author would also like to thank Stathis Psillos, Peter Machamer, Aristides Baltas, Murat Baç, Brian Hepburn, Claudio Callosi and Dimitris Papayiannakos for insightful reactions to earlier versions.
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Karitzis, A. On Devitt’s Defence of Realism. J Gen Philos Sci 42, 61–73 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9144-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9144-2