

Editors' Preface

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The papers in this issue all grew out of presentations to the Philosophy section of the 14th World Sanskrit Conference held in Kyoto on 1–5 September 2009. Since that time they have undergone significant revision and refinement, thanks at least in part to the many fruitful exchanges that occurred during the conference. The diversity of the papers gathered here is testimony to the richness of the Indian philosophical tradition, as well as to the strength of current scholarship on that tradition. Here the reader will find detailed treatments of issues in some of the core areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic.

In the philosophy of language, for instance, we have four papers: one by Das on a Nyāya account of indirect meaning, another by Pinchard on the theory of *sphoṭa* or word-type, a paper by Unebe on a variety of different Indian approaches to the semantics of terms denoting unobservable entities, and Yoshimizu's piece on the role of the semantics-pragmatics distinction in the dispute between Dignāga and Kumārila over the existence of universals. Three papers take up issues in logic: one by Shiga concerning the concept of all-inclusive pervasion, a paper by Shida on the role of abductive inference in the argumentative strategy of Udayana, and a piece by Kano exploring the tension between Dharmakīrti's rejection of negative-only pervasion and his attempts to establish the absence of the self. In epistemology there is a paper by Hugon that explores another tension in Dharmakīrti, that between the claim that non-existent things may serve as objects of cognition and a

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pragmatic orientation that stresses the role of veridical cognition in successful practice; a paper by Pellegrini concerning some difficulties that arise in attempting to define the concept of non-veridicality; and a paper by Kobayashi concerning the relation between the Buddhist notion of conventional truth and the concept of provisional acceptance employed in the debate over whether a means of knowledge is intrinsically veridical. In metaphysics we have a paper by Kellner concerning the infinite regress argument for the view that cognitions are reflexive or self-cognizing; Ratié's paper on a strategy used by certain idealists to refute a representationalist form of realism about the external world; and a paper by Watanabe on developments in the Buddhist critique of Sāṅkhya's theory of transformation. (It is interesting to note that the subject of Kellner's paper, the issue of reflexive awareness, is often thought to belong to epistemology, but this may only be because of the centrality of the theory of the means of knowledge in Indian philosophy; the debate over reflexivity is part of the philosophy of mind, which is in turn a part of metaphysics.)

It was B.K. Matilal's hope that this journal would serve as a venue for work that might make the Indian philosophical tradition more accessible to Western philosophers. Many of the papers included in this special issue do just that. The paper by Shida, for instance, explores how the great Nyāya philosopher Udayana exploited the distinction between inductive and abductive reasoning in his argumentative strategy, thereby bringing out an important connection between Indian discussions of reasoning strategies and recent work in the epistemology of science. But some caution is called for if the audience for work on the riches of the Indian philosophical tradition is to include philosophers who are not already well versed in Sanskrit and knowledgeable about the debates of the Indian philosophers. Sometimes an expression that might seem like an apt translation of a Sanskrit technical term is already in wide use, with a very different meaning, among Western philosophers. Ratié, for instance, has chosen to translate *bāhyārthavāda*, the theory that perceptual cognition is either directly or indirectly aware of an external (i.e., physical) object, by the word 'externalism'. Unfortunately, this word is already used by philosophers in the fields of ethics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind to mean something quite different. A philosopher of mind working on the cognitive science issue of mental content and looking for classical Indian approaches to the same set of problems would be intrigued to discover that there was a debate over 'externalism' in the Indian tradition. But they would in time discover, much to their disappointment, that the debate concerned an issue of an altogether different nature than the one they were interested in. We are, of course, free to define our technical terms as we choose. But if we hope to communicate with experts in other areas, we must pay attention to their own use of technical terminology.

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