Abstract
According to the Fragmentation Analysis, epistemic akrasia is a state of conflict between beliefs formed by the linguistic and non-linguistic belief-formation systems, and epistemic akrasia is irrational because it is a state of conflict between beliefs so formed. I argue that there are cases of higher-order epistemic akrasia, where both beliefs are formed by the linguistic belief-formation system. Because the Fragmentation Analysis cannot accommodate this possibility, the Fragmentation Analysis is incorrect. I consider three objections to the possibility of higher-order epistemic akrasia. Along the way, I offer a revision of the Fragmentation Analysis that can allow for the possibility of higher-order akrasia while avoiding the problems I point out for the original view.
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Notes
This is not offered as any sort of definition of epistemic akrasia. One such definition will be considered in Sect. 2. Instead, this is just to point to a sort of schema, given by 1 and 2, that paradigmatically epistemically akratic beliefs instantiate. Other schemas might involve other propositional attitudes. For instance, a subject who both fails to believe that P—perhaps by disbelieving that P or suspending judgment as to whether P—and who believes that it is irrational to fail to believe that P is also paradigmatically epistemically akratic, or at least instantiating a schema of beliefs that paradigmatically epistemically akratic beliefs instantiate. In what follows, I will focus on examples where the subject believes that P, setting aside cases of disbelief and suspension of judgment to simplify the discussion. Nothing substantive should turn on this.
Equivalent for present purposes, state 2 could also be formulated as:
- 2*.:
-
S believes that S’s evidence doesn’t support (the belief that) P.
- 2**.:
-
S believes that S ought not to believe that P.
Etc.
Each of these authors deals with cases of bad evidence; Williamson (2011) discusses cases where one is unsure of what one’s evidence is, Horowitz (2014) discusses cases where ones evidence is “falsity-guiding,” and Christensen (2013) discusses cases where one has evidence of one’s own “anti-reliability”.
For examples of fragmentation views in philosophical literature, see Lewis (1982), Stalnaker (1984), Gibbard (1990), Egan (2008), Schwitzgebel (2012), Greco (2014, 2015), and Elga and Rayo (unpublished manuscript). Of these authors, only Gibbard and Greco are considering akrasia per se, and Gibbard is concerned with practical, not epistemic, akrasia.
Suitably modified, my arguments apply to similar distinctions one finds in the literature of fragmentation views, although those authors are not concerned with giving accounts of epistemic akrasia. Gendler (2008) relies on that of ‘belief’ and ‘alief’, Sosa (2007) on ‘animal’ and ‘reflective’, and much of contemporary psychology and cognitive science on ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’. For applications in theories of learning and reasoning, see, e.g., Berry and Dienes (1993), Stanovich and West (2000), and Paivio (2007); for applications in social psychology, see, e.g., Devine (1989) and Evans (2007); and for applications in moral psychology, see, e.g, Cushman (2013). One can imagine that the Fragmentation Analysis might proceed by appealing to any of these distinctions, and I aim to argue against that analysis, whichever distinction it appeals to.
Some authors (e.g., Williamson (2000)) would likely deny that Smith’s beliefs in Higher-Order Akrasia have the same content. Whether this is a feature or a bug of the meta-epistemological assumptions of this paper ultimately turn on subtle and contentious theses in epistemic logic, which I will not address here.
You might think something stronger than that Higher-Order Akrasia presents an exceptional and psychologically implausible case. You might think that Higher-Order Akrasia presents an impossible case; there just aren’t higher-order beliefs about what is rational to believe. It would be a feature—not a bug—of the Fragmentation Analysis that it didn’t make room for higher-order beliefs about what is rational to believe, if there were no such beliefs after all. I respond to this stronger objection in Sect. 3.3.
Thanks to Juan Comesaña for this example.
One could say that, on the one hand, there is things-like-us epistemic akrasia, and on the other hand, there is things-unlike-us epistemic akrasia. The Fragmentation Analysis would be an analysis of the former sort of epistemic akrasia. This does seem objectionably ad hoc, and it fails to capture the unity of epistemic akrasia in things like us and things unlike us. We would need a further account of epistemic akrasia full stop.
One might, for instance, suggest that the conditions of individuation for belief-formation systems are at least partly settled by facts about the context or aim of belief. More plausibly, I think, we can provide an independent story about the conditions of individuation for belief-formation systems to supplement our story about context or aim-dependent information access. Acknowledging that information is accessible relative to contexts or aims should not obviate the explanatory role for the etiology of belief.
For instance, on a view like Williamson’s (2000), which rejects the broadly Stalnaker-inspired (1984) meta-epistemology informing Greco’s account, higher-order beliefs have different propositional contents than first-order beliefs. Moreover, because higher- and first-order beliefs have different contents, they are subject to different margins for error; their functional difference can be brought out, for instance, in the context of placing bets. On a Williamsonian view, one is generally disposed to bet more money on the truth of some propositions P than to bet on the truth of the proposition that they know that P. Because the Williamsonian and Stalnakerian accounts of belief differ significantly, and because the Williamsonian cannot help themselves to the “same subject matter” argument from the end of Sect. 2, I do not discuss this view in further detail.
See Aumann (1992) for an argument that any failure of rationality, or of common knowledge of the players’ rationality, alters the rational strategy in playing (namely by justifying cooperative play).
See, for instance, Priest (2000).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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Kearl, T. Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs. Philos Stud 177, 2501–2515 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01323-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01323-y