Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 179 Schelling and the young Hegel, was a main factor in the evolution of the post-Kantian phase of German idealism. This volume will be interesting to anyone concerned with the development of this movement, especially for those concerned with the genesis of Fichte's theory. Although perhaps not crucial for the latter, it is certainly important and has recently provoked debate among Fichte scholars (e.g. Masullo, Renaut, Druet, Radrizzani, Pareyson). As compared to the Jena Wissenschaftslehre,this version is written in a livelier style. There are also a number of substantive changes. Fichte here abandons his Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. In a refreshing change from the modern concentration on the object from an epistemological perspective, including the Kantian thing-in-itself, Fichte says quite clearly that transcendental idealism is focused on the subject. This translates into a theory of self-consciousness understood as the ground of consciousness, or an intelligible world as the ground of the empirical world. The idea of freedom is much in evidence in the effort to understand the subject as both self-determining and determined. Although Fichte objects to Kant's failure to deduce intersubjectivity, despite some gestures in that direction his own deduction seems to be lacking in this text. In short, this work records the continuing effort of one of the great minds of German Idealism to work out his own theory. TOM ROCKMORE Duquesne University Frank M. Oppenheim. Royce's Mature Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993. Pp. xv + 294. Cloth, $36.95 . Frank Oppenheim once again has revealed to us new depths in the thought of Josiah Royce. Through a careful and sensitive investigation of Royce's later life and works, especially the unpublished "Last Lectures on Metaphysics," the x914 Berkeley Lecture and the 1915-16 Extension Course on Ethics, Oppenheim has provided an overview of Royce's mature ethics as well as insights into his final thoughts on epistemology and metaphysics. He has highlighted the continuities in Royce's thought, but also has made evident how Royce, using the method of musement, allowed his ideas to grow in refinement, depth, and richness. Oppenheim's book, therefore, will be essential in developing any fair evaluation of Royce's work in the long run. This book should clear away the many misinterpretations of Royce's philosophy of loyalty. Royce continually purified the meaning of loyalty; he articulated positive and negative criteria for true and false loyalities; he connected loyalty and adversity via a vision of the suffering and loyal servant working to build community; and he moved to an emphasis on the spirit of loyalty and the art of loyalty. Royce also explicated three species of loyalty exemplified in the family relationships of spouses/lovers, siblings, and parent/child. Although Oppenheim's analysis of this aspect of Royce's thought is somewhat weak, Royce's emphasis on family and on intergenerational relationships is very contemporary and worth further probing. Finally, Oppenheim provides us with two of Royce's vitally rich interpretations of loyalty in application via the story of a mother 180 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:1 JANUARY 1995 and daughter and the classic tale of Antigone. Royce's analysis of the Antigone story is striking because it presents, argues Oppenheim, a "supersexual insight." Antigone, according to Royce, expresses "feminine" compassion for her brother, "masculine" independence from the king, and religious fidelity to the gods. Although one might disagree with Oppenheim's choice of "supersexuar' to describe this aspect of Royce's thought, it provides a challenge to those concerned to address the chasm between feminist and traditional ethics. In interconnecting Royce's late epistemology and metaphysics with his ethics, Oppenheim provides an additional horn of riches for discussion of Royce in connection with contemporary issues in philosophy of science and philosophy of language and mind. Thus, Royce's "interpretive" epistemology emphasizes a notion of truth as essentially social, requiring a community of minded beings as well as "moral musts," e.g. honest communication, and a right attitude of "embracing the universe." Oppenhelm portrays Royce as developing Peircean ideas of the ubertyof inference and reasoning as exalting the values of...