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Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

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Abstract

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.

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Kekes, J. Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values. Argumentation 9, 577–594 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00737779

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00737779

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