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Aquinas and the Problem of No Best World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

B. Kyle Keltz
B. Kyle Keltz*
Affiliation:
South Plains College
*
Levelland, Texas 79336-6595, USA. bkeltz@southplainscollege.edu
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Abstract

Thomas Aquinas is often mentioned in the debate regarding whether God must create a best possible world. Contemporary philosophers usually place Aquinas alongside philosophers who also believe that there can be no best possible world. However, contemporary philosophers have been inconsistent in their understanding of Aquinas’ position. Some have placed him in the same category as Gottfried Leibniz, agreeing that God must create one best possible world.

Keywords

Best possible worldThomas Aquinasproblem of no best worldKlaas J. KraayJ.F. Ross
Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 99 , Issue 1082 , July 2018 , pp. 503 - 519
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

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References

1 For examples see Kraay, Klaas J., ‘Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse’, Philosophical Studies 147 (2010), p. 357CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rowe, William L., ‘Can God Be Free?’ Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), p. 410CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ross, J.F., ‘Did God Create the Only Possible World?’ The Review of Metaphysics 16 (1962), p. 17Google Scholar.

3 Ibid.

4 Kraay, ‘Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse’, p. 357.

5 Ibid.

6 Ross, ‘Did God Create the Only Possible World?’, p. 19.

7 Ibid.

8 Kraay, ‘Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse’, p. 357.

9 Ibid.

10 Rowe, William L., ‘The Problem of No Best World’, Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 269-271CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 For a detailed explanation of the problem see Kraay, Klaas J., ‘The Problem of No Best World’, in Taliaferro, Charles, Draper, Paul, and Quinn, Philip L., eds., A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 482-490CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Kraay, ‘The Problem of No Best World’, p. 483. [emphasis in original]

13 SCG I, 72-88; see also ST I, 19; and Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (De Ver.), 23.

14 SCG I, 74; see also ST I, 19, ad 3; and De Ver., 23, ad 3.

15 All quotes from the Summa contra Gentiles are from Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Pegis, Anton C., Anderson, James F., Bourke, Vernon J., and O'Neil, Charles J. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

16 ST I, 6, 1-2; Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (De Pot.), 7, 5; SCG I, 38.

17 ST I, 14, 2-3; De Ver., 2, 2; SCG I, 47.

18 ST I, 5, 1; De Ver., 21, 1.

19 SCG I, 72; De Ver. 23, 1; ST I, 19, 1.

20 SCG I, 72; see also De Ver. 23, 1; and ST I, 19, 1.

21 ST I, 19, 2, arg 3.

22 SCG II, 31.

23 Ibid.

24 ST III, 1, 1; see also ST I, 19, 2.

25 Garrigou-Lagrange, R., God, His Existence and His Nature: A Thomistic Solution of Certain Agnostic Antinomies, 5th ed., trans. Rose, Dom Bede (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1949), p. 2:99Google Scholar.

26 SCG I, 80.

27 SCG I, 75; ST I, 19, 2.

28 SCG I, 86; ST I, 19, 2, ad 2.

29 SCG II, 25; ST I, 7, 2.

30 SCG II, 25; see also ST I, 7, 2.

31 SCG II, 45; see also De Pot., 3, 16; and ST I, 47, 1.

32 SCG III, 20; see also ST I, 5, 5.

33 Kretzmann, Norman, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 225Google Scholar.

34 Aquinas’ wording that God ‘orders the world to Himself’ might sound strange to some readers. However, Aquinas basically means that God orders the world according to God's purpose. This can be seen when Aquinas writes that “An effect is most perfect when it returns to its source; thus, the circle is the most perfect of all figures, and circular motion the most perfect of all motions, because in their case a return is made to the starting point. It is therefore necessary that creatures return to their principle in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection. Now, each and every creature returns to its source so far as it bears a likeness to its source, according to its being and its nature, wherein it enjoys a certain perfection” (SCG II, 46).

35 ST I, 103, 1; ST I, 103, 3; see also ST I 47, 2, ad 1.

36 All quotes from the Summa Theologiae are from Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, first complete American ed., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947)Google Scholar.

37 See also ST I, 103, 4.

38 SCG II, 46; ST I, 50, 1.

39 SCG II, 46.

40 Ibid.

41 SCG III, 22.

42 Examples of monograph treatments include Barrow, John D. and Tipler, Frank J., The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; Rees, Martin, Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe (New York: Basic Books, 2000)Google Scholar; and Davies, Paul, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008)Google Scholar.

43 Davies, Paul, Superforce: The Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 242Google Scholar.

44 ST I, 25, 6, ad 3.

45 Ibid.

46 In contemporary terms regarding possible worlds, Aquinas’ position entails that possible worlds can be grouped into sets of worlds containing equal amounts and qualities of substances. In each set there will be a best possible world that possesses the order that is the best for fulfilling His purpose, given the quantity and quality of substances that world contains.

47 Ross, ‘Did God Create the Only Possible World?’, pp. 18-19.

48 Not just any amount of beings will do, however. As mentioned above, the world needs to contain a hierarchy of beings with a sufficient amount of creatures to represent God's goodness to a certain degree. But given a sufficient hierarchy of beings, any world God chooses to create will fulfill its purpose if it is perfectly ordered.

49 Rowe, William L., ‘The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom’, in Stump, Eleonore, ed., Reasoned Faith (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 230Google Scholar. [emphasis in original]

50 For example, Brian Davies argues against God being a moral agent in Davies, Brian, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (New York: Continuum Books, 2006), 84-111Google Scholar.

51 ST I, 21, 1, ad 2.

52 SCG III, 114-115; ST II-I, 91, 2.

53 ST I, 12, 7; SCG I, 14.

54 ST II-I, 79, 1; see also SCG I, 95; and Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo (De Malo), 3, 1.

55 ST I, 22, 2, ad 3; ST I, 48, 2.

56 Ecologists have found that animal predation is extremely conducive for healthy ecosystems. For examples see Saether, Bernt-Erik, ‘Top Dogs Maintain Diversity’, Nature 400 (1999), pp. 510-511CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crooks, Kevin R. and Soulé, Michael E., ‘Mesopredator Release and Avifaunal Extinctions in a Fragmented System’, Nature 400 (1999), pp. 563-566CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Terborgh, John, et al., ‘Ecological Meltdown in Predator-Free Forest Fragments’, Science 294 (2001), pp. 1923-1926CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Schmitz, Oswald J., Hawlena, Dror, and Trussell, Geoffrey C., ‘Predator Control of Ecosystem Nutrient Dynamics’, Ecology Letters 13 (2010), pp. 1199-1209CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Ripple, William J. and Beschta, Robert L., ‘Large Predators Limit Herbivore Densities in Northern Forest Ecosystems’, European Journal of Wildlife Research 58 (2012), pp. 733-742CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 ST I, 23, 5, ad 3.

58 ST I, 19, 6.

59 ST I, 49, 1; De Malo, 1, 1.

60 ST I, 97, 1.

61 ST I, 97, 1; De Malo, 5, 4, ad 1.

62 ST I, 7, 4; SCG II, 38; II, 49.

63 SCG II, 44; see also ST I, 47, 2.

64 SCG II, 45; see also ST I, 47, 2.