

## Self-Awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *-vṛtti*: A Close Reading

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**Abstract** The concept of “self-awareness” (*svasaṃvedana*) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *-vṛtti* by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (*pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala*), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of self-awareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one's own mental states and factors.

**Keywords** *Svasaṃvitti* · Self-awareness · Dignāga · Dharmakīrti

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To what extent is self-consciousness a philosophical *explanation* of everyday experience, and to what extent is it a *presupposition* of such experience?

Paul Williams (1998: 245)

The concept of self-awareness was introduced into the South Asian *pramāṇa* discourse by the Buddhist epistemologist and logician Dignāga (ca. 480–540).<sup>1</sup> As defined by his prominent successor Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), “self-awareness” (*svasaṃvedana*) refers to the idea that all mental states and the factors like passion or feelings that accompany them are aware of themselves.<sup>2</sup> This Buddhist position is typically articulated in tandem with the claim that this awareness is not due to a subsequent mental state, as this would produce an infinite regress. Self-awareness is therefore innate to mental states; it is a dimension or aspect of sense-perception, inference, and other classes of mental states. The Buddhist account of self-awareness was criticized from the Brahminical side, by representatives of the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā and of Nyāya. Prābhākāra-Mīmāṃsākas as well as Śaivas, on the other hand, adapted and appropriated self-awareness within their own philosophical frameworks. In Buddhism itself, the status of self-awareness was debated among later Mādhyamikas, a phenomenon that speaks of the latter school’s complex relationship with the *pramāṇa* enterprise.

In this paper, I am going to take a fresh look at Dignāga’s exposition of self-awareness in the chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*) of his seminal work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* together with its auto-commentary, the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, which I will refer to jointly as PS(V). One relevant passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) has recently attracted considerable attention. The papers by Shinya Moriyama and Dan Arnold in this volume show not only how much food for thought this brief passage offers, but also demonstrate just how differently it can be (and historically was) interpreted.<sup>3</sup> However, to my knowledge no attempt has been made so far to reflect comprehensively on Dignāga’s pithy statements and dense arguments about self-awareness. In trying precisely this, I hope to lay a foundation for a better understanding not only of Dignāga’s arguments, but also of what later interpreters, notably Dharmakīrti, made of them or, at the very least, to highlight points that demand further attention. While I shall also make some philosophical observations, I am for the time being not aiming at a philosophical characterization or an elaboration of Dignāga’s position, as Dan Arnold so impressively offers in this volume. Nevertheless, some of the points I make are in agreement with components of Arnold’s account, as he also highlights.

The second main reason for re-reading Dignāga’s PS(V) concerns the philological basis. Earlier studies could only access the PS(V), lost in its original language Sanskrit, via two Tibetan translations that are widely divergent and problematic, as well as a rather limited number of Sanskrit fragments; fragments of the PS(V)’s chapter on perception were assembled by Masaaki Hattori in his groundbreaking study *Dignāga, On Perception* (1968). The philological situation has improved dramatically from 40 years ago, as in 2005 Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser and Horst Lasic published critical and

<sup>1</sup> See Yao (2005) for an attempt to find possible precursors and sources in earlier Buddhist thought for Dignāga’s notion of *svasaṃvedana*.

<sup>2</sup> See NB 1.10: *sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṃvedanam*.

<sup>3</sup> Other recent accounts of this passage can be found in Arnold (2005a, 2008), Chu (2006), and Kataoka (2009).

diplomatic editions of the chapter on perception of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on this text, the *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (short PST), based on a copy of a Sanskrit manuscript held by the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing. The large number of cases where Jinendrabuddhi incorporates material from Dignāga's text into his commentary enabled Steinkellner to produce a hypothetical reconstruction of the PS(V), which he has generously made available online, in full awareness of its tentative character and with the express wish that others improve upon it.

In his 1998 study *The Reflexive Nature of Awareness*, which focuses on the Tibetan Mādhyamika reception and critique of self-awareness, Paul Williams showed that the concept of self-awareness is by no means uniform in the Buddhist tradition. On the basis of a distinction made in Thub bstan chos kyi grags pa's (1823–1905) outline of the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's (ca. 650–700) *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Williams presents two kinds of self-awareness (Williams 1998: 4f.; Tibetan text in n. 6). The first, which he traces back to Dignāga, is intentional (in broadly Brentanian terms) and refers to the mind's subjective aspect (*grāhakākāra*) being aware of its objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*). When this idea is further restricted such that the mind is intentionally aware *only* of itself, and not of anything external that exists independently of it—and, apparently, some Buddhists do restrict it in this way—self-awareness comes to epitomize an epistemic version or component of idealism. This suggests that this kind of self-awareness, which I am going to call “intentional self-awareness,” plays a role in the complex interplay between Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika and Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda ideas within Buddhist epistemology. This interplay has recently been accounted for with the heuristic metaphor of a “sliding” or “ascending” scale of analysis, since ontological or epistemological analyses gradually move from low-level, less true and more intuitive accounts to high-level, truer and less intuitive theories.<sup>4</sup> Some have argued that self-awareness in particular acts as a kind of “bridging concept” between Sautrāntika and Yogācāra theories (Katsura 1969: 28; Matilal 1986: 151): once it is recognized that a mental state is directly aware of a mental object-image contained within itself, one might just as well do away with external objects of cognition altogether—a representationalist and externalist (Sautrāntika) approach paves the way for an internalist (Yogācāra) position.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Dreyfus (1996), McClintock (2003), Dunne (2004). For a critique especially of Dunne's account of such a scale, see Kellner (forthcoming 2).

<sup>5</sup> I prefer to speak of “externalism” and “internalism” about intentional objects, and to avoid the traditional labels of Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika and Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. Using such external characterizations allows the philosophically salient point of disagreement to be brought out without creating the misleading impression that other, partly non-epistemological divergences between the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra, which also exist, are pertinent to this issue. This use differs from the use of “externalism” and “internalism” in contemporary philosophical discourse, where these terms commonly, though by no means exclusively, designate positions about the truth and justification of knowledge. For similar reasons I also avoid the multifaceted terms “realism” and “idealism” that likewise have connotations that extend beyond the issues that are at stake here. Finally, within the confines of this paper, “externalism” will be used to refer specifically to the idea that cognition arises from external objects bearing their form. In general, of course, there are also other varieties of externalism that do not accept that forms belong to cognition (e.g. the Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka or Śaiva views).

Dunne refers to externalism as external realism and internalism as epistemic idealism (cf. esp. Dunne 2004: 58ff.); cf. Arnold (2008) for a reinterpretation of what I refer to as externalism as a form of epistemic idealism, with an emphasis on its epistemic component, since for externalism, too, the direct objects of cognition are mental entities.

Williams' second kind of self-awareness, prominent in Śāntarakṣita's (ca. 725–788) *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* and *-vṛtti*, is mere luminosity, a mere awareness that accompanies all object-cognition, that makes consciousness conscious and distinguishes it from insentient (*jaḍa*) objects such as chariots.<sup>6</sup> It is this latter, non-intentional self-awareness that Williams terms “reflexive awareness” and sees connected to the rejection of an infinite regress. How, then, are these two kinds of self-awareness related? Williams suggests that intentional self-awareness might require reflexive self-awareness. That is to say, a subjective aspect of a mental state cannot be aware of its objective aspect unless the mental state is conscious in the first place. Conversely, however, reflexive awareness as the “hallmark of the mental” (Arnold) is logically independent of intentional self-awareness<sup>7</sup>—clearly one can argue that there is such a thing as consciousness as mere luminosity of the mind without committing oneself thereby to the view that intentional objects are fully inside the mind (in internalism), or that mental states access external reality by means of internal representations (in externalism). The relationship between the two kinds of self-awareness, and why Buddhists might have found the need to distinguish between them, is therefore an open question to which I shall return in my concluding remarks.

### The Passages on *svasamvedana* in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *-vṛtti*

The main passages dealing with self-awareness in the PS(V) can be found in the *svamata* or “own view” portion near the beginning of the chapter on perception.<sup>8</sup> The analysis presented in the following makes extensive use of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, which is an indispensable guideline for fleshing out Dignāga's highly compact arguments, and at times provides a rationale where Dignāga proceeds by assertion rather than argument. As has long been recognized, and as can now also be seen from the annotation in the critical edition of PST 1, Jinendrabuddhi's commentary relies heavily on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (short PV), often filtered through Devendrabuddhi's commentary on it, the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*. In relying on the PST, one may therefore unwittingly superimpose Dharmakīrti's potentially different ideas and arguments on those of Dignāga and obliterate the difference between their respective approaches. Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti's extensive discussion of self-awareness in the *Pramāṇavārttika*<sup>9</sup> has not yet been studied comprehensively; even if it had been, proceeding along the lines of “Jinendrabuddhi minus Dharmakīrti equals Dignāga” would certainly be overly simplistic, for it would move to the other extreme and unwittingly presuppose a radical difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Carefully documenting one's reliance on Jinendrabuddhi, reflecting on a case-by-case basis on the plausibility of his commentarial explanations

<sup>6</sup> See TS 2000 = MA 17, and Williams (1998: 26ff.) for further references.

<sup>7</sup> Williams (1998: 6f., n. 8).

<sup>8</sup> A detailed structural analysis of the chapter is appended to Steinkellner's tentative reconstruction.

<sup>9</sup> Dharmakīrti's commentary on PS(V) 1.8–12 comprises 239 stanzas (PV 3.301–539); his commentary on PS(V) 1.6ab extends over 32 stanzas (PV 3.249–280), and PV 3.287 comments on PS(V) 1.7ab.

in view of Dignāga's own context, and considering by comparison as much of Dharmakīrti's context as possible remains the only viable approach.

A second characteristic of the following close reading is to treat the PS and PSV as a unified composition. This deserves emphasis because it has been proposed that the verse text of the PS and the prose of the PSV may be two separate works, and that the PSV at times expresses different views from those that are articulated in the PS, indicating that Dignāga changed his mind in between. However, only two cases of discrepancies between the PS and PSV have been pointed out so far: the discussion of pseudo-perceptions (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) in PS(V) 1.7cd-8ab and the section on the means and result of valid cognition, in particular, PS(V) 1.9.<sup>10</sup> As I shall demonstrate below, Jinendrabuddhi's commentary shows one way to explain away the alleged discrepancy in the latter case. It is clear that if it is possible to explain away these discrepancies, then it is no longer necessary to assume that the PS and PSV were composed separately in order to account for them—unless, of course, further discrepancies were found. This possibility notwithstanding, given the current state of research on the PS(V) as a text, a unified composition is more probable because words from the stanzas are such tightly integral parts of the prose that it is very hard to imagine the stanzas having been written prior to the prose and independently of it.

After defining perception as free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpodha*) in PS(V) 1.3cd and discussing various conceptual and exegetical problems relating to this definition, Dignāga addresses forms of perception that are different from perception through the five external senses (*indriyapratyakṣa*) in PS(V) 1.6-7. These include the mental perception of external objects and the self-awareness of passion and other mental factors, such as hatred, delusion or pleasant and unpleasant feelings (PS(V) 1.6ab). This brings us to one function of self-awareness: it accounts for how those states that the Buddhist Abhidharma subsumes under the category of “mental associates” (*caitta*) are brought to awareness. Self-awareness is, moreover, non-conceptual and therefore a form of perception. As clarified by Dignāga, it is a mental perception because it is independent of the five external senses.<sup>11</sup> That

<sup>10</sup> See Franco 1986 for *pratyakṣābhāsa*, following a hypothesis attributed to Schmithausen that the latter unfortunately never published; see Iwata (1991) for means and result. In the introduction to his hypothetical reconstruction, Steinkellner expresses the opinion that the PS and PSV are not two separate works, but he does not present the reasoning that led him to this conclusion.

<sup>11</sup> PS 1.6ab: *mānasaṃ cārtharāgādīsvasaṃvittir akalpikā*, and PSV: *mānasaṃ api rūpādīviṣayālabhānam avikalpakam anubhavākārapravṛttam. rāgādīṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasaṃ pratyakṣam*. (Note that the full-stop after *-pravṛttam* is absent in Steinkellner's hypothetical reconstruction.) The expression *rāgādīṣu* is based on PST; other fragments, as well as the Tibetan translations of PSV, expand the compound to contain further instances of mental associates, cf. Pr<sub>2</sub> 305,17f. (Pr<sub>B</sub> 154a2): *rāgadvēṣamahasukhaduḥkhādīṣu*... Vibhūti 194, n. 1: *rāgādīsukhādīṣu*...

Scholars have debated whether Dignāga includes self-awareness in mental perception or regards it as a separate type. The former view has been advocated by Hattori (1968), Nagatomi (1980), and Franco (1993, 2005), the latter by Wayman (1977–1978, 1991) and Yao (2004, 2005). A fragment in Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaikārabhāṣya* played a key role in the debate; for a discussion of this fragment in Prajñākaragupta's own context, see the article by Hisayasu Kobayashi in the present volume.

The PSV distinguishes mental perception and self-awareness in terms of its object—the former applies to external objects, the latter to mental associates—but also points out a common feature: their independence of the external sense-faculties. Agreeing with Franco's suggestion that Dignāga did not intend to provide a typology of perception in the first place, I am referring to self-awareness simply as a form of (mental) perception.

self-awareness brings mental associates to awareness exhausts neither its function nor its sphere of application. Dignāga makes this clear immediately following this passage, where he quickly adds that there is also self-awareness of conceptual cognition: conceptual cognitions are conceptualizing with regard to external objects, but they are perceptual in their awareness of themselves.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, since Dignāga introduces self-awareness as a form of perception and perception is a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), we can deduce that self-awareness is also a means of valid cognition. However, this information is not as revealing as one might expect—since Dignāga did not articulate a definition of *pramāṇa*, it remains unclear just what quality is thereby bestowed upon self-awareness.<sup>13</sup>

So far, we know that self-awareness is a form of perception that is independent of external senses, that it is a non-conceptual mode of awareness, that it is epistemically valid, and that it accounts for the awareness of mental associates, exemplified by passion and feelings, but also for the awareness of conceptual cognitions. For any further understanding of self-awareness, the discussion of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*) in PS(V) 1.8cd-12 is crucial. In this section, the exposition of means and result proper in 1.8cd-10 is followed by an appendix, where Dignāga sets out to prove that cognition has two appearances or forms (PS(V) 1.11abc), and, finally, that it is aware of itself (PS(V) 1.11d-12). Because of their importance, these proofs will now be discussed first.

### Proofs for the Two Appearances of Cognition and for Self-Awareness (PS(V) 1.11-12)

The idea that cognition has two appearances or forms (*dvyābhāsātā*, *dvirūpatā*, *dvairūpya*) means that it has an object-appearance (*viśayābhāsa*)<sup>14</sup> and also its own appearance (*svābhāsa*). Since Dignāga himself refers to the own appearance of cognition as its apprehending aspect (*grāhakākāra*) in PS 1.10, we can gather that cognition's "own" appearance is its appearance in terms of apprehending objects.<sup>15</sup> As Hattori has pointed out, that consciousness itself appears as subject and object is

<sup>12</sup> PS 1.7ab: *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt |*

<sup>13</sup> Viewed from the perspective of the subsequent tradition, the relevant question is whether Dignāga would have regarded the "validity" of a *pramāṇa* in terms of its congruence with reality, in terms of its usefulness for the achievement of practical human goals, or in terms of a combination of the two. See Tillemans (1999: 6ff.) for a discussion, with reference to Dharmakīrti, of ensuing issues in characterizing Buddhist epistemology as a form of pragmatism.

<sup>14</sup> For the compound *viśayābhāsa*, cf. PST 1 69,11f.: *atra yadā bāhyo viśaya āśrīyate, tadā viśaya-yasyevābhāso 'syeti vīgrahaḥ, yadā tu nāśrīyate, tadā viśaya ābhāso 'syeti*. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *viśayābhāsa* is to be analyzed as a genitive *atapurusa* if an external object is relied upon, whereas it is to be taken as a *karmadhāraya* if this is not the case. I do not follow this analysis, and use "appearance of the object" or "object-appearance" in the sense of "appearance of the intentional object" regardless of whether that object is thought to be internal or external.

<sup>15</sup> See further Ganeri (1999: 470f.) for an argument against the claim, attributed to unnamed modern writers, that Dignāga's *svābhāsa* refers to the phenomenological quality of experience, to "how it feels" to the experienter.

“a principal doctrine of the Yogācāras.” (Hattori 1968: 102, n. 1.61). In the words of Paul Hoornaert, prior to Dignāga, the doctrine of duality was

... taught as a purely soteriological doctrine and was not concerned with epistemological issues. The purpose of the doctrine was not to explain how perceptual cognitions originate, what their object is, how their object is cognized, and so forth. The purpose was to explain what defilement (*saṃkleśa*), how it originates and how it can be eliminated. (Hoornaert 2000: 102)

The soteriological purpose of the doctrine of duality yields a specific connotation for the idea that there is an *appearance* (*ābhāsa*) of duality: duality is an appearance, but it is not real; it can and should be overcome on the path to liberation. This amounts to using the predicate “appear” as it is used in sentences of the kind “it appears to be the case that *p* (but it is not),” where appearance connotes falsehood. However, a second usage of “appearance” is also generally present in Yogācāra literature, when for instance texts speak of a “subject-appearance” or an “object-appearance.” This usage of “appearance” corresponds to what the philosopher Roderick Chisholm referred to as a descriptive phenomenological usage, where the verb “to appear” simply informs how things present themselves to a cognizing subject (Chisholm 1987: 199f.). In PS(V), we find both usages. In PS 1.10 Dignāga declares that the different “forms” of a mental state are not ultimately separate, indicating thereby that there is a certain falsehood to their separation. In contrast, Dignāga speaks in PS(V) 1.11 not of the (ultimately mistaken) appearance of duality, but of two distinct appearances. In this usage, “appearances” are also referred to as “forms” (*rūpa/ākāra*).

In PS(V) 1.11, altogether three arguments are jointly used to prove the two appearances:

PSV: *atha dvirūpaṃ jñānam iti kathaṃ pratipādyam.*<sup>16</sup>

[Argument 1:] PS 1.11ab: *viśayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣāt tu dvirūpatā |*

PSV: *viśaye hi rūpādau yaj jñānaṃ tad arthasvābhāsam eva. viśayajñāne tu yaj jñānaṃ tad viśayānurūpajñānābhāsaṃ svābhāsaṃ ca. anyathā yadi viśayānurūpaṃ eva viśayajñānaṃ syāt svarūpaṃ vā, jñānajñānam api viśayajñānenāviśiṣṭaṃ syāt.*

[Argument 2:] PSV: *na cottarottarāṇi jñānāni pūrvaviprakṛṣṭaviśayābhāsāni syuḥ, tasyāviśayatvāt. ataś ca siddhaṃ dvairūpyaṃ jñānasya.*

[Argument 3:] PS 1.11c: *smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca*

PSV: *dvairūpyam iti sambandhaḥ. yasmāc cānubhavottarakālaṃ viśaya iva jñāne 'pi smṛtir utpadyate, tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca.*

PSV: [Question:] Now, how can it be known that cognition has two forms?

<sup>16</sup> The Sanskrit text of the PS(V) is here and in the following taken from Steinkellner's hypothetical reconstruction; occasional changes are indicated. Fully reconstructed words without attested Sanskrit fragments are printed in roman typeface.

[Argument 1:] PS 1.11ab: There are two forms [in cognition] on account of the difference between the cognition of an object and the cognition of that [object-cognition].<sup>17</sup>

PSV: That is to say, the cognition [that applies] to an object like colour and the like certainly (*eva*) has the appearance of the object and of itself (*arthasvābhāsa*), whereas the [second] cognition [that applies] to the object-cognition has the appearance of the cognition that resembles the object, and [also] its own appearance. Otherwise, if the cognition of an object only resembled its object, or had [only] its own form, the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be different from the cognition of the object.

[Argument 2:] PSV: Furthermore, [if cognition did not have an object-form]<sup>18</sup> then individual later cognitions would not have the appearance of a [temporally] distant object of an earlier [cognition],<sup>19</sup> for the [earlier object] is not the object [of the later cognitions].

And therefore it is established that cognition has two forms.

[Argument 3:] PS 1.11c: Also because of memory at a later time.

PSV: “[Cognition has] two forms” – this is how [PS 1.11c] is syntactically connected. [To explain:] And because memory arises after experience, for the cognition just as for the object, cognition has two forms, and it is also brought to awareness by itself (*svasaṃvedyatā*).<sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The particle *tu* is considered a *pāda*-filler and thus is left untranslated.

Jinendrabuddhi analyzes the syntax differently, influenced by the locatives in Dignāga’s prose (*viṣaye... viṣayajñāne...* ), see PST 1 77,7: *viṣayajñāne tajjñānam viṣayajñānatajjñānam*. He also points out that *-tat-* should not be understood as referring to the object-cognition, for, this being understood even without the pronoun, it would then have no purpose. Indeed, this is easy to see if PS 1.11ab is translated following his construction, and without *tat*: “Because a cognition [that applies] to the object-cognition (*viṣayajñāne*) is different.” Having to provide *tat* with a meaning and function of its own, Jinendrabuddhi suggests it clarifies that the second-order cognition is one that itself has an object-form (*viṣayākāra*); he presents this argument directed at opponents who accept that cognition has its own form, but not that of an object: “Because such a cognition [i.e. a cognition that applies to the object and has an object-form] is different.”

This is, however, a commentator’s solution to a problem he has created for himself by superimposing the syntactic structure of the prose sentence on the stanza. The analysis of *viṣayajñānatajjñāna-* as a *dvandva* compound does not yield this problem: “Because the cognition of the object and the cognition of that [cognition] . . .” This construction was also adopted in both Tibetan translations of the stanza—which do not reflect the locative construction in the prose—and consequently also by Hattori (1968: 29). Aside from these textual intricacies, however, the underlying claim remains the same.

<sup>18</sup> Hattori (1968: 30) supplies as a condition for this argument “if cognition had only one form, either that of the object or of itself,” but the argument more specifically focuses on the object-form, as Jinendrabuddhi also notes in his concluding remark, PST 1 81, 11: *tasmāt tad apy arthābhāsam eṣṭavyam*.

<sup>19</sup> The analysis of the compound *pūrvaviprakṛṣṭaviṣayābhāsāni* follows PST 1 80,9f.: *pūrvasyānubhavajñānasya yo viṣayaḥ . . . viprakṛṣṭas tadābhāsāni . . .* Devendrabuddhi, as far as can be made out from the Tibetan translation, in some places uses *pūrva* also as an attribute of *viprakṛṣṭaviṣaya* (De, D 232b6ff. on PV 3.379).

<sup>20</sup> This compound analysis of *svasaṃvedyatā* is based on the assumption that *svasaṃvedya* is the passive counterpart of the active *svasaṃvedana*. If *svasaṃvedana* expresses that a cognition, as the grammatical agent, performs the action of bringing to awareness (*saṃ-vid*) with respect to itself as the grammatical object, then the passive counterpart *svasaṃvedya* can be assumed to express conversely that a cognition is brought to awareness by itself.



The first two arguments speak of a cognition of an object-cognition, that is, an instance of memory that arises some time after an object-directed cognition like the perception of the colour blue, and that takes the latter for its intentional object.<sup>21</sup> The first argument claims that cognition has two forms because the object-cognition and the cognition of the object-cognition are different; they would not be different if cognition only had one of these two forms. This is, in fact, the general structure of all of Dignāga's arguments for the two appearances and for self-awareness: a state of affairs X is stated as a fact, and the two appearances/self-awareness are concluded from X. Further explanations, if given at all, simply state that X could not be the case if the two appearances or self-awareness were not assumed, which, at least rhetorically, reinforces that X is an established fact. This pattern suggests that the two appearances and self-awareness are supposed to provide the best available explanation for certain facts, and this is the chosen method for establishing them. We can therefore consider these arguments as inferences to the best explanation.<sup>22</sup>

How, then, are we to understand the absurd consequences that arise if cognition were to have only one of the two forms? Here, we are left to fill in the details of Dignāga's skeletal presentation by way of a reconstruction. Both consequences imply that the object-cognition and the memory that takes it for its intentional object are not different. Now, assume that the object-cognition  $C_1$  has only the form of its object  $O_1$ , and no other form. Likewise, its memory  $C_2$  has only the form of its object  $O_2$ , which is actually  $C_1$ , and no other form. Since  $C_1$  can be identified with the form of  $O_1$ —it has no other form— $C_2$  also has only the form of  $O_1$ . In other words, because  $C_1$  has no form of its own that it would add to  $O_1$ , the form of  $O_1$ , as it were, passes through it to the second-level cognition  $O_2$ , which is then indistinguishable from  $C_1$ , as well as, by implication, from  $O_1$ .<sup>23</sup> If, on the other hand,  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  both only had their own form and not that of their objects, they would both be nothing but cognitions—they could then not be differentiated according to their content.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, Dignāga's theory that each cognition has two forms explains the difference between the perception  $C_1$  and the later memory  $C_2$ , through a theory

<sup>21</sup> For the identification of the "cognition of the object-cognition" as memory, cf. also PV 3.378-380, with M<sub>1</sub> 232,17f.

Theoretically, the "cognition of the object-cognition" could also be interpreted as a second-order cognition that is introduced with the purpose of establishing the first-level cognition, but this is in conflict with the refutation of a higher-order cognition later in Dignāga's text (cf. below). Matilal nevertheless understands Dignāga's first argument for *dvirūpatā* along these lines, interpreting it as showing that if cognition had only one form, the distinction between object-awareness and self-awareness would collapse (Matilal 1986: 152). See also Ganeri (1999: 471), where this argument is framed in terms of introspection.

<sup>22</sup> In a similar vein, Thompson also proposes understanding the proof of self-awareness as an inference to the best explanation (Thompson, forthcoming).

<sup>23</sup> Jinendrabuddhi (PST 1 78,16-79,3) does not give much weight to this first alternative, for, as he has an objector argue, no one maintains the position that cognition has only an object-form in the first place. For him, Dignāga only takes this alternative into consideration in order to stress that when cognition takes on an object-form, it does not do so by abandoning its own form.

<sup>24</sup> See Hattori (1968: 108, n. 1.69) for a slightly more abstract reconstruction of both alternatives. Arnold (2008: 19) interprets Dignāga as arguing for a phenomenological difference between the first-order cognition and its later memory insofar as the memory explicitly involves, in addition to the content of the original cognition, also the awareness of oneself as having experienced it.

that the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka Kumāṛila has described as assuming an “increase in forms” (*ākārapracaya*):<sup>25</sup> the object-cognition has the form of its object  $O_1$ , whereas its later memory  $C_2$  has as its object-form the cognition of the object, that is,  $C_1$  and  $O_1$ , and a still further memory of  $C_2$  has as its object-form  $C_2$ .

The second argument for the two appearances focuses on establishing the object-form: an instance of memory could not have the appearance of a temporally distant object of an earlier cognition, for the object of the earlier cognition is not the object of the later one.<sup>26</sup> Devendrabuddhi, commenting on PV 3.381, provides a counterposition against which Dignāga’s claim can be understood: an object-cognition does not have an object-form, but is rather the effect of its external object. At some point in time after a visual perception of blue occurred, memory may arise, remembering the object as the cause of its cognition. Cognition and object are then erroneously joined together, and the cognition is wrongly determined to have the object’s form, whereas in fact cognitions do not have an object-form.<sup>27</sup> If we take Dignāga to be speaking against such a position, then his claim is that the memory in which the colour blue appears as the earlier cognition’s cause would not even be possible unless that cognition already possessed the object’s form. Unless there are object-forms in cognitions, there is no way for memory to be connected to objects that were cognized at an earlier point in time. Causation alone, as Dharmakīrti clarifies in PV 3.381, cannot account for this connection, for we would then also be able to remember light or the preceding moment of consciousness, both of which acted as contributing causes for the initial visual perception—but we remember objects, and not such additional causes.

Dignāga’s first two arguments for the two forms deal with instances of memory in their relationship to the earlier perceptions that they take for their intentional objects. This may explain why Dignāga speaks here of the object-cognition and its cognition (*viśayajñānatajjñāna*), rather than using a word for “memory” such as *smṛti*. The third and final argument, in contrast, makes a fundamental claim about the nature of memory itself, and accordingly directly speaks of *smṛti*.<sup>28</sup> Focusing on

<sup>25</sup> ŚV *sūnyavāda* 112cd-114ab (Hattori 1968: 109, n. 1.70).

<sup>26</sup> As Hattori notes, both PSV<sub>V</sub> and PSV<sub>K</sub> translate *viprakṛṣṭa* (*riṇḍu ’das pa*), which is also attested in the PST (Hattori 1968: 109, n. 1.71). Hattori’s translation and interpretation, on the other hand, follow a fragment in Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārahāṣya* where *viprakṛṣṭa* is missing, cf. Pr<sub>2</sub> 409,1: *na cottarottarāṇi jñānāni pūrvapūrvajñānaviśayābhāsāni syuh*; Pr<sub>B</sub> 206a1 *-vijñāna*, Pr<sub>A</sub>’ 58,2 *-jñāna* (*śes pa* Pr<sub>T</sub> D 74a5); Pr<sub>A</sub>’ also reads *-ottarāṇi* (with marks for correction) for Pr<sub>B</sub> *-ottarottarāṇi* (*phyi ma phyi ma* Pr<sub>T</sub>).

Matilal, who relies on Hattori’s translation, is somewhat at a loss in interpreting this argument (1986: 152). He thinks it explains the contingent situation that objects grasped by cognitions sometimes appear in succeeding cognitions, but wonders whether it accomplishes anything else. Hattori, in turn, interprets the argument (without *-viprakṛṣṭa*) as relying on the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (1968: 109, n. 1.71): an object ceases to exist before its cognition arises. Unless the object-form is represented in a cognition, an object-form of an earlier cognition can never appear in the succeeding one, but this is contrary to experience.

<sup>27</sup> De<sub>t</sub> D 232b7ff., parallel in PST 1 80,3-6.

<sup>28</sup> Devendrabuddhi also draws a distinction between the two preceding arguments and this one, and emphasizes that what is at issue here is that cognitions, just like objects, can be remembered as distinct from one another (De<sub>t</sub> D 241b6ff. on PV 3.422)—for instance, as Jinendrabuddhi adds in PST 1 83,1ff., “I had a visual perception, not an auditory one.”

cognition's own form, the argument claims that it is established from a subsequent memory, which applies as much to a cognition as it does to an object.

With the final remark, that because of a subsequent memory, cognition "is also brought to awareness by itself" (*svasaṃvedyatā*), Dignāga uses facts about memory also to establish—in addition to the two forms in cognition—self-awareness.<sup>29</sup> This leads us to the first step in the two-step proof of self-awareness in PS(V) 1.11d:

PSV: *kiṃ kāraṇam?*

PS 1.11d: *na hy asāv avibhāvite ||*

PSV: *na hy ananubhūtārthavedanasmr̥tī rūpādismr̥tivat.*

PSV: Why?

PS 1.11d: Because this [memory] does not apply to what was not experienced [before].

PSV: [To explain:] Because there is no memory of an object-awareness (*arthavedana*) that was not experienced before, just as [there is no] memory of colour and the like [when these were not experienced before].

Remembering an object is possible only if the object was experienced earlier, and the same holds true for an object's cognition, be it perceptual or conceptual in character. Dignāga does not explain further why and how experience (of objects or their cognitions) is a precondition for memory. Dharmakīrti for his part specifies that if there were memory of past cognitions without their previous experience, then one's cognition of one's own past cognitions would not be different from determining the cognitions of others.<sup>30</sup> Experiential access to one's mental states thus provides the special subjective dimension that enables one to remember them. Setting aside whether Dignāga's argument was made with the same rationale in mind, the further argumentation in the PS(V) in any case presupposes that the experience of a cognition can be explained in two, and only two, ways. Either cognitions are, just like objects, experienced by cognitions that are different from them, or cognitions are self-experiencing. With the second step of the argument, which is an infinite regress argument, Dignāga rules out the former and believes to have established thereby the latter.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Drawing on PV 3.425, Hattori (1968: 110, n. 1.74) interprets *svasaṃvedyatā ca* to mean: that the cognition has both forms implies that it is cognized by itself, which assumes that the sense of self-awareness intended here is "the subject-aspect is aware of the object-aspect." However, in this verse Dharmakīrti begins the section about self-awareness with an original argument of his own (as Devendra-buddhi highlights in De, D 243a1 = P 287b1f.), which makes it problematic to rely on it for interpreting Dignāga. It is only much later, in PV 3.484a-b1, that Dharmakīrti picks up Dignāga's argument from memory with the laconic statement *smṛter apy ātmavit siddhā jñānasya*.

<sup>30</sup> PV 3.179: *smṛtir bhaved atīte ca sāgr̥hīte kathaṃ bhavet | syāc cānyadhīparicchedābhinnarūpā svabuddhidhīḥ ||*

<sup>31</sup> Williams gives a different account of the argument, omitting the second step (Williams 1983: 325, 1998: 10). According to him, the argument claims that we remember both the sensation of blue (i.e. the object-cognition) and the sensation of seeing blue (i.e. self-awareness). The argument would then simply state, as a (perhaps observable) fact, that self-awareness is remembered when we remember past experiences. Essentially the same account is also given in Arnold 2008: 18f. Arnold's version makes it clear

PSV: *syād etat: rūpādivaj jñānasyāpi jñānāntareṇānubhavaḥ. tad apy ayuktam, yasmāj*  
 PS 1.12.ab1: *jñānāntareṇānubhave 'niṣṭhā*  
 PSV: *anavastheti tajjñāne jñānāntareṇānubhūyamāne. kasmāt?*  
 PS 1.12b2: *tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ |*  
 PSV: *yena hi jñānena taj jñānam anubhūyate, tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir drṣṭā.*<sup>32</sup> *tatas tatrāpy anyena jñānenānubhave 'navasthā syāt.*

Footnote 31 continued

that this account rests conceptually on the identification of self-awareness with the apprehending aspect. Note that this step is expressly taken in some Tibetan traditions (perhaps especially among the dGe lugs pas)—Williams for his part relies on passages from the works of Tsoṅ kha pa (Williams 1983: 325, n. 16 and 17). See further Dreyfus (1997, chap. 25), for a glimpse of the variety of Tibetan interpretations of the relationship between subjective aspect, objective aspect, self-awareness and (according to some) external objects.

<sup>32</sup> This sentence, which explains PS 1.12b2 *tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ*, has been reconstructed by Steinkellner as *tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir drṣṭā yuktā*, but he now agrees with my suggestion to drop *yuktā* (oral communication). The rationale for adopting *yuktā* was because of certain words contained in the two Tibetan translations and Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, and that these two phenomena are related. PSV and PSV<sub>K</sub> translate the main clause as *dran pa mthoñ dgos pas so* and thus add a necessitative auxiliary (*dgos*) to the verb for seeing (*mthoñ*). Jinendrabuddhi comments (PST 1 84.7f., material from the basic text as Steinkellner reconstructs it is underlined): *yena hi jñānena jñānam anubhūyate, tatrāpy uttarakālaṃ smṛtir drṣṭā. na cānanubhūte smṛtir yuktā*. The editors of the PST have, like Steinkellner in his reconstruction of the PSV, assumed the final *yuktā* as a part of the PSV. However, there are contextual and semantic reasons to drop *yuktā* from the PSV after all; the Tibetan translators may have had a Sanskrit *draṣṭavyā* before them or understood *drṣṭā* with a necessitative aspect: a memory of the object-cognition has to be seen—in other words, it has to be admitted. This is also as Hattori has translated this.

Jinendrabuddhi here adds an explanation that draws on PS 1.11d as a paraphrase of the main sentence under consideration: a memory-cognition of the object-cognition is observed at a later point in time, and it is not appropriate for it to occur with something that was not experienced earlier—*yuktā* in the PST functions quite differently from how *yuktā* would have to function in the PSV. As a part of the PSV, moreover, *yuktā* is semantically suspicious when combined with *drṣṭā*, for Dignāga would either say that “with respect to this [object-cognition], too, a memory-cognition at a later time is observed [and] suitable/reasonable,” in which case *yuktā* appears redundant and unmotivated, or that “. . . it is suitable/reasonable for a memory-cognition to be observed at a later time.” In this case one wonders why *observing* the memory-cognition should be suitable or reasonable, and not the memory-cognition pure and simple.

Semantically, the relevant dictionary definitions make translating *yuktā* with *dgos pa* highly improbable: *dgos pa* does not mean that something is suitable or reasonable, but that it is necessary, that it has a purpose, or that it is useful. On the other hand, the common translation of *yukta* when it means “suitable” or “reasonable” is *rigs pa*. A search of MVyut-digital, checked against MVyut, yields not a single case where *yukta*, in a compound or on its own, is translated as *dgos pa*. Negi's dictionary does not attest *dgos pa* as a translation for a derivative of the root *yuj-* without *upasarga*, but has *dgos pa* only for derivations of *pra-yuj-* or *upa-yuj-*, in meanings that suit the semantic potential of *dgos pa* as “purpose(ful)” or “use(ful).” As the sole potential evidence, Lokesh Chandra (q.v. *dgos* (1)) reports that BCA 6.100 translates *ayukta* as *mi dgos*, cf. BCA 6.100ab: *muktyarthinaś cāyuktaṃ me lābhasatkārabandhanam | ye mocayanti mām bandhād dveṣas teṣu kathaṃ mama ||*, BCA, D 18b2f. *bdag ni grol ba don gñer la || rñed dan bkur sti 'chiñ mi dgos || gañ dag bdag bciñs grol byed pa || de la bdag ni ji ltar khro ||* “For me who strives for liberation, the fetters of success and honour are unsuitable. Why should I hate those who liberate me from these fetters?” Here, the Sanskrit *ayuktaṃ* expresses that something is unsuitable; cf. also the paraphrase with *nocitam* in BCAP 225,9, translated as *mi rigs* in BCAP, D 130b5. The translation *mi dgos* in BCAT can be taken as interpretative, motivated by the context, insofar as it concretizes how the fetters are unsuitable (inasmuch as they are without purpose or use).

PSV: Let there be the following [objection]: Like colour and the like, cognition, too, is experienced through another cognition. – This is also incorrect, because:

PS 1.12ab1: When [cognition] is experienced through another cognition, there is no end (*aniṣṭhā*).

PSV: There is no end (*anavasthā*) – when the cognition of this [colour and the like] is experienced through another cognition. Why?

PS 1.12b2: Because there is also memory of that [cognition of the cognition].

PSV: That is to say, when the cognition [ $C_1$  of colour and the like] is experienced through a cognition [ $C_2$ ], then one observes that for that [ $C_2$ ], too, there is memory at a later time. Therefore, when this [ $C_2$ ] is [then] experienced by another cognition, there would be no end.

The reliance on memory distinguishes Dignāga's infinite regress argument from others in South Asian philosophical literature that are more generic and also have parallels in contemporary refutations of so-called higher-order theories of consciousness.<sup>33</sup> The infinite regress argument and its structure will be treated elsewhere (Kellner, forthcoming); here I am going to limit myself to what this passage might reveal about self-awareness. It clearly demonstrates that for Dignāga, self-awareness is something that occurs with the very occurrence of an object-cognition. Self-awareness is neither *reflective* (a subsequent act of reflection directed at an earlier mental state) nor *introspective* (a look “inside” at one's own mental realm),<sup>34</sup> since both of these approaches would involve stipulating a separate higher-order mental state. If, however, Dignāga intends to establish self-awareness as an intrinsic feature of all mental states and thereby as a part of their nature, then his argument based on memory is problematic, for strictly speaking it proves self-awareness only of cognitions that are or can be remembered. But does Dignāga believe that all cognitions can be remembered? To my knowledge, it is by no means clear from his works whether Dignāga would limit subsequent memory to certain classes of mental states, or to states that occur only under specific conditions, like wakefulness.<sup>35</sup> This leaves two possibilities: either Dignāga did not intend to establish self-awareness as an intrinsic feature of all mental states, or his argument based on memory is problematic because it is meant to establish a stronger claim than it actually does. The former is contextually improbable because PS(V) 1.8cd-10, as we shall see, refers to a self-awareness of a mental state that is not made dependent on whether or not the state is later remembered.

<sup>33</sup> See Hattori (1968: 112, n. 1.78), for some references.

<sup>34</sup> For interpretations that assimilate *svasaṃvedana* into introspection, see Stcherbatsky (1932: 12), and Hattori (1968: 95, n. 1.50).

<sup>35</sup> Mādhyamikas and later Tibetan scholastics who criticize self-awareness accordingly also question the link between experience and memory, cf. the example of the hibernating bear (Garfield 2006: 210 on the basis of Śāntideva and rGyal tshab): while asleep, the bear was bitten by a rat. Woken up, the bear feels pain from the infected wound. He remembers that he was bitten by a rat, but, having been in deep sleep, clearly was not aware of being bitten at the time. See Thompson, forthcoming, for a critical discussion of this example. For a critique of the argument based on memory from a different angle, see Ganeri (1999).

To all appearances, the two proofs of the two appearances and of self-awareness in PS(V) 1.11-12 explain states of affairs relating to memory that are of a general kind, in the sense that as explananda, they are not peculiar to either externalism or internalism—in spite of the historical origin of the “two appearances” in the Yogācāra doctrine that has been pointed out by Hattori. While a characteristically Yogācāra emphasis that the various aspects of a mental state are not ultimately separate is made in PS 1.10 (cf. below), here, in the proof of the two appearances, their being distinct—that is, the existence of both—is crucial. Furthermore, the arguments that Dignāga presents here do not contain any ingredients that indicate or even demand the rejection of external objects of cognition—the object-appearance, after all, could just as well represent an outside reality that exists independently of consciousness. If Dignāga borrowed the idea of two appearances from Yogācāra, then his argumentation does not indicate this was because of its relationship to the non-existence (or non-cognizability) of external objects. In fact, a motivation for introducing such “appearances” into epistemological discourse might well have been that this model allows the specification of an internal structure to and a phenomenal component of mental states (how they present themselves), irrespective of the source of mental content.

The most natural interpretation of Dignāga’s proofs of the two appearances and of self-awareness in their specific textual context is then, to emphasize, that they hold true regardless of the status of the intentional objects, and are in this respect neutral. The closing remark of the entire section on the means of valid cognition and its result, to which the two proofs are appended, offers further textual support for such a neutral reading; it simply says, without any qualification, that “therefore, one inevitably has to accept that cognition is brought to awareness by itself (*svasaṃvedyatā*), and this is certainly the result [of the means of valid cognition].”<sup>36</sup>

### Self-Awareness as the Result of the Means of Valid Cognition (*pramāṇaphala*) in the Case of Sense-Perception (PS(V) 1.8cd-10)

To understand the significance of Dignāga’s claim that self-awareness is the “result,” it is necessary to briefly clarify some central aspects of the debate about means and result and their mutual relationship, which, being deeply entrenched in technicalities of South Asian epistemology, cannot be treated here in detail.<sup>37</sup> Historically, the debate arose with respect to one particular means of valid cognition, namely perception (*pratyakṣa*). And perception—more narrowly: perception through the five external senses—also remains at its core. To all appearances, means and result came to be discussed at a time when the various religio-philosophical

<sup>36</sup> PSV on PS 1.12: *tasmād avāṣyaṃ svasaṃvedyatā jñānasyābhyupeyā. sā ca phalam eva.*

Cf. PSVv: *de yañ 'bras bu ñid du gnas par grub bo* (with *bo* missing in CD), PSVκ *de yañ 'bras bu ñid de.* Hattori (1968: 31) translates the (reconstructed) *eva* as emphatic: “It itself is a result.” There are, however, no Sanskrit fragments for the final sentence.

<sup>37</sup> See Bandyopadhyay (1979) for a general introduction into the debate; Dunne (2004, chap. I.1 and, especially, pp. 268ff.) for an account of some of the underlying issues; and Taber (2005: 19ff. and 70ff.) for Kumāriila’s position and his critique of Dignāga.

traditions, especially the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, had developed distinctive analyses of perception, when a more technical conception of what it means to be a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) came into focus, one that emphasized a *pramāṇa*'s instrumental character. This technical conception was influenced by the grammatical analysis of the instrument as the most efficient factor involved in bringing about an action,<sup>38</sup> just as, to cite the stock example used by Brahminical philosophers, an axe is the most efficient factor involved in the felling of a tree. Unlike Dharmakīrti, Dignāga does not explicitly frame his exposition of means and result in terms of this grammatical analysis, but rather deals with its (in his view) problematic implication that instrument and result then have to be different things (*arthāntara*). Accordingly, in the polemical sections of PS(V) 1, he refers to certain adherents of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as well as to a commentator (*vṛttikāra*) of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, as “proponents of the view that the result is a different thing” (*arthāntaraphalavādin*).<sup>39</sup> In these polemical sections, he also presents the “understanding of an (external) object” (*arthādhiḡama*) as the result that a means of valid cognition brings about;<sup>40</sup> as we shall see, this is also, initially at least, his own view.

Arnold does not consider this technical background in Arnold (2008), which is mostly concerned with Dharmakīrti (as filtered through Manorathanandin's commentary), but whose main propositions are also intended to apply to Dignāga, on the presumption that the two thinkers have a “unified intention.” According to Arnold, Dignāga presents self-awareness in PS(V) 1.8cd-10 as the only real means of valid cognition because the only thing we truly cannot doubt is that our cognitions have mental content (Arnold 2008: 14). Arnold's interpretation is based on problematic translations (whose problems are in part, but not completely, due to his overly confident reliance on the Tibetan translations), which will partly be discussed in footnotes in the following. But more fundamentally, he interprets the exposition of means and result as being essentially about normative aspects of epistemology, about a hierarchy among means of valid cognition, which strikes me as unwarranted.

When Dignāga claims that one thing or another is a *pramāṇa* with respect to this result, this is not to proclaim a hierarchy of individual *pramāṇas* in terms of which one best or most immediately brings about the awareness of an object, or to fundamentally delineate valid from invalid cognitions, knowledge from error. According to Dharmakīrti, what is at stake is rather to determine what accounts for the reason that perception is limited to a specific intentional object (*pratīkarmānīyama*).<sup>41</sup> Certain representatives of Vaiśeṣika, for instance, propose the contact

<sup>38</sup> *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.42: *sādhakatamatvāt karaṇam*. The earliest explicit reliance on the grammatical definition of the instrument in connection with valid cognition is, to my knowledge, found in Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, NV 6,7ff. on NS 1.1.1.

<sup>39</sup> PSV 1.19 (Nyāya): ... *arthāntaraphalavādinah*, PSV 1.20 (Vaiśeṣika): *kecit tu pramāṇāt phalam arthāntaram icchanti* ... , and PSV 1.38 (Mīmāṃsā): *vṛttikāro hy arthāntaraphalavādy āha* ...

<sup>40</sup> See PS(V) 1.19c (Nyāya) and PS(V) 1.42 (Mīmāṃsā). For the general idea, cf. also NBh 1,15, where valid cognition (*pramiti*) is identified as the distinctive cognition of an object (*arthaviḡāna*). For Kumāriila's generally more flexible approach to the distribution of the roles of means and result, see Taber (2005: 66–84).

<sup>41</sup> See PV 3.302, 304; PVin 1 31,4f., 31,9f.

between a sense faculty and an object (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) as the means of valid cognition. Dignāga rejects this because the whole object is in contact with the sense faculty—but, as Dharmakīrti clarifies, only some aspects of it are perceived. As Manorathanandin exemplifies, we see colours and shapes, not a mass of atoms.<sup>42</sup> What distinguishes an acceptable means of valid cognition from an unacceptable one, with respect to object-awareness as the result, is therefore a particular suitability to explain cognition's object-specificity.

Beginning with Dignāga, Buddhist epistemologists provide alternative accounts of what means and result are in the case of sense-perception.<sup>43</sup> It is not uncontroversial how many alternatives there are, nor how they differ exactly. But scholars today have been unanimous in assuming that these alternatives depend on whether the object of perception is external or wholly internal to the mind. Japanese scholars in particular tend to frame their treatment in terms of the doctrinal systems of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra and accordingly discuss whether Dignāga might have wished to harmonize the two systems or to provide an account that would have been acceptable to representatives of both.<sup>44</sup> Self-awareness is involved in this shift in its function as a “bridging concept” between externalism and internalism, and in its specific manifestation as intentional self-awareness: the awareness that the subjective aspect of a mental state has of its objective counterpart. The interpretation of PS(V) 1.8cd-10 that I shall suggest below also entails that the difference between externalism and internalism is relevant to the alternative accounts of means and result, but perhaps not in the way that scholars have interpreted so far. The crucial point lies, interestingly, precisely in how we understand self-awareness and its role.

Having thus set the stage for reconsidering Dignāga's exposition of means and result, let us see how it proceeds. In PS(V) 1.8cd-10, Dignāga advances his signature claim that the means of valid cognition and its result are not different things (*arthāntara*), as the (Brahmanical) “outsiders” (*bāhyaka*) believe.<sup>45</sup> In PS(V) 1.8cd, Dignāga first presents the cognition of an external object as the result:

<sup>42</sup> PS(V) 1.20, PV 3.316a-c1, PVin 1 33,8f.; for the example, see M<sub>1</sub> 213,22.

<sup>43</sup> Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti state that the distribution of means and result in the case of inference is the same and thus show that the underlying principles are more generally applicable; see PS 2.1, NB 2.4, as well as PVin 2 46,4. Cf. also NP 10,9f.

<sup>44</sup> This is a current that runs through practically all Japanese-language publications on this and related subjects. In my opinion, the most concise expression of this position in a Western language is found in Iwata (1991: 3f.).

<sup>45</sup> PSV 1.8cd: *na hy atra bāhyakānām iva pramāṇād arthāntaram phalam*. Arnold (2005a: 34) and Chu (2006: 238) interpret *bāhyaka*, “outsider,” as *bāhyārthavādin*, i.e. as one who advocates external objects. This has the problematic side-effect that Dignāga would be generally distancing himself from externalists while at the same time propounding an externalist account.



PS 1.8cd: *savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṃ phalam eva sat.*

[Cognition], though it is actually the result, is [metaphorically referred to as] the means of valid cognition because it is held to perform an activity.<sup>46</sup>

According to the prose that expands on this claim, cognition arises (from an external object) as bearing or containing the form of the object (*viśayākāratayā*) that caused it, which is why one commonly believes that an activity is performed, namely that of apprehending the object. In fact, however, cognition performs no activity whatsoever. This situation is comparable to that of cause and effect in general. The effect arises from its cause and resembles it. It is therefore believed to perform the activity of taking on the cause's form, but in reality, it is without any activity.<sup>47</sup> Hiromasa Tosaki was probably the first to point out that this exposition rests on the model of perception that is traditionally attributed to Sautrāntikas or Dārṣṭāntikas (Tosaki 1979: 43–45). Ābhidharmikas were in disagreement about what factor involved in perception constitutes the “see-er” (*draṣṭr*) that performs the activity of “seeing” the object.<sup>48</sup> In the first chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the Sautrāntika answers the question as to who perceives and who sees when statements such as “perception perceives” (*viññānaṃ vijānāti*) are used by pointing out that these statements are just conventional ways of speaking. In reality, perception is without activity (*nirvyāpāra*), it is merely a factor (*dharma*) and only to be analysed in terms of causes and effects.<sup>49</sup> An “anti-activity” analysis of the statement “perception perceives” can also be found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*'s ninth chapter, where furthermore the idea underlying Dignāga's analysis is expressed that

<sup>46</sup> Dignāga makes it clear in the prose (cf. *phalabhūtasya jñānasya . . .*) that *jñāna* is to be supplied as the subject term. Cf. also NP 10,10: . . . *savyāparavatkhyāteḥ pramāṇam*, predicated of *jñānam*, as well as NB 1.18–19. See also (Hattori 1968: 28), Iwata (1991: 2), and Taber (2005: 80).

Arnold, in contrast, takes *pramāṇa* as the subject term: “a *pramāṇa* is real only as result,” see Arnold (2005a: 34, 2005b: 8, 2008: 7), likewise Eckel (2008: 238, n. 44). As the discussion in Arnold (2008) makes clear, this is linked to a reading of this half-stanza as answering what the referent of the word *pramāṇa* is—an interpretative connection that is tied in with Arnold's claim that self-awareness is for Dignāga the only real *pramāṇa*.

<sup>47</sup> PS(V) 1.8cd: *tasyaiva tu phalabhūtasya jñānasya viśayākāratayotpattyā savyāpārapratītiḥ. tām upādāya pramāṇatvam upacaryate nirvyāpāram api sat. tad yathā phalaṃ hetvanurūpam utpadyamānam heturūpam gr̥hṇātīty kathyate nirvyāpāram api, tadvad atrāpi.*

I assume that the noun-phrase *viśayākāratayotpattyā* in the initial statement about cognition is echoed in the phrase “hetvanurūpam utpadyamānam” in the subsequent analogy of cause and effect. With Iwata 1991: 3, I also assume that *pratīti* in *savyāpārapratītiḥ* refers to how one ordinarily experiences one's perceptions—in other words, a pre-theoretical way in which normal people understand their experiences that is not dependent on any particular philosophical system. Cf. also the reference to *loke* in an account of the Buddhist position, clearly based on PS(V) 1.8cd, in YD 77,18.

<sup>48</sup> See Kajiyama (1983: 11f.) (in Japanese), Cox (1988), Willemen et al. (1998: 20, n. 115) (with further references), and most recently, Dhammajoti (2007, chap. 4–5).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. AKBh 31,11–15 = AKBh (Ejima) 49,12–17.

perception resembles the object by bearing its form (*ākāra*).<sup>50</sup> The analysis of perception as an effect, combined with the rejection that a particular factor “sees” another, is also found in several passages of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as well as in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, in the latter justified with the principle that factors in general are without activity; Dignāga picks up this principle later in the PSV when introducing PS 1.10.<sup>51</sup>

In PS 1.9a, Dignāga introduces self-awareness as the result, alternatively to the cognition of an external object.<sup>52</sup>

PS 1.9a: *svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra*.

PSV: *dvyābhāsaṃ hi jñānaṃ utpadyate, svābhāsaṃ viṣayābhāsaṃ ca. tasyobhayābhāsasya yat svasaṃvedanaṃ tat phalaṃ*.

PS 1.9a: Or self-awareness is the result here.<sup>53</sup>

PSV: To explain: cognition arises with two appearances, with its own and with that of the object. The self-awareness of that [cognition] with both appearances is the result.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>50</sup> AKBh 473,23-474,1. Cf. Cox (1988: 39), Chu (2006: 238, n. 91), and Moriyama’s paper in the present volume.

Concerning Dignāga’s use of *ākāra* in this context, Chu (2006: 235) observes further that it is not inconsistent with the Sautrāntika understanding of *ākāra* as expressed in other passages of the AKBh, cf. AKBh 401,16ff. ad AK 7.13, identified as Sautrāntika position in AKV 629,6 (Kritzler 2005: 374). There, *ākāra* is specified as *sarvacittacaitānām ālambanagrahaṇaprakārah*, a particular “mode of apprehending the object-support” that belongs to all mental states and associates. This specification is part of a debate between Sautrāntikas/Dārṣṭāntikas and Sarvāstivādins who, while agreeing that all mental states and associates have an *ākāra*, disagree on what this means. See also AK 2.34b-d with AKBh, AD 482 with ADV 376,1ff., and for the background of the debate, Cox 1988: 81, n. 92.

It remains an open question, however, just how this “mode of apprehending” historically and conceptually relates to the notion of *ākāra* as a mental image or “form” that is pertinent in Buddhist epistemological literature, even though both the “mode of apprehending” and the mental “form” clearly have *something* to do with mental intentionality. Note that the Chinese commentator Puguang in this connection famously distinguishes between two meanings of *ākāra*: “comprehending activity” (行相) and “image” (影像); see Dhammajoti (2007: 354). Dreyfus, for his part, traces the Buddhist epistemological usage of *ākāra* back to Sāṅkhya influence (Dreyfus 2007: 100; Dreyfus and Thompson 2007: 102).

<sup>51</sup> See Kritzler (2003: 334, n. 13, 2005: 33) for references to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and ASBh 17,6f.: *naikaṃ nāparaṃ paśyatīti vedītavayam, nirvyāpāratvād dharmāṅām*.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. also PST 1 69,6: *pūrvaṃ viṣayasamvittiḥ phalaṃ uktā*.

<sup>53</sup> For *atra*, cf. PST 1 69,7: *atreti pūrvokte pratyakṣe*.

<sup>54</sup> Arnold has provided a different translation on the basis of the Tibetan, where *tasyobhayābhāsasya* is translated as *snañ ba de gñis la* PSVκ (*las* PSVv; Arnold relies on PSVκ): “Cognition arises as appearing twofold: [having] the appearance of itself [as subject], and the appearance of an object. In terms of these two appearances, the one that is apperception (*svasaṃvitti*) is the one that is the result.” (Arnold 2005a: 35) The Tibetan does not identify *ubhayābhāsasya* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, which is the most natural construction of the Sanskrit text, already known to Hattori from fragments (1968: 101, n. 1.61). Furthermore, the Tibetan translates *ubhaya* not as “both,” but simply as “two,” which makes for an important difference. Even if the nominal phrase *tasyobhayābhāsasya* could be syntactically construed as referring to a group of appearances from which one is selected, the emphatic pronoun “both” (*ubhaya*) rules this out: in the sentence “in terms of *both* appearances, the one that is *svasaṃvitti* is the result,” the closure of the totality of appearances that is indicated with “both” conflicts with the selection of merely one, as in the (awkward) statement “of both these persons, the one on the left is quite tall,” when compared to “of these two persons, the one on the left is quite tall.”

The prose introduces the by now already familiar idea that cognition arises with two appearances. The nominal phrase *tasyobhayābhāsasya . . . svasaṃvedanaṃ* in the final sentence, “self-awareness . . . of that [cognition] with both appearances,” is ambiguous. If *tasya* is taken to refer to *jñāna* as the object of self-awareness, and *ubhāyābhāsasya* construed as a Bahuvrīhi compound with *tasya*, we could first of all interpret Dignāga as saying that there is a self-awareness of cognition, and cognition just happens to have both appearances, tantamount to a descriptive relative clause in English translation: “The self-awareness of that [cognition], which has both appearances, . . .” But it is hard to see why Dignāga would mention that cognition has both appearances, as an additional piece of information, unless the self-awareness of cognition related to these appearances in some way that is relevant in this particular context. If we take Dignāga to consider cognition to be aware of itself as having both appearances, this could again be taken in a narrower and a wider sense: either cognition is just aware of itself as having both appearances—it is aware of itself as somehow encompassing both aspects—or it also has access to both these appearances.<sup>55</sup> In other words, is the *existence* of both appearances within the scope of self-awareness, or are the appearances themselves within its scope? Taken on its own, this passage is not conclusive. But in PSV before PS 1.10 (cf. below), Dignāga returns to this idea in an internalist framework. But why is self-awareness, rather than the cognition of the external object, the result, and under what conditions might this be the case?

*kiṃ kāraṇam?*

PS 1.9b: *tadrūpo hy arthaniścayaḥ |*

PSV: *yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ, tadā svasaṃvedanānurūpam arthaṃ pratipadyata iṣṭam aniṣṭam vā. yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ, tadā*

PS 1.9c: *viṣayābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam*

PSV: *tadā hi jñānasvasaṃvedyam apī svarūpam anapekṣyārthābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam. yasmāt so 'rthaḥ*

PS 1.9d: *tena mīyate ||*

PSV: *yathā yathā hy arthākāro jñāne pratibhāti śubhāśubhāditvena, tattadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyate.*

Why [is self-awareness the result]?

PS 1.9b: Because the determination of the object [that is to be validly cognised]<sup>56</sup> conforms to it.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. the constructions in PST 1 69,14: *ubhayābhāsaṃ jñānaṃ saṃvedyate* and PV 3.337c2d: *ubhayākārasyāsya saṃvedanaṃ phalam*; see further Iwata (1991: 3), Chu (2006: 239). Jinendrabuddhi supports the *bahuvrīhi*-analysis, but apart from that both his construction and that in PV are just as ambiguous as Dignāga's (reconstructed) wording.

<sup>56</sup> With PST 1 71,11: *arthaśabdaś cāyaṃ prameyavacanaḥ*.

PSV: [Self-awareness is the result] because<sup>57</sup> when the object is [everything,] cognition right down to the object (*saviṣayam*),<sup>58</sup> then one<sup>59</sup> cognises the object as desirable or undesirable in conformity with self-awareness. When, on the other hand, the object to be validly cognised is just the external object, then

PS 1.9c: the means of valid cognition is the fact that the [cognition] has the object-appearance.

PSV: That is to say, then the means of valid cognition is the fact that the [cognition] has the appearance of the [external] object, disregarding [cognition's] nature (*svarūpa*), even though it is [invariably] brought to awareness by cognition itself.<sup>60</sup> For the [external] object

PS 1.9d: is determined by means of this [object-appearance].

PSV: That is to say, an object is determined as having this or that form in accordance with how the object-form appears in cognition, as white, non-white, etc.

Jinendrabuddhi points out that earlier in the text (in PS 1.6) Dignāga mentioned self-awareness as a means of valid cognition for mental associates like passion, which belong to the nature of cognition (*jñānasvarūpa*). The suspicion may therefore arise that self-awareness is the result only when self-awareness is also the means of valid cognition, but not in the case of sense-perception. To avert this suspicion, Dignāga added the initial conditional clause *yadā hi saviṣayam jñānam arthaḥ*, with the indeclinable *saviṣayam* expressing completeness: self-awareness is the result for everything, from cognition right down to intentional objects like colours and shapes.<sup>61</sup> That self-awareness is the result is justified on the grounds that the determination of all these objects as desirable or undesirable conforms to their self-awareness (*svasaṃvedanānurūpam*). This, according to Jinendrabuddhi, furthermore applies in both externalism and internalism.<sup>62</sup> Considering that the desirability or undesirability of an object or feeling is subjective,<sup>63</sup> Dignāga's argument can be explicated as claiming that intentional objects (as well as mental associates) are

<sup>57</sup> Note that *hi* has no clear equivalent in the Tibetan translations, but it is well-attested in PST 1 70,3f.: *yadā hityādyasyaiva vivaraṇam. hiśabdo yasmādarthe*. Cf. further 71,2 and the quotation of the entire conditional clause in 71,7.

<sup>58</sup> See PST 1 71,12: *saviṣayam iti ca sākalye 'vyayībhāvaḥ*. The compound *saviṣayam* is an indeclinable compound signifying completeness, on the basis of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.6. The sentence *satṛṇam abhivyavaharati*, for instance, means "he eats everything, right down to a blade of grass." When Jinendrabuddhi earlier (70,5) glosses *saviṣayam* as *saha viṣayeṇa*, this would then have to be understood as referring not to cognition bearing the object, but to cognition together with the object in the sense of cognition and the object.

<sup>59</sup> So with PST 1 70,4, where the subject term *pratipattr* is supplied.

<sup>60</sup> Jinendrabuddhi separates the compound *jñānasvasaṃvedyam* as *jñānasya svasaṃvedyam* (PST 1 72,5), but it is not clear how he understands the genitive.

<sup>61</sup> PST 1 71,1-15.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. PST 1 70,6-8. This is in line with PV 3.339-350, where Dharmakīrti elaborates on PS 1.9ab first from an internalist, then from an externalist viewpoint. See Moriyama 2008 for an interpretation of Dharmakīrti's argument, focusing on the relationship between self-awareness and what Dignāga calls the "determination of the object" (*arthaniścaya*).

<sup>63</sup> More specifically, following Dharmakīrti, they vary depending on the subject; see PV 3.341-345 (from the viewpoint of externalism).

determined as desirable or undesirable depending on how they appear in the mind, and it is this *how* of appearing that is accessed through self-awareness. From this perspective, the feature of self-awareness that grants it its status as the result is its access to the way things subjectively present themselves in the mind.

The shift to self-awareness as the result, indicated with “or” (*vā*)<sup>64</sup> in PS 1.9a, accordingly does not indicate a shift from externalism to internalism, but rather a change in perspective from external objects in PS(V) 1.8cd to validly cognised objects in general, regardless of whether they are conceived as internal or external to the mind, and including mental associates. The conditional clause *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ*, “when, on the other hand, the object to be validly cognised is just the external object [and not a mental state or associate]. . .,” which begins the introduction of PS 1.9c, then also fulfills a different purpose than is often supposed. It does not indicate a shift back from internalism to externalism, but rather refocuses from the general perspective in PSV 1.9b to the particular case where the validly cognised object is just external, and explains what then serves as the means: the fact that cognition possesses the object-appearance. While the nature of cognition is then also known through self-awareness, this is set aside when the object is external. As Dharmakīrti puts it in PV 3.346, this is because cognition’s apprehending aspect (*grāhakākāra*) does not have something other—than cognition—for its object (*aparārthatvāt*); in other words, it cannot be *about* an external object. From this perspective, the object-appearance must be the means because it is about the external object and is that by means of which that object is determined (*mīyate*, PS 1.9d): the external object is determined as having this or that form in accordance with how this object-form appears in cognition, as white, non-white, etc.

When, on the other hand, the object is just the object-appearance, and not external, cognition’s apprehending aspect is the means for self-awareness as the result.<sup>65</sup> In an internalist framework, the object of valid cognition is therefore the internal object-appearance, the means is the apprehending aspect, and the result is (self-)awareness (*saṃvitti*), as Dignāga clarifies in conclusion:

PSV: *evaṃ jñānasamvedanam anekākāram upādāya tathā tathā pramāṇa-prameyatvam upacaryate. nirvyāpārās tu sarvadharmāḥ.*

*āha ca*

PS 1.10: *yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ | grāhakākārasamvittiyos trayam nātaḥ pṛthak kṛtam ||*

<sup>64</sup> ŚVK and NR, two commentaries on Kumāriḥa’s *Ślokaṃvṛttika*, cite PS 1.9a with *ca* (*cātra*) instead of *vā*, which may be the result of an innocent scribal error. Note, however, that they also reverse the order of PS 1.9ab and 9cd, see Hattori (1968: 101f., n. 1.60) for further details.

<sup>65</sup> PV 3.363: *tatra buddheḥ paricchedo grāhakākārasammatāḥ | tādatmyād ātmavit tasya sa tasyāḥ sādhanam tataḥ ||* The reading *tataḥ* is supported in De<sub>1</sub> D 227b7 = P 267b2, M<sub>A</sub> 44b2, PV<sub>H</sub> 36b3, PV<sub>1</sub> D 132a7 = P 231a2, and R<sub>1</sub> D 132a5 = P 158b7. On the other hand, Pr<sub>A</sub>’ 51,2f. (page beginning with *atrocyate*) and Pr<sub>B</sub> 202b1 read *matam* (cf. also Kellner 2009–2010). “In this [doctrine of consciousness-only], the determination belonging to cognition is assumed to be its form as apprehending. Because [the form as apprehending] has that [determination] for its nature, it is self-awareness. Therefore the [form as apprehending] is the means for bringing about that [self-awareness as the result].” Cf. also PVin 1 42,8f. Manorathanandin interprets *ātmavit tasya* to mean that self-awareness is the result of the form as apprehending, that is, supplies *phalam* as predicate (M<sub>1</sub> 228,11ff.). Iwata (1991: 5) understands this sentence as saying that the apprehending aspect is aware of itself.

PSV: In this way, based on the [self-]awareness of cognition with [its] several forms,<sup>66</sup> one metaphorically speaks in this or that way of [one form] being the means of valid cognition, [another] being the object. But [in reality], all constituent factors are without activity.

Furthermore, he says:

PSV 1.10: That whose appearance [cognition possesses] is the object that is validly cognized. The form as apprehending and [self-]awareness, again, are the means of valid cognition and the result. Therefore these three [aspects of cognition] are not separate [from one another].

In internalism as well as in externalism, therefore, Dignāga's conception of means and result is based on rejecting that cognition is an activity.

How does this reading of PS(V) 1.8cd-10 differ from earlier interpretations, and, most importantly, what does it tell us about self-awareness? In textual terms, it differs from earlier scholarly accounts mainly in its understanding of PS(V) 1.9. Hattori thinks that "although Dignāga bases the theory of *sva-saṃvitti* on the Yogācāra doctrine, he believes that even the Sautrāntikas will accept the theory that *sva-saṃvitti* is the *pramāṇa-phala*." (Hattori 1968: 102, n. 1.61) Textually, this means that he regards PS(V) 1.9ab as referring only to internalism; the conditional clause *yadā tu bāhya evārtha prameyaḥ* in PSV that introduces PS 1.9c then signals Dignāga's belief that the Sautrāntikas would also accept self-awareness—which is, however, implausible because this clause introduces the consideration of the means and is no longer related to the result.

Iwata observes that as a whole PS 1.9 can be interpreted as consistent with an externalist (Sautrāntika) viewpoint without any difficulties. PSV 1.9a is unspecific in its presuppositions, PSV 1.9b is articulated from an internalist perspective, and 1.9cd is framed from an externalist one.<sup>67</sup> If considering the stanzas 1.8 and 1.9 on their own, one would expect Dignāga to formulate them as *also* conforming to externalism, and not to proclaim a shift to internalism. This reasoning leads Iwata to conclude that Dignāga may have intended to provide an account acceptable to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras in the stanzas. Moreover, while Iwata is not explicit on this point, his dismissal of the shifts he observed in the prose in favour of a uniform reading of the stanzas probably reflects the hypothesis that the PS and PSV were composed separately, which Franco attributes to Schmithausen (see above n. 10).

The Sanskrit text that is now accessible first of all makes the internalist interpretation of PSV 1.9b improbable, which Hattori and Iwata took from the Tibetan translations. These do not translate the explanatory *hi* in *yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ*<sup>68</sup> and thus obliterate the relationship of this clause to PS 1.9b. They also

<sup>66</sup> For the analysis of *jñānasamvedanam anekākāram*, see PST 1 74,7ff.: *evam iti yathoktam. dvyābhāsaṃ jñānam iti* (cf. PSV ad PS 1.9a). *jñānasamvedanam iti jñānasya karmaṇaḥ samvedanam darśanam. kimbhūtam? anekākāram. anekā ākāra yasya, tat tathoktam.*

<sup>67</sup> Iwata (1991: 3f.), cf. also (Kataoka 2009: 107).

<sup>68</sup> The particle *hi* is, however, well attested in PST 1 70,3f.: *yadā hṛtyādyaśyaiva vivaraṇam. hiśabdo yasmādarthe*. Cf. further 71,2 and the quotation of the entire conditional clause in 71,7.

translate *saviṣayam* as *yul daṅ bcas pa*, “provided with an object,” a phrase suggestive of internalism.<sup>69</sup> Accordingly, Hattori translated from the Tibetan: “When a cognition possessing [the form of] an object... is itself the object to be cognised. . . .”<sup>70</sup> To regard this as an expression of the internalist position runs into problems of text-internal consistency, since, as Dignāga will state in PS 1.10, when the object is internal to the mind, it is the object-appearance (*ābhāsa*); it is not a cognition that bears it. It is interesting to note that Dharmakīrti, in his internalist interpretation of PS(V) 1.9b in PV 3.339, literally takes up *yadi saviṣayaṃ jñānam*, but (conveniently?) omits Dignāga's *arthah* and thus turns the condition into “when cognition bears the object” (*yadi saviṣayaṃ jñānam*). According to Jinendrabuddhi, who here departs from Dharmakīrti, *saviṣayam* is an *avyayībhāva*-compound expressing completeness, which averts this problem. If PSV 1.9b is interpreted as not making a shift to internalism, but simply as changing perspective from a limited to a comprehensive view, the discrepancy to PS 1.9b that Iwata has noted disappears—there is no need to argue for a change in Dignāga's ideas between an alleged earlier composition of the stanzas and the later addition of the auto-commentary.

Kei Kataoka has recently argued that Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is clearly unnatural (Kataoka 2009: 109). According to him, the (limiting) particle *eva* in the clause *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ* is restrictive: “When, on the other hand, only the external object is to be validly cognized. . .” (contrast with our translation above: “When, on the other hand, the object to be validly cognized is just the external object. . .”). The sentence therefore excludes something internal being *prameya*. For Kataoka, this in turn establishes that prior to this statement, Dignāga argued from an internalist viewpoint, which is expressed with *yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ*. Kataoka's argument is driven by the tacit assumption that the contrast “internal/external” constitutes the main and only interpretative frame for PS 1.9, and that the two *yadā*-clauses address precisely and exclusively this contrast. To be sure, if this assumption is made, Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation appears forced or “unnatural,” but it arguably does not if Dignāga is interpreted as simply having changed perspective, as I have suggested. Furthermore, Kataoka's account runs into the same problem of text-internal consistency as Hattori's translation, and therefore effectively trades in one “unnatural” interpretation for another: If Dignāga had just aimed at signalling a shift to the internal object-form as the *prameya* from an internalist perspective in PS(V) 1.9b, why would he have chosen to express this with the cumbersome phrase *yadā hi saviṣayaṃ jñānam arthaḥ*? Why did he not choose a less misleading phrase like *yadā hi viṣayābhāsa evārthaḥ*?

<sup>69</sup> So also Kataoka (2009: 109) (*taishō o tomonatta ninshiki*).

<sup>70</sup> Hattori (1968: 29). This translation follows PSV: *gañ gi tše śes pa yul dañ bcas pa don yin pa . . .* PSV has the (from the point of view of Jinendrabuddhi's Sanskrit) improbable *gañ gi tše śes pa don gyi yul dañ bcas pa*. See also Hattori (1968: 104f., n. 1.63), Iwata (1991: 3), Chu (2006: 242).

## Conclusions: Intentional Self-Awareness and Subjective Access

The interpretative problems with PS(V) 1.8cd-10 may not be possible to resolve, owing to the brevity of the text. As is often the case, looking closer at an interpretation advanced by earlier scholars reveals a tacit general assumption about the nature of the problem that these scholars considered the author to address. Both Hattori and Iwata, among others, have interpreted PS(V) 1.8cd-10 on the assumption that the status of intentional objects is the main underlying issue—is the object of valid cognition something external, or internal to the mind? This assumption is not as such outlandish, considering that Dignāga himself opens his *Ālambanaparīkṣā* with a very similar question: is the object-support outside the mind or within?

Inspired by Jinendrabuddhi, I have suggested the possibility of a different reading of PS(V) 1.8cd-10, which involves the assumption of a different underlying problem. Self-awareness is the result because, owing to its providing access to how objects of valid cognition appear subjectively, it allows for a comprehensive conception of the result, applicable to intentional objects as well as mental associates, and also applicable regardless of whether externalism or internalism are advocated. This could well be seen as an attempt on the part of Dignāga to provide an account of the result that is compatible with both Sautrāntika and Yogācāra positions—one that identifies immediate, non-conceptual access to how things subjectively appear to the mind as what unites them both, and one that also allows accounting for the “result” in the case of mental associates. To this extent, I find myself in agreement with Iwata. On the other hand, Dignāga’s clear distinction of what occupies the role of the means of valid cognition—object-appearance versus apprehending aspect—also shows that some issues have to be resolved differently depending on which account of intentional objects one adopts. It is furthermore worth noting that in the exposition in PS(V), the existence of two alternative accounts, externalism and internalism, is presupposed without any further elaboration; no commitment is made to one or the other as superior. This is, as is well known, different in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, where Dignāga points out fundamental problems of externalism and presents internalism as the superior account of what counts as the “object-support” (*ālambana*) of a mental state.<sup>71</sup>

The assumption that PS(V) 1.8cd-10 is mainly concerned with the status of intentional objects also has implications for how self-awareness is understood in this passage. Earlier interpreters of PS(V) 1.8cd-10 understood self-awareness to refer to what I initially labelled as intentional self-awareness: the subject-aspect of a mental state is aware of the same state’s object-aspect. Paul Williams, for his part, derived the intentional structure of this kind of self-awareness from the way the doctrine of the two appearances is presented in the (post-Dignāga) *Tarkajvālā*,<sup>72</sup> and as it is

<sup>71</sup> See also PS(V) 1.14cd-15, where themes from the ĀP are applied in the criticism of Vasubandhu’s definition of perception in his (lost) *Vādavidhi*.

<sup>72</sup> This passage can be found in the introduction to *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* 5.20; see the Tibetan text in Hoornaert (2000: 84), translation p. 101f.; see also Eckel (2008: 234). This marks the beginning of the critique of the two appearances, presented as a Yogācāra doctrine; note that self-awareness is not explicitly at stake in this passage.



related in Thub bstan chos kyi grags pa's outline of the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. One should note, however, that Dignāga's exposition of means and result does not unequivocally indicate that self-awareness here is nothing but intentional self-awareness—in fact, if one reads it unrelated to any subsequent tradition, one finds little in terms of explicit statements that point to intentional self-awareness. The main textual anchor that such an interpretation could claim is the statement that the apprehending aspect is the means from an internalist viewpoint (PS 1.10), at least as it is elaborated by Dharmakīrti when he explains why it cannot fulfil this role when the object is external: because the apprehending aspect does not have anything other than what is mental for its object—it apprehends *only* the objective aspect—this apprehension could be referred to as self-awareness.

Finally, Dignāga's exposition of means and result contains at least two further components of self-awareness that scholars have so far not taken into consideration. The first is that self-awareness provides access to how things subjectively appear in the mind, developed—according to the interpretation suggested above—in PSV on PS 1.9b and also on 1.9d; this point especially is pertinent to Dan Arnold's contribution to this volume. The second is the (probable) specification of self-awareness in PSV on PS 1.9a as a mental state's awareness of *both* its appearances<sup>73</sup>; this idea is also reflected in the introduction to PS 1.10, where the (self-)awareness of cognition with its two forms is mentioned as the basis for distinguishing object, means and result from an internalist perspective. This complexity calls accounts of (intentional) self-awareness as a “bridging concept” between externalism and internalism into question, and may call for revisions of accounts of Buddhist epistemology in terms of a “sliding” or “ascending” scale of analysis.

Moreover, if the dominant role of self-awareness were to provide mental states with intentional access to their own object-appearance, one would expect Dignāga to articulate a proof of self-awareness that is actually concerned with this particular point. But the proof of self-awareness in PS(V) 1.11d-12 is not at all about intentional objects—it establishes cognition's self-awareness of its own appearance or apprehending aspect through memory. Like objects, cognitions have to be experienced if they are to be remembered, and the best possible explanation (that avoids an infinite regress) for this is that they are aware of themselves. Unlike Williams' (and Śāntarakṣita's) reflexive awareness, which could be seen as a (perhaps even transcendental)<sup>74</sup> *presupposition* of experience, the self-awareness of a cognition as cognition is here introduced as part of a philosophical *explanation* of (certain aspects of) experience.

Rather than being introduced as a hallmark of the mental, self-awareness could here be said to amount to a hallmark of *access* to the mental. This is, perhaps, then the single unifying characteristic of Dignāga's internally diverse articulation of self-awareness: self-awareness is an immediate, non-conceptual mode of awareness that

<sup>73</sup> On this point, see especially Arnold's contribution to this volume, which, based on a grammatically different construal of the passage under consideration, arrives at a fundamentally different interpretation of self-awareness: not as a mode of awareness, but as a quality of the mental.

<sup>74</sup> See Arnold (2005b), where Śāntarakṣita's reflexive awareness is developed in this direction.

provides access to how mental content (including feelings, etc.) presents itself subjectively. Clearly, Williams' two kinds of self-awareness cannot be neatly mapped onto the different areas or contexts of Dignāga's presentation, but they can perhaps be understood as the result of attempts on the part of subsequent representatives of his tradition to think through the logical and conceptual relationship between the individual components of his initial account.

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