Abstract
Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yields a sceptical paradox. This means that Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a rather strong argument for scepticism and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that this paradox can be solved by an approach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution proposed has to leave open.
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Kertész, A. On the de-naturalization of epistemology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33, 269–288 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022463521120
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022463521120