Skip to main content
Log in

On the Ranking of Teams

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that in a possible world there is a determinate ranking of teams. Our argument rests on the premise: In theory, nothing prevents a determinate better than ranking. This premise in turn rests on assumptions with regard to stipulations regarding ‘better than’ and nature of a competition as well as a right answer theory of interpretation. We then speculate that in some actual leagues in some years, there were determinate rankings. We consider objections that focus on ties, noise, intransitivity, meaning of ‘better than’, and league recognition of the best team. We finish by noting that the issues involved in sport also apply to ranking candidates to occupy roles in our lives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For the notion that infinity is not a number, see (Huemer, 2016).

  2. For the idea of looking at a subset of an infinite sequence, see (Vallentyne & Kagan, Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory, 1997) and (Vallentyne, Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility, 1993).

  3. An example of a ranking that attempts to compare a team to all other teams in the league is a power ranking. This looks at a team’s record adjusted by the competitive strength of its schedule.

  4. An analogy here might apply to picking out the most valuable player. This might rest on a player’s gross contribution to team wins or on his contribution when compared to an average replacement. In baseball, this might track the distinction between (1) the aggregation of runs and runs batted in (RBI) and (2) wins above replacement (WAR). For a discussion of the most valuable player, see [], [], and [].

  5. See Hurka, Average Utilitarianisms (1982a) and Hurka, More Average Utilitarianisms (1982b).

  6. Thing labeled ‘A’ and thing labeled ‘B’ are numerically (strictly) identical if and only if they are one and the same thing simpliciter. Consider, for example, the person labeled ‘Mark Twain’ and the person labeled ‘Samuel Clemens’.

  7. For a classic discussion of mereological essentialism, see (Chisholm, 1973).

  8. For a version of this distinction, see (Cherry, 1973).

  9. For discussion of this issue, see PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).

  10. For discussion of the notion that intrinsic value is intransitive, see (Tempkin, 1987), (Chang, 2002), and (Rachels, 2005).

  11. For discussion of whether a system of rules can validate the fundamental rule-validating rule (rule of recognition) see (Hart, 1994). For a discussion of a formal axiomatic model of arithmetic, see Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in (Feferman, et al. 1986).

  12. On a side note, we think that league owners stipulate the rules because they own the game, but nothing in our argument rests on this claim.

  13. See Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) and Dworkin, The Model of Rules (1967). In sports, see Simon, Internalism and Internal Values in Sport (2000), Simon, The Ethics of Sports: What Everyone Needs to Know (2016), and Russell, Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With, (1999).

  14. See Searle (1997).

  15. For an exploration of random factors in NBA shooting, see (Gilovich, Tversky, & Vallone, 1985).

  16. This example is from the literature on trash-talking in sport see Dixon (2008).

  17. See Bordner (2016).

  18. We are grateful to the extremely helpful comments and criticisms of by paper by Neil Feit and David Hershenov.

References

  • Bordner, S. S. (2016). All-things-considered’, ‘Better-than’, and sports rankings‘. ‘All-things-considered’, ‘better-than’, and sports rankings. Journal of the Philosophy, 43(2), 215–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, R. (2002). The possibility of parity. Ethics, 112(4), 659–688.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cherry, C. (1973). Regulative rules and constitutive rules. The Philosophical Quarterly, 23(93), 301–315.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, R. (1973). Parts as essential to their wholes. Review of Metaphysics, 26, 581–603.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixon,  N. (2008).  “Trash talking as irrelevant to athletic excellent: response to summers,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 35 (1), 90–96.

  • Dworkin, R. (1967). The model of rules. The University of Chicago Law Review, 35(1), 14–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s empire. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feferman, S., Dawson, J., Kleene, S., Moore, G., Solovay, R., & van Heijenoort, J. (Eds.). (n.d.). Kurt Gödel: Collected works (Vol. 1). 1986, Oxford University Press.

  • Gilovich, T., Tversky, A., & Vallone, R. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 295–314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, H. (1994). The concept of law (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huemer, M. (2016). Approaching infinity. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hurka, T. (1982a). Average utilitarianisms. Analysis, 42, 65–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hurka, T. (1982b). More average utilitarianisms. Analysis, 42, 115–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, S. (2005). Counterexamples to the transitivity of better than. In T. Rønnow-Rasmussen & M. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value (pp. 249–265). Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, J. S. (1999).  “Are rules all an umpire has to work with?,”  Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 26 (1), 27–49.

  • Searle, J. (1997). The construction of social reality. Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon, R. (2000). Internalism and internal values in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 27(1), 1–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simon, R. (2016). The ethics of sports: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tempkin, L. (1987). Intransitivity and the mere addition paradox. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16(2), 138–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vallentyne, P. (1993). Utilitarianism and infinite utility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71, 212–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vallentyne, P., & Kagan, S. (1997). Infinite value and finitely additive value theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 94, 5–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the extremely helpful comments and criticisms of by paper by Neil Feit and David Hershenov.

Funding

None.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Stephen Kershnar.

Ethics declarations

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kershnar, S., Delaney, J. On the Ranking of Teams. Philosophia 50, 567–579 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00408-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00408-5

Keywords

Navigation