Abstract
This paper deals with the question whether some morally normative content is grounded in the dialogical practice that both Apel and Habermas call argumentative discourse, and, if so, how to demonstrate that it is so grounded. Apel (unlike Habermas) claims that discourse has rationally necessary conceptual presuppositions; that morally normative content is part of such presuppositions; and that this can be ascertained in transcendental reflection, i. e. by a kind of transcendental argument. I argue that these claims can be charitably interpreted but require clarifications of their key concepts, i. e. “discourse”, “validity claims”, “performative self-contradiction”, and “community of communication”. I argue that discourse as a practice of reason-sensitive agents who are communicatively connected via argumentation can be explained by its normatively constitutive aim, namely fixing the true values of our reasons; that the primary level of validity claims are claims concerning good reasons; that performative self-contradictions are pragmatic-cum-logical inconsistencies that we can know a priori to be incompatible with discourse’s constitutive aim; and finally, that competent discourse participants can know a priori that they would be performatively inconsistent if they flouted a moral kernel that is intrinsic in discourse.
