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Epistemic Injustice and Religion
Ian James Kidd
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham
Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice
1. Introduction
This chapter charts various ways that religious persons and groups can be perpetrators and
victims of epistemic injustice. The practices of testifying and interpreting experiences take a
range of distinctive forms in religious life, for instance, if the testimonial practices require a
special sort of religious accomplishment, such as enlightenment, or if proper understanding
of religious experiences is only available to those with authentic faith. But it is also clear that
religious communities and traditions have been sources of epistemic injustice, for instance,
by conjoining epistemic and spiritual credibility in ways disadvantageous to ‘deviant’ groups.
I focus mainly on the major monotheistic religions, culturally dominant in the modern West.
2. Epistemic injustice and theologies
The literature on epistemic injustice and religion is modest and mostly represented by the
work of the eminent feminist philosopher of religion, Pamela Sue Anderson (2004, 2012).
She focuses on ways that gendered prejudices in Western religious traditions has damaged
the spiritual development and self-understanding of women. The epistemic aspect of these
critiques lies in the erosion and distortion of the testimonial and hermeneutical credibility
and confidence of religious women. The transposition of gendered stereotypes into the
epistemic practices of theism can and has excluded women from religious discourses, which,
if left unchecked, corrupts the concepts, symbols, and other epistemic resources of the
religious imaginary, a concept Marije Altorf (2009) adapts from Michele Le Doeff (2002). If a
religious woman lacks the confidence and credibility needed to articulate and make sense of
her experiences, then she suffers a spiritually-toned epistemic injustice.
A striking feature of Anderson’s more recent work on epistemic injustice are potent
criticisms of the ways that the practice of mainstream philosophy of religion might promote
certain forms of epistemic injustice. A sensitivity to gender, race, ‘epistemic location’, and an
expansive engagement with the many forms of religiosity are needed for just understanding
of ‘thinking subjects’, and religious persons, who are marginalised epistemically and socially
within the academy (see Anderson 2012, 2015). It is too soon to tell whether philosophers of
religion will engage with the ethico-epistemic issues that Fricker’s concept captures, but one
can look elsewhere for work exploring their relation to religion. The trick is to not to look for
discussions couched in Fricker’s own terms, but rather for the sorts of concerns and topics it
captures. One can talk about epistemic injustice without using that term, and lack of a term
ought not to be confused with lack of sensitivity to the underlying phenomenon.
Several significant movements in theology engage with issues of epistemic injustice
and I consider two – feminist and liberation – in detail, making occasional remarks on queer
theologies along the way.
At their broader, the many varieties of feminist theology share a concern to identify
and reconstruct gender prejudices in religious thought and practice. Its relation to epistemic
injustice turns on the conviction, voiced by the late Rita Gross (2002, 63), that ‘adequate
theology cannot be done on the basis of erasing many voices’, such as those of women and
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aboriginal peoples. Feminist theologies explore the fact that the institutional and intellectual
structures of many, if not all, religions are shaped by androcentric biases, in different ways,
at different levels. For a start, women may be characterised negatively in the relevant terms
in a religious tradition, perhaps as earthly or bodily, or loci of craving and desire, even if the
characterisations are more nuanced and less fixed than was once supposed (Coakley 2000).
If a dominant theological anthropology assigns to women a derogatory status, then the very
possibility of their enjoying epistemic credibility and authority is denied or impugned. Next is
the related promotion of overwhelmingly male religious exemplars, often coupled to explicit
denial that women are apt for religious exemplarity, although this varies by tradition; there
is, for instance, a long Indian tradition of men recognising, indeed esteeming, female
spiritual exemplars (Frazier 2009). If, in a religious culture, epistemic and spiritual status are
connected, then to deprive women of religious exemplarity in effect deflates their credibility
and authority, at least in religious matters.
If there are general ways that religions could generate epistemic injustices, there are
other ways peculiar to distinctive traditions. One is that theistic traditions can conceptualise
God or the divine using typically masculine terms, like power or reason, thereby presenting a
conception of epistemic authority defined relative to men. Such conceptualisations project a
sexist social order onto a transcendent reality, explicitly or not; for instance, the Wisdom
tradition of Hebrew Scripture insisted that God is beyond gender, while the Church Fathers
denied that woman was theomorphic, able to ‘image’ God (Ruether 1990). Another specific
way to impose epistemic injustices onto women within a religious tradition is to privilege the
use of gendered language, metaphors, and images in quotidian and theological discourse – a
default to the male pronoun for God, ‘the Father’, say. And another would be nomination of
women as the sources of epistemic and spiritual corruption, whose best example is likely the
Christian postlapsarian doctrine by which Eve is the ‘embodiment of sin and corruption’ (Yee
2003, 1).1
Feminist theologies offer at least three ways to understand the unjust epistemic
effects of entrenched religious sexism. The first is to show the silencing of the experiences,
thoughts, and reflections of women of spirit, not least their accounts of their marginalisation
in and by the traditions to which they belong - a theme of Ursula King’s influential collection,
Voices of Protest, Voices of Promise (King 1989). Second, to document and protest occlusion
of the social and spiritual experiences of religious women, including the ways they have are
‘shut out of theological reflection’ (Ruenther 1983, 13) and denied a role in the ‘formation of
… theological meaning’ (Loades 1990, 4). And third, feminist theologies offer powerful ways
to identify and interdict systems of doctrinal and social power that deprive religious women
of their epistemic authority – for instance, by detailing the ‘disastrous’ effects on Christian
women’s ‘self-understanding’ of their tradition’s ‘fundamentally ambivalent’ conceptions of
the moral and metaphysical status of women (Loades 1990, 2). These systems must also be
sensitive to the intersections of gender and race (see Armour 1999).
Alongside such critical ways, constructive projects for a diversification of our
conceptions of religion and theology can be offered. Though a standing concern of feminist
theologies, positive projects are clear in the efforts by queer theologians, such as Marcella
Althaus-Reid, to create ‘a new space for a theological dialogue for and from heterosexual
dissenters’, able to exploit theological insights latent in the ‘elements of consciousness’ of
‘loving relationships’ (2003, 4, 115) and new ‘discourses of the sacred’ (2000, 3). This
requires overcoming the credibility deficits and hermeneutical marginalisation imposed on
queer religious communities, a project whose relationship to ‘orthodox’ theologies is highly
contested (see Cornwall 2011).
I suggest that epistemic injustice is a deep, latent theme in feminist and queer
theologies. A religious life is only possible if one can engage in testimonial practices and
draw upon rich hermeneutic resources within an epistemically nourishing tradition. But such
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abilities to participate in those practices and access to those resources can be corrupted by a
variety of prejudices, generating testimonial silencing and smothering, and hermeneutic
marginalisation. If so, such corrupted traditions perpetrate epistemic injustices that prevent
women and others of being able to report and make sense of their spiritual experiences.
Liberation theologies
Early critics of feminist theologies called attention to a neglect of other marginalized social
and religious groups, insisting that the ‘struggle for justice for women’ ought be extended to
the ‘liberation of humankind’ (Grey 1999, 89). Perhaps the most influential manifestation of
this call is the ‘liberation theology’ movement that emerged in the Latin American Catholic
Church in the 1970s. True to its Marxist inspirations, ‘liberation’ has social and economic as
well as epistemic aspects, of which two stand out. The first is a profound association of
epistemic and material oppression, of a sense that effective oppression of people requires
restriction of epistemic opportunities, for education, criticism, and debate. Second, a more
theologically charged conviction reflected in the title of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s 1986 book, The
Truth Shall Make You Free, taken from John 8:32. The aspects converge in a conviction that
epistemic and spiritual oppression are mutually reinforcing, since enforced failures to create
and share in truth and knowledge are spiritually deleterious. Crucially, however, social and
economic realities in modern societies ensure that this afflicts the illiterate poor more than a
literate elite. If so, argues Gutiérrez, theological thought and practice should make epistemic
justice a central aim – not abstract grasp of ‘cold, warehouse truths’, but liberatory actions
with truth and love as their ‘criteria for discernment’ (1986, 102).
The tacit aim of epistemic injustice is warranted by appeal to the epistemic lessons
of Jesus’ own ministry, devoted to tending and attending to the marginalized. At the heart of
liberation theology is the positive promotion of an ‘ethical and intellectual orientation’
towards those people and groups ‘marginalized by and within theology’ (Rowland 1999, 3).
The related critical aim is to encourage materially and epistemically privileged theologians to
revise what Kwok Pui-lan describes as their ‘suspicion’ of those on the social and theological
‘margins’ (2005, 126). If so, there are two ways that liberation theology engages issues of
epistemic issues. One is drawing attention to the social, material, and theological structures
that marginalize the testimonies and experiences of certain religious groups, or what Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak dubs the ‘itinerary of silencing’ (Spivak 2013).2 Such efforts include
interrogating established theological economies of credibility, taking seriously marginalized
voices, and a virtuous openness ‘to listen and to be challenged and to respond’ (Noble 2014,
9). Second, liberation theologies can show the fruits of more epistemically just modes of
theological practice and how this can ‘liberate’ previously occluded forms of religious
experience and understanding. Interestingly, this is presented not as an ideological intrusion
into Christian theology, but an overdue realization of its latent imperatives – hence why
many liberation theologians quote Jeremiah 22:13-17, ‘To know God is to do justice’, in its
fullest spiritual, material, and epistemic senses.
The conjunction of epistemic and spiritual liberation is also evident in other religious
traditions as the feminist, postcolonial, and queer insights flowed through other traditions. A
systematic study could focus on religious movements alert to (i) the articulation of the latent
epistemic aspects of religious concepts of justice – particularly in Judaism (Stone 2004) and
Islam (Shaikh 2013) – and (ii) the appreciation of the ways that prejudices distort judgments
of epistemic and spiritual credibility and authority within the historical and current forms of
those traditions. A promising possibility is Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of satyāgraha, built
from Hindu materials, that promotes both personal ‘insistence’ on truth and the creation of
social and epistemic conditions receptive to its acquisition and debate - ones unmarred by
gender and caste prejudice, for instance. In effect, this is a call for epistemic injustice rooted
in a religious tradition (see Gandhi 1996 and Parekh 2001).
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3. Religion as a source of epistemic injustice
A vigorous literature exists devoted to the epistemic, as well as moral and social, harms that
can be generated within religious institutions and traditions, often from their members. Can
these criticisms be articulated in the terms of epistemic injustice?
Religious aliens
Paul J. Griffith (2010) defines a ‘religious alien’ is anyone who seems to inhabit a religious
form of life that one does not take oneself to inhabit. To a nonreligious person, all religious
people are aliens, as theists are to atheists, while to a religious person only the people who
inhabit a different form of life are religious aliens, as Sikhs do to Zen Buddhists, say. Griffiths
describes a set of ‘families of responses’ to them, including ‘domestication’, ‘shunning’, and
‘love’s embrace’, each of which can be analysed using the concept of epistemic injustice. It is
clear, for instance, that our responses to religious aliens invoke complex questions of
testimonial and hermeneutical engagement of sorts that bring the possibility of injustice.
Are religious aliens negatively stereotyped – as godless, profane, or pagan – in ways that are
credibility-deflating? Do religious people have the hermeneutical practices and resources
needed to be, as Griffith’s (2010, 123) says, ‘receptive to the … alien’s particular otherness’?
Can one even regard aliens as epistemically credible if their conception of reality is regarded
as metaphysically and spiritually false or flawed?
Such questions invoke complex issues of epistemic injustice, confidence, and power
that are ripe for systematic investigation. A good starting point would be Anderson’s (2015)
work on feminist perspectives on religious diversity, and the discussion of how aliens can
provoke crises of epistemic confidence in one’s tradition offered by Griffiths (2001, chs.2-3).
Those less sympathetic to religious concerns might also consider the ways that non-religious
aliens were, historically, epistemically stigmatized. During the Middle Ages, atheism was an
indisputable ‘sign of ignorance’ and ‘immorality’, such that listening to them was a tangible
risk to one’s moral and spiritual integrity. If so, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice may
sometimes be latent in a whole culture and picture of the world (see Weltecke 2013).
Christian mysticism
Feminist philosophy of religion affords rich materials for studies of epistemic injustices that
were facilitated and legitimated by religious traditions. Grace Jantzen offers the case of the
marginalization of women in the Western Christian mystical tradition in her influential book
Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism. To retrieve and ‘celebrate’ those women mystics is
to contribute to the feminist project of ‘deconstructing patriarchal paradigms’ that led to the
occlusion of their testimonies and experiences (1995, 347, 3). It is also to challenge modern
philosophical approaches to mysticism that continue that legacy of marginalization, not least
by reactivating debates about ‘who counts as a mystic’ within cultures averse to the idea of
women having an ‘authoritative’ status. If women mystics’ experiences were accepted, then
their attainment of union with God would undermine their spiritually derogated status and
force a ‘reconsideration of the categories’ of spiritual and social order (1995, 15, 2, 16). The
women’s testimonies and experiences could transform the entire religious imagination.
Jantzen’s study of the gendered injustices perpetrated against women mystics in the
Christian medieval tradition is complex and has been contested.3 But it addresses the issues
definitive of epistemic injustice, such as the hermeneutical marginalization of certain groups,
for instance, and the abuse of social power to distort credibility economies. Similar themes
are developed by Sarah Coakley who recently argued that analytic philosophy of religion has
tended to ‘trivialise’ the ‘epistemic significance’ of St Teresa of Avila’s mystical experiences.
Although she does not explicitly invoke the concept of epistemic justice, it flows through her
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suggestion that, by taking lessons from feminist thought, philosophers of religion can ‘do
richer justice hermeneutically to the texts of mystical theology’ (2009, 283).
The soul-making theodicy
The project of theodicy has been subjected to morally inflected criticisms that offer another
possibility for detecting subtle forms of epistemic injustice generated by religious traditions.
I focus on the soul-making theodicy, developed by John Hick in Evil and the Love of God, and
the epistemically-inflected criticisms of it developed by moral anti-theodicists.
The core claim that Hick develops is that experiencing and engaging with suffering is
necessary to the cultivation of moral and spiritual virtues. Since God desires our perfection,
He places us into a world whose abundant suffering makes it an optimal environment for the
exercise of those virtues - a ‘vale of soul-making’. Influential as it is, the theodicy is criticized
on many fronts, but I focus on objections of a feminist character. Marilyn McCord Adams is
perhaps the most famous critic, challenging its central claim by arguing that certain human
experiences of suffering are so terrible – extensive and intensive – that they ‘crush [one’s]
character’. Such ‘horrors’, as she dubs them, not only ‘fail to advance’ the sufferer’s moral
and spiritual ‘progress’, but are so ‘damaging’ that progress becomes ‘virtually impossible’
(2010, 330-31, 1999, 53). Indeed, such ‘horrors’, far from being soul-making, are irreversibly
soul-breaking—a religiously-inflected form of what José Medina calls ‘epistemic death’, that
occurs as a result of harm to one’s epistemic capacities and agency, ‘so deep as to annihilate
one’s self’ (this volume, pp.).
If certain experiences of suffering result in ‘epistemic death’, then that is one way to
base a critique of the soul-making theodicy in epistemic injustice. But two others are worth
mentioning. The first arises from Hick’s appeal to mystery as a response to horrendous evils
(which he calls ‘dysteleological evils’). The deep problem of evil, he argues, lies in the fact
that evils and suffering are ‘distributed in random and meaningless ways’, for which we can
provide no rationally and morally compelling explanation (2010, 333). Although Hick invokes
such ‘mysteriousness’, arguing that it is conducive to the process of soul-making, the claim is
false and – I argue – a source of epistemic injustice. It is false because the distribution of evil
and suffering is not ‘random’, but obviously socially and materially conditioned. Evils track
individuals and groups along the lines of sex, gender, race, and social-economic situation, in
the case of both natural and social evils. If the distribution is explicable, it is not mysterious –
a point obvious from historical and sociological investigation, and neglected by philosophers
of religion who, as Morny Joy (2010) complains, blandly and vaguely say that ‘people suffer’,
rather than admit that certain people—women and the poor, say—suffer from intensely and
extensively from evils, including group-specific evils (like female genital mutilation), and are
also less able, socially and epistemically, to protest and interdict their suffering. If epistemic
injustice is a sort of evil, then its distribution is not ‘random’.
An appeal to mystery, of the sort Hick offers, is a source of epistemic injustice in two
ways. First, it is apt to distract attention away from the empirical realities of suffering, and
least the social identities of the sufferers, thereby occluding the testimonies and experiences
of the sufferers by removing any sense that it is relevant or imperative to attend to them. It
adds silencing to the experience of suffering, hence the ‘refusal’ of feminist philosophies of
religion to ‘distract attention’ away from the lives and voices of the suffering (Jantzen 1998,
264). Second, appeal to mystery tends to diverse intellectual attention away from concrete
empirical realities onto a transcendent domain, to inquiry in God’s reasons for allowing evil.
This has the hermeneutical consequence that understanding evil becomes a task of abstract
theorizing rather than sensitive engagement with the lived experiences of the sufferers (see
Burley 2012a). Understanding evil is a matter of ratiocination informed only minimally by an
empathetic engagement with the testimonies and experiences of sufferers – a criticism that
is central to moral anti-theodicy, which emerged, over the last fifty years, to challenge styles
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of theodicy judged to encourage detachment from and insensitivity to suffering. But moral
anti-theodicy has a latent epistemic aspect, closely related to concerns about injustice. D.Z.
Philips, for instance, argued that theodicies ‘betray the evils that people have suffered’, and
so ‘sin against them’ (2004, xi). Among its many aspects, this ‘betrayal’ includes a failure to
assign a central role to the testimonies of those who suffer – a betrayal by silencing. Indeed,
a grim irony is that suffering is silenced by the very people who confidently assume the task
of making sense of the experiences of the suffering. Theodicies, as critics put it, are complicit
in ‘dehumanising victimization without reconciliation’, objectionable insofar as it ‘averts its
gaze from the cruelties that exist in the world’ (quoted and discussed in Trakakis 2008, ch.2).
Theodical projects can be a source of epistemic injustice if they fail to encourage the
development of resources and sensitivities needed to attend to the testimonies of religious
people of their experiences of suffering. If so, such projects will, however inadvertently, be
epistemically unjust.
4. Religion as a victim of epistemic injustice
Debates about the epistemological status of religion in late modern societies are arguably
shaped by two background convictions – inherited from the Enlightenment, operating at the
level of sensus communis rather than explicitly affirmed doctrine. One is that religious belief
is epistemically suspicious, reflective of ignorance, superstition, or of the persistence of a set
of psychosocial needs. Another is that religious beliefs, institutions, and traditions have been
and continue to be epistemically deleterious at the individual and social levels – a claim that
is developed and explored by political theorists, cultural critics, and many others. If so, then
religion is liable to be interpreted as the source, not the victim, of epistemic injustices. These
are deep waters – historically, culturally, intellectually – and there is little work on the ways
that the concept of epistemic injustice could be used to navigate them.
Certainly the central concerns captured by the concept of epistemic injustice can be
found in influential recent works, including Charles Taylor’s recent study, A Secular Age, that
interprets modern secularism in terms of a change in the prevailing ‘conditions of belief’ of
modern societies. Religious belief, once ‘axiomatic’, is now ‘one … possibility’ among others,
‘eligible’ for some, but not for others, such that different groups within a culture ‘experience
their world very differently’ (2007, 3, 14). Such contexts complicate judgments of credibility
and interpretation because epistemic possibilities that are crucial to one group are ruled out
by another – for instance, if talk of a sense of love of or union with god can only be heard as
symbolic or expressive at best, or ‘outmoded’ or literally senseless at worst, then there is a
space for epistemic injustice (see Cottingham 2003, ch. 6 and Kidd 2014). Or religious groups
might be negatively stereotyped in ways that prejudicially deflate their credibility or find the
activities and experiences constitutive of their faith rendered hermeneutically opaque within
a religiously illiterate society (see Adnerson 2013, Svartvik and Wirén 2013).4 Or the nonreligious social peers might not only be ignorant of basic knowledge – of doctrines, dietary
rules, and so on – but also have a hermeneutically inadequate approach to religion.
Contemporary philosophers of religion of many different stripes nowadays advocate richer
ways of making sense of the diversity of forms of human religiosity – historical, cross-cultural
and phenomenology, for instance (see, inter alia, Burley 2016, Wynn 2008, Zagzebski 2007).
Underlying such work is a call for an enriched hermeneutical sensibility of a sort that relates
to what Fricker calls epistemic injustice – for instance, an appreciation that ‘taking a religious
belief seriously’ means locating it within a ‘form of life’, rather than isolating it from its
supporting context of thought and sensibility, thereby consigning it to unintelligibility. This is
difficult if the beliefs and practices seem absurd or unintelligible, but the virtue lies in seeing
that such appraisals are products of a contingently inherited sensibility, rather than exercise
of an epistemically privileged perspective on reality (see Burley 2012b). The idea that our
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contingently inherited epistemic sensibilities can act as deep sources of epistemic injustice is
a complex one – sketched, in part, by Kidd (2013) and Ratcliffe (2008, ch. 10). But the idea is
best explored in the context of religion where epistemological issues are complicated by the
very fact of significant differences in how human beings experience and conceive the world.
Naturalism and religious experiences
The deep roots of epistemic injustice are usually contingent prejudices against certain social
groups – women, blacks, the disabled, and so on – that are explicable in psychosocial terms.
But a further possibility, at least in the case of religion, is that the roots of such injustice can
be something akin to a worldview or conception of reality. Certainly certain philosophers of
religion have argued that certain religious claims and experiences are deprived of credibility
and intelligibility by a naturalistic worldview (see, for instance, Cottingham 2005). Central to
that worldview – or set of related views – is a denial of the existence of supernatural entities
and realities – gods, soul, karma, and other components of many religious ways of life. Since
they are judged not to exist, belief in them must be evidence of epistemic fault, usually to be
explained in the terms of psychological and evolutionary terms (see Dennett 2007 and De
Cruz and De Smedt 2015).
Most cases of epistemic injustice involve deficiencies of epistemic goods – credibility
and intelligibility – stem from negative prejudice or lack of hermeneutical resources. I want
to suggest that, in certain cases, the very possibility of credibility or intelligibility is removed
and that this can result from adoption by an epistemic agent of a certain worldview. Call this
a deep epistemic injustice and consider as an example the project of ‘spiritual neuroscience’,
which used to be called ‘neurotheology’. Critics make various empirical and methodological
objections to such projects, but a deeper worry is that spiritual neuroscience presupposes a
naturalistic framework that implicitly rules our certain epistemic possibilities – specifically, it
rules out the possibility of a veridical interpretation of religious experiences, of their being
what their experients report and interpret them to be. Although ‘religious experiences’ is a
broad and elastic one, within religious communities it is typically taken to refer to some sort
of experience or – absorption in, union with, sense of – a something whose reality is not only
denied but excluded by a naturalistic picture of the world (see Katz 2012). But as David E.
Cooper argues, such a picture necessarily ‘denies truth or sense to such … such experience’
and ‘entails that the experience cannot be taken at face value’ (2002, 337, 338). If so, people
who adopt it are de facto prevented from regarding as credible testimonies to such religious
experiences that are regarded, at least if they are interpreted to be, inter alia, perception of
a divine being, ‘union’ with the ‘grounds of being’, or whatever. In such cases, the person’s
credibility is not deflated, but definitively denied, at least concerning those experiences.5
The idea of deep epistemic injustices of this sort is contestable, of course, because it
depends on fundamental metaphysical convictions. Naturalists will likely reject talk of their
illegitimately ruling out the possibility of veridical interpretations of religious experience by
denying that they are legitimate. If the blunt fact is that there are no transcendent realities,
then rejecting reports of experiences of one is not an injustice, but what informed scientific
reason requires. Yet the critics’ response will be to reject the naturalistic confidence in that
picture of the world; perhaps, like the later Wittgenstein, they think Weltbilde cannot be
proven or refuted, since any practices and criteria of proof and refutation would presuppose
the very picture whose status is being questioned. Or perhaps they follow the position of the
existential phenomenologists, that naturalism takes for granted a tacit sense of reality that it
cannot epistemically justify (see Ratcliffe 2003, 2013).
Since exploration of the points of contact between epistemic injustice and the deep
philosophical issues sketched here is in its early days, these remarks are necessarily brief. It
is striking, though, that those who develop them evince a consistent concern with issues of
our testimonial and hermeneutical capacities. Ratcliffe argues that neurotheologians fail to
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grasp that their commitment to methodological naturalism, their ‘definitive refusal’ to admit
theistic possibilities into scientific enquiry, entails implicit ontological commitments, that are
‘antagonistic to theism’. Confident in its own sense of neutrality, neurotheology ‘implicitly
rules out the possibility of certain coherent, theistic ontological claims’ (2003, 327, 234). The
epistemic consequence is that the naturalist cannot but withhold the possibility of credibility
and intelligibility from people’s reports of religious experiences, which will be naturalised
and pathologised (see Kidd 2016). If one agrees with the critique of the naturalism, then this
may seem like a case of deep epistemic injustice – a denial of the possibility of testimonial
credibility and intelligibility to those who report experiences incompatible with a naturalistic
metaphysics. But naturalists, of course, will reject the critique and hence the charge of deep
epistemic injustice.
Since the possibility of deep epistemic injustices will ultimately turn on a larger
debate about philosophical naturalism, it is best not to hold one’s breath for solutions. But it
does point to the potential fruits of exploring cases where religious persons might feel that
they are victims of epistemic injustice. Certainly we can use it to pose interesting questions.
Is it a testimonial injustice to deny credibility to religious persons who report experiences of
a sort that, though profoundly significant to them and their communities, can only be found
incredible (in a technical, literal sense) by others? Is it a sort of hermeneutical injustice if the
education and culture of secular societies fail to provide their members with the sensibilities
and resources needed to make sense of religious people’s experiences? If epistemic justice a
political and civic virtue within modern societies where a premium is placed on debate and
understanding between diverse religious and non-religious communities? And if our pictures
of the world fundamentally structure our sense what sorts of testimonies and experiences
can be regarded as credible and intelligible, then is there a deeper – ‘metaphysical’ – aspect
to the epistemic and cultural tensions concerning religion in modern societies?
A sense of what sorts of experiences can be credibly reported and cogently made
sense of may be rooted in a picture of the world. But this may be a vision some social peers
may not share; indeed, one that many may regard as absurd.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has surveyed several points of contact between epistemic injustice and religion.
Although this study is in its very early stages, there are rich existing resources within various
forms of theology - feminist, liberation, and queer – and various current debates within the
philosophy of religion and wider philosophical thought. One can think of religious doctrines,
communities, and systems of thought as sources of epistemic injustice; or one can think of
religious agents are victims of epistemic injustice; or – of course – one can recognize that the
options are mutually compatible and consider both together. There are various possibilities
available and given the epistemic and cultural complexities attending religion – in its widest
sense – in modern societies, there should be great interest and urgency in exploring them.6
Ian James Kidd
ian.kidd@nottingham.ac.uk
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Notes
1
This is a large theme, explored by, inter alia, Daly 1973, Ruether 1983, and Schüssler
Fiorenza 1993.
2
See ‘Reading Spivak’, Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean’s introduction to Spivak 2013, for
useful context and criticisms of her work.
3
Useful critical discussions of Jantzen’s book, and its relation to wider scholarship on
medieval Christian mysticism, can be found in the reviews by Stanley Hauerwas in Modern
Theology 13.3 (1997), 399-421 and Anneke Mulder-Bakker in Gender and History 10.2
(1998), 316-318.
4
A disturbing example of a morally obnoxious hermeneutical failure in the context of
religion is discussed by Medina (2012: §4.2.1).
5
I give a fuller account of how adoption of a naturalistic stance can occlude a person’s
capacity to engage epistemically with religious claims and experiences in Kidd (2012).
6
I am grateful to José Medina and Gaile Pohlhaus for comments on an earlier draft, to
Rachel Muers and Tasia Scrutton for encouraging my early interest, and to David E. Cooper
and Matthew Ratcliffe for inspiring my ideas.