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Achievement and the Value of Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2019

Brian Kim Open the ORCID record for Brian Kim [Opens in a new window]
Brian Kim*
Affiliation:
Oklahoma State University
*
*Corresponding author. Email: brianhkim@gmail.com
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Abstract

How does being a knower and possessing knowledge contribute to living well? Some have assumed that the eudaimonic value of knowledge is exhausted by its role as either a means or a final end. On this basis, it has been concluded that knowledge is not always valuable since its value will depend upon the ends that one has. I propose to expand our exploration by considering how knowledge might be valuable in virtue of being constitutive of certain eudaimonic goods. Using achievement as an example of an eudaimonic good, I argue, by way of considering its relations to credit and luck, that knowledge is necessary for achievement.

Keywords

Value of knowledgeachievementhappinessflourishingluckcredit
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 269 - 281
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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