Abstract
In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li—as moral virtue and as civic virtue—in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms—human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi.
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Notes
Sor-hoon Tan, ‘From Cannibalism to Empowerment: An Analects-Inspired Attempt to Balance Community and Liberty,’ Philosophy East and West 54:1 (2004), pp. 52-70; see p. 54.
Ibid., pp. 57-61. For similar accounts of the li, see Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper, 1972) and Chenyang Li, ‘Li as Cultural Grammar: On the Relation between Li and Ren in Confucius’ Analects,’ Philosophy East and West 57:3 (2007), pp. 311-329.
See Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
See William A. Galston, ‘Pluralism and Civic Virtue,’ Social Theory and Practice 33:4 (2007), p. 625. Note that Galston does not use the term ‘moral virtue’ when he distinguishes civic virtue from human virtue.
According to Adam Seligman (and others), civic virtue and civility are qualitatively different as the former is much more concerned with a republican community of thick civic bonds, while the latter is of modern invention, which is focused on inner sociability of the self. See Adam B. Seligman, ‘Public and Private in Political Thought: Rousseau, Smith, and Some Contemporaries,’ in The Problem of Trust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). In this paper, however, I use the terms interchangeably by understanding as the virtue that is institutionally originated and that sustains and invigorates sociopolitical relationships and associated institutions. In this paper, it is the contrast between human/moral virtue and civic/political virtue that is far more significant than the subtle distinction between civic virtue and civility, however important it is in the Western history of ideas.
Mencius 4A5. Throughout the paper, all English translations of the Mengzi are adopted from D. C. Lau, Mencius (New York: Penguin, 1970).
For instance, see Henry Rosemont, Jr., ‘Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons,’ in Mary I Bockover (ed.), Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility (La Salle and Chicago: Open Court, 1991); David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, The Democracy of the Dead (La Salle and Chicago: Open Court, 1999); A. T. Nuyen, ‘Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation in Confucian Role-Based Ethics,’ Dao 8:1 (2009), pp. 1-11. Interestingly, Confucian role-ethicists have largely drawn from the Analects of Confucius (Lunyu
) but often neglected the Mencius 孟子.Tan, ‘From Cannibalism to Empowerment,’ p. 54 (my emphasis). For Tan’s more detailed account on this issue, see her Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 17-62.
Tu Wei-ming, ‘The Creative Tension between Jen and Li,’ in Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979); Kwong-loi Shun, ‘Jen and Li in the Analects,’ Philosophy East and West 43:3 (1993), pp. 457-479.
Sin Yee Chan, ‘The Confucian Notion of Jing 敬 (Respect),’ Philosophy East and West 56:2 (2006), pp. 229-252; Karyn Lai, ‘Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility,’ Philosophy East and West 56:1 (2006), pp. 69-83
It is interesting to note that the plethora of studies of Mencius’s moral philosophy notwithstanding, none of them is devoted to the investigation of the place of the li in Mencius’s moral philosophy. For instance, no author in the highly acclaimed volume on Mencius’s moral philosophy edited by Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002)) focuses his or her attention on li. In contrast, there is indeed a great deal of studies on li in Xunzi’s thought, but most of them are predominantly interested in its moral implications and rarely in its civic implications. See, for instance, T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000); Antonio S. Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005); Kurtis Hagen, The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction (La Salle and Chicago: Open Court, 2007).
Jian ai is sometimes translated as ‘inclusive care.’
Mencius criticizes Mohists for making the root of ren two, namely, filial piety and universal love (or love of others). Qingping Liu, though, criticizes Mencius for the same charge. See his ‘Is Mencius’ Doctrine of “Commiseration” Tenable?’ Asian Philosophy 11:2 (2002), pp. 73-90.
In various places in the Lunyu, Confucius (and his disciples) gives special attention to the mourning ritual as one of the most sacred moral obligations of the filial son toward his parents and presents it as the core of Confucian ritual practice. See Analects 1:9; 17:21; 19:17.
Mencius 3A5.
On the difference in the understanding of the state of nature between Hobbes and Xunzi, see Sungmoon Kim, ‘From Desire to Civility: Is Xunzi a Hobbesian?’ Dao 10:2 (2011), pp. 291-309.
As one of the reviewers reminded me, Mencius’s example of the man bursting into sweat is situated in the context of his response to Mohist challenge, attempting to show that people’s affection for those who stand in special relationship to them are indeed stronger. That is, Mencius did not present this story in terms of political theory nor in the context of natural versus civil. In this respect, the story alone may not be able to substantiate my subsequent claim that man in the Mencian state of nature is neither irrational nor self-interested. This problem does not necessarily invalidate my claim, however, because Mencius’s general understanding of human nature is qualitatively different from both Hobbesian and Xunzian accounts of human nature. And yet, Mencius’s unstated account of the natural state is inextricably intertwined with his understanding of human nature.
Rousseau says: ‘The transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting in his behavior justice for instinct, and by imbuing his actions with a moral quality they previously lacked…his faculties are used and developed; his ideas are expanded; his feelings are ennobled; his entire soul is raised…and [therefore he is] transformed from a stupid, limited animal into an intelligent being and a man.’ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, bk I, chap. VIII, pp. 166-167, in The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses, Susan Dunn, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
It is dubious that this archaic man had broad social relationships at this stage.
This is not to say that self-awareness here is equivalent to sudden self-enlightenment emphasized in Zen Buddhism and Wang Yang-ming’s moral philosophy. As one of the reviewers reminded, Mencian self-awareness presupposes that the cultivation of the ‘sprouts’ of moral virtue requires a reflective component (see Mencius 6A15 for Mencius’s emphasis of moral reflection). I am grateful to the reviewer for drawing my attention to this point.
Mencius 7A1.
Mencius 6A6 (translation modified).
Note that there is no Cartesian severance between mind and body in Confucianism.
On the importance of the practice to the development of the moral character in early Confucianism, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, ‘Character Consequentialism: An Early Confucian Contribution to Contemporary Ethical Theory,’ Journal of Religious Ethics 19:1 (1991), pp. 55-70.
I understand the concept ‘citizen’ very broadly, that is, in the sense of ‘the member of a society,’ without implicating it with its original Greek etymology.
On (ancient) Confucian constitutionalism, see Sungmoon Kim, ‘Confucian Constitutionalism: Mencius and Xunzi on Virtue, Ritual and Royal Transmission,’ Review of Politics 73:3 (2011), pp. 371-399.
Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985) and Humanity and Self-Cultivation; Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
Xunzi 19:1a (translation slightly modified). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations of the Xunzi are adopted from John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 3 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 1990, 1994).
Although ‘the political’ in Xunzi’s political thought is still tied with ‘the ethical.’ It is important to note that it is far from my intention in this paper to show that Xunzi has a robust political philosophy while Mencius does not. My goal is only to show that Xunzi and Mencius each developed a robust Confucian political philosophy, yet different kinds, due to their differing understandings of human nature and their focus on the different aspect—primarily moral or primarily civil—of Confucian virtues. This difference sounds subtle, but this subtle difference enabled both thinkers to develop two qualitatively different modes of Confucian constitutionalism—dezhi 德治 on one hand and lizhi
on the other. For more on the substantive difference between dezhi and lizhi, despite their much-shared Confucian moral-political ground see Kim, ‘Confucian Constitutionalism.’Precisely from this perspective, Eric Hutton presents Xunzi as a virtue ethicist. See his ‘Character, Situationism, and Early Confucian Thought,’ Philosophical Studies 127:1 (2006), pp. 37-58.
Xunzi 23:1b.
During the review process, one of the reviewers claimed that the scope of zhi in Xunzi’s moral and political thought goes beyond government (or ‘kingship and social institutions’ in my own words) and hinges on Xunzi’s concept of the heart/mind (xin) by drawing on Xunzi’s statement in Xunzi 22:5a: ‘If what the mind (xin 心) permits coincides with reason (li 理), then although the desires be numerous, how could there be harm to order (zhi 治)!’ But, as I argued in another place, ‘by li 理 Xunzi implies not only the natural order of things as the term originally connotes but, more importantly, the sociopolitical order implicated in the li
(or lizhi
) which he argues was consciously brought into place by the Ancient (Sage-) Kings’ (Kim, ‘From Desire to Civility,’ p. 300). Here Xunzi’s key concern is with how to create a civil order (zhi) that can properly nurture (yang 養) human desires (i.e., appetitive desires) that are numerous and often mutually conflicting by discovering the sociopolitical institutions of the li
that best reflect the natural order of things (li 理). I am not sure whether Xunzi’s statement above is internally connected to his ‘concept’ of the heart/mind. Perhaps the reviewer might have interpreted li 理 in terms of moral principles (tianli 天理) or a certain innate moral order as Zhu Xi (1130-1200) would have but, again, I am not sure whether this typical Neo-Confucian reading of the passage is plausible in understanding Xunzi’s moral and political philosophy that predates Neo-Confucianism.Xunzi 23:1a (slightly modified). The English translation here is adopted from Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 157.
‘Where the classes of society are equally ranked, there is no proper arrangement of society; where authority is evenly distributed, there is no unity; and where everyone is of like status, none would be willing to serve the other…Two men of equal eminence cannot attend each other; two men of the same low status cannot command each other—such is the norm of Heaven. When power and positions are equally distributed and likes and dislikes are identical, and material goods are inadequate to satisfy all, there is certain to be contention. Such contention is bound to produce civil disorder, and this disorder will result in poverty. The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder. Thus, they instituted regulations, ritual practices, and moral principles in order to create proper social class divisions (zhi li yi yi fen zhi
). They ordered that there be sufficient gradations of wealth and eminence of station to bring everyone under supervision. This is the fundamental principle by which to nurture the empire’ (Xunzi 9:3). Also see Xunzi 10:1; 10:4; 10:7; 12:7; 19:1c.Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), pp. 15-28.
According to Mencius, a junzi may be allowed to act against the general norms of civility (or ritual propriety) when it comes to the vengeance of the murders of his own family members. See Mencius 7B7.
Mencius 1A7: ‘Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families, and you can roll the Empire on your palm.’
Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, pp. 29-42.
Xunzi 4:2.
Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 1276b34.
Interestingly, Xunzi (or any other classical Confucians for that matter) never talks about the class conflict between the propertied and the propertyless, which is the most serious ‘civil conflict’ that Western political theory is concerned with.
Xunzi 4:3.
Xunzi 2:12.
Mencius 3B2.
Xunzi 3:3.
This is not to dismiss the fact that even for Xunzi, what fundamentally ensures civility/civic virtue is the heart/mind (xin) or the moral virtue of the person. Irrespective of its nature—moral or civic, virtue is necessarily dependent upon the moral cultivation of one’s self, which for Xunzi includes the re-formation of the self (See Ivanhoe, Confucian Self-Cultivation, pp. 29-42). My point is that unlike Mencius, Xunzi presents his virtue ethics explicitly and self-consciously in the civil context (which, again unlike Mencius, he clearly demarcates from the chaotic state of nature) and predominantly in civil terms. In other words, for Xunzi, virtue is not only the matter of the moral self-cultivation of the self or the matter of one’s personal moral character; equally, even more, important for Xunzi is virtue’s civic/civil character, which is profoundly concerned with the preservation of a civil order and one’s resolve not to let the civil order deteriorate into the natural state. As far as I can see, Mencius did not take such a moral resolve, which I identified in this paper in terms of civic virtue, to be the essential component of his moral-political philosophy.
Xunzi 5:7. Also see Xunzi 5:9.
Instead, Confucius was much more interested in the moral persuasion by examples. See Analects 2:20; 12:17; 12:19; 13:1; 13:4; 13:6; 13:13; 14:41; 19:21. It does not mean that Xunzi was not aware of the dangerous power of the word. For instance, he says, ‘Pride and excess bring disaster for man. Respectfulness and moderation ward off the five weapons…The wound caused by words is deeper than that of spears and halberds. Thus, that one can find no place to walk through the breath of the earth is not because the earth is not tranquil but because the danger to every step of the traveler lies generally with words’ (Xunzi 4:1). Nevertheless, Xunzi thinks verbal communication is an indispensable medium of man’s sociability.
Xunzi 5:6.
Xunzi 5:7.
Ibid.
Xunzi 5:8.
Xunzi 8:13.
Xunzi 27:16.
In a sense, my statement in note 46 is in response to those who believe that Xunzi and Mencius both subscribe to the same type of Confucian virtue ethics.
) but often neglected the Mencius 孟子.
on the other. For more on the substantive difference between dezhi and lizhi, despite their much-shared Confucian moral-political ground see Kim, ‘Confucian Constitutionalism.’
(or lizhi
) which he argues was consciously brought into place by the Ancient (Sage-) Kings’ (Kim, ‘From Desire to Civility,’ p. 300). Here Xunzi’s key concern is with how to create a civil order (zhi) that can properly nurture (yang 養) human desires (i.e., appetitive desires) that are numerous and often mutually conflicting by discovering the sociopolitical institutions of the li
that best reflect the natural order of things (li 理). I am not sure whether Xunzi’s statement above is internally connected to his ‘concept’ of the heart/mind. Perhaps the reviewer might have interpreted li 理 in terms of moral principles (tianli 天理) or a certain innate moral order as Zhu Xi (1130-1200) would have but, again, I am not sure whether this typical Neo-Confucian reading of the passage is plausible in understanding Xunzi’s moral and political philosophy that predates Neo-Confucianism.
). They ordered that there be sufficient gradations of wealth and eminence of station to bring everyone under supervision. This is the fundamental principle by which to nurture the empire’ (Xunzi 9:3). Also see Xunzi 10:1; 10:4; 10:7; 12:7; 19:1c.Author information
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Kim, S. Before and after Ritual: Two Accounts of Li as Virtue in Early Confucianism. SOPHIA 51, 195–210 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0301-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-012-0301-9