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Modal Fictionalism Generalized and Defended

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Abstract

In this paper, I will defend modalfictionalism. The paper has two parts. In thefirst part, I will suggest a revised version ofmodal fictionalism which can avoid certaintechnical problems. In the second part, I willpropose a nominalized version of modalfictionalism and a general scheme offictionalism for the nominalist.

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  1. Seoul, Korea

    Seahwa Kim

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  1. Seahwa Kim
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Kim, S. Modal Fictionalism Generalized and Defended. Philosophical Studies 111, 121–146 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021202427372

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