Abstract
In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is a real.’
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Notes
Yagisawa (2010: 178).
Yagisawa (2010: 205).
To be more precise, ‘Tom is a a lawyer’ is a true as it is a evaluated at we if and only if (i) Tom is a a lawyer at we if we is a @, and (ii) Tom is p a lawyer at we if we is a not @. See Yagisawa (2010: 77–8).
Yagisawa (2010: 92).
Yagisawa (2010: 81–91).
van Inwagen (1986: 221–2).
Yagisawa (2010: 87).
Yagisawa (2010: 93).
Yagisawa (2010: 87).
Yagisawa (2010: 92).
Yagisawa (2010: 238).
References
Van Inwagen, Peter (1986). “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds” in French et al. Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism (pp. 185–213). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; reprinted in van Inwagen (2001) Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (pp. 206–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yagisawa, T. (2010). Worlds and Individuals: Possible and Otherwise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Kim, S. Modal Tense and the Absolutely Unrestricted Quantifier. Acta Anal 27, 73–76 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0128-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0128-y