INCOMPLETNESS AND THE ROMANCE OF SCIENCE

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Abstract

It is argued that qualities of *complete/incomplete science theory* do not relate to the fertility or diversity or validity of science theory, but correspond with social, behavioral, moral values, and trespass into the realms of innate knowing, absolutes, cognition and behavior. It is suggested that terms employed such as "innately incomplete" are redundant in description- i.e.- "flats are innately flat"-a curved dwelling would not be suitable for habitation, it is similarly very difficult to find other words to speak of the notion of science as incomplete.

Discussion

With regard to a notion *complete science theory*, I am not sure that, though current effort is to unfold the *inherent incompletenesses in science theory,* the meaning referred to by the words "*complete science theory*" in actuality falls into some other category than science theory. This false categorization indeed makes discussion very difficult/redundant.
Consider religion: e.g. belief, empirical justification, empirical validity. That which we attribute to existing things always parallels a known fact of the self: that they are somewhere distal, or proximal to witness. That which is distal is basically empirically untestable. That which is proximal is amenable to first hand acquaintance. If one considers these two world divisions-the *proximal* and the *distal*, in order to seek and to establish a necessary quality for distinct distant phenomenon, i.e. uniqueness, one must assume that they , or at least
something of these distal phenomenon is distinct from the proximal and not common everywhere. If not, in the same sense, the word "world" could also denote a phenomenon.
Thus, what exists, is not common everywhere, is necessarily somewhere, as one self is somewhere and distant thing are elsewhere. There are only these two possibilities , everywhere, or somewhere, and thus in order to discuss phenomenon that are not directly present, in assuming a specific location, we are attesting only to facts perceived of self existence(an unique entity that is somewhere) . A second fact, of voluntary motion and will, though arbitrarily deleted, "of itself "delineates the living from the inert.

I wish to argue that the words complete science refer to entities in the everywhere category and have no quality of location. *Complete science*, then, refers to a theory of everything everywhere. Its meaning might be construed as a ground/grounding link to classification, ontology and epistemology-and referal to the existance of many non overlapping scientific pursuits . Not much can be readily said of it and it is asserted that a theory of science has not been achieved, and is mistaken for a collection of observations, proposed observation (though of not so little complexity) and experimental correspondences-i.e. -"that would be the way it works" It is not clear in discussions whether this fact of incompleteness is considered in science practice.

As a collection of notions that entail the existence of specific entities, the parts of modern science need not resemble the whole. A slap to bring a new born to life, details of its living and activities, bear little or no resemblance to the known biochemistry of its' construction; it is easy to become confused in the detail of the exact correspondences of entities and referrals of nomenclature over the components of an actual whole and complete theory(they may overlap) and it is important, that, from the initiation of experiment

that an awareness of this notion is accomplished: At its' limits, form/structure and functioning may not only appear to merge in the immediate sense realms of empirical experience, at the outset of questions, the chain of cause and effect, but also at all levels of explanation. There does not only not exist a theory that can satisfy this requirement, it would have no practical application, but as a philosophy of science or ethics..as a guiding path to steer the pursuit of facts.

For a better analogy, consider a fingerprint. I wish to propose that as a finger print is unique to each individual; it tells of the hand, and the whole individual and not of its' activities and awarenessess; that a real assessment the physical form of the finger print has the same ontology, in the same categories, as the functioning of the individual/entity. An easier to conceive comparison could be, in the naming of the collections of descriptions and (observations)/(parts from theoretical construction) as fingerprints whose correct ontological appraisal must bear the same ontology as the whole topic.

I have found that better divisions and ontology are established from no more and no less than criteria of proximal and distal , appropriate and inappropriate.

Consider in imagery an automobile(auto) and a road(terrain). The automobile to be assumed existing of itself, self contained, a self contained transmission ,as light or sound are transmissions, the world a forwards progression, forwards passing as in foot ball game. Each stage parents the following stage in a way such that the automobile is always the same in its' simplest description, goes and functions the same way, but is always at a different place on the playing field time to time. Each auto parents each subsequent (identical)one, but each terrain is not parented by the preceding one. The total result is a synergism of the existing, of-itself, free will of the auto and the environment. As the environmental component consider the earth as a member of the set of *terrains*- having a location, and a complete theory, *auto*, that is self contained (as described). A complete *auto* theory must always entail some evidence restricted to location that have qualities more of an entity/object than of *notion* and ithus the set *auto* can include both *notions* and *terrains*. However *terrain* is restricted to *terrains* and has no set members of *notions.* Thus if one wishes to define overlap with the physical notion of *miscibility*, some members of the set *auto* will be *immiscible* with set of *terrains*, i.e. *terrain* is *miscible* with *terrain* only, *notion* with *notion* only. The world, then, has no component of *certainty*. On approach to *certainty, notions* assume *a (physical location)/(terrain)* in description.

A *finger print* as a stop action picture:

$$Notion\{A,B/Notion_{AB},Terrain_{B}\} + Terrain\{B/Terrain_{B}\} = Fingerprint\{C/Terrain_{B}\}$$

can only be divided according to the features of a *terrain*; according to how a *terrain* is studied, an ontology created, one must also be able to describe *functioning* with the same nomenclature and ontology. *Non -Terrainious notions* , are exempt from this rule and, not only not components of the final theory, must be immiscible with it.

In the consideration of a *human finger print* one has the possible applicable attributes to consider, for nomenclature and ontology, of distance, shape, size, volume, proximal, distal, appropriate, inappropriate, witness, transmission(path, pathlength, time) etc [4,5] with which to work to create a viable (*terraineous*) *notion*. A linear genetic sequence in terms of the genetic code, for example, would be considered as non-terraineous and not pertinent with respect to the events of nature, though molecular structures of code components in terms of physical geometry(lengths, distances, path lengths, transmission, etc), theoretical conjecture related to the means of its' emergence, and transmissions with respect to these parameters , not the same as the translations and propagations attributed to a genetic code(base pairing etc), are not applicable. It is very premature to experiment with clones, cloning etc.

In the current usage, "science"(i.e. incomplete science) is basically denoted as a collection of entities with locations; a(n) (inherently absent) complete science with this same usage refers to objects/entities without locations, *non-terraineous notions* . The word "i*nherent"("inherently incomplete")* is then valid with respect to the

current usage, though this usage itself is not only not what one might construe as a suitable notion for "science", it is very clumsy in argument. Better ontology and definitions, make for clearer thinking, easier arrived at solutions, great saving in resources, that some reorganization towards better individual and public education is of very high priority.

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