Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the kind of evidence that might be adduced in support of relativist semantics of a kind that have recently been proposed for predicates of personal taste, for epistemic modals, for knowledge attributions and for other cases. I shall concentrate on the case of taste predicates, but what I have to say is easily transposed to the other cases just mentioned. I shall begin by considering in general the question of what kind of evidence can be offered in favour of some semantic theory or framework of semantic theorizing. In other words, I shall begin with the difficult question of the empirical significance of semantic theorizing. In Sect. 2, I outline a relativist semantic theory, and in Sect. 3, I review four types of evidence that might be offered in favour of a relativistic framework. I show that the evidence is not conclusive because a sophisticated form of contextualism (or indexical relativism) can stand up to the evidence. However, the evidence can be taken to support the view that either relativism or the sophisticated form of contextualism is correct.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bach K. (2001). You don’t say. Synthese 128:15–44
Cappelen H., Lepore E. (2005). Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism. Oxford, Blackwell
Egan, A., Hawthorne, J., & Weatherson, B. (2005). Epistemic modals in context. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in philosophy. Oxford: OUP. Available at http://www.brian.weatherson.net/papers.html
Einheuser, I. (2008). Varieties of relativism. In M. García-Carpintero & M. Kölbel (Eds.).
Evans, G. (1979). Does tense logic rest on a mistake? In Collected papers (1985) (pp. 341–363). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fara D.G. (2000). Shifting sands: An interest-relative theory of vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28:45–81
García-Carpintero M., Kölbel M. (eds). (2008). Relative truth. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Grice H.P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kaplan D. (1977). Demonstratives. In: Almog J., et al. (eds). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford, Clarendon Press
Kölbel M. (2002). Truth without objectivity. London, Routledge.
Kölbel M. (2003). Faultless disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104:53–73
Kölbel, M. (2005). Moral relativism. In: D. Westerstahl & T. Tännsjö (Eds.), Lectures on relativism. Göteborg University.
Kölbel M. (2007). How to spell out genuine relativism and how to defend indexical relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15:281–288
Lasersohn P. (2005). Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28:643–686
Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Language, 7, 3–35. Reprinted in Lewis (1983).
Lewis, D. (1980). Index, context, and content. In: S. Kanger & S. Öhman (Eds.), Philosophy and grammar. Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in Lewis (1998).
Lewis D. (1983). Philosophical papers (Vol. 1). Oxford, Oxford University Press
Lewis D. (1998). Papers in philosophical logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
MacFarlane J. (2003). Future contingents and relative truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53:321–336
MacFarlane J. (2005a). Making sense of relative truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:321–339
MacFarlane J. (2005b). The assessment sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In: Gendler T.S., Hawthorne J. (eds). Oxford studies in epistemology. Oxford, Oxford University Press
MacFarlane J. (2008a). Truth in the garden of forking paths. In: Kölbel M., García-Carpintero M. (eds). Relative truth. Oxford, Oxford University Press
MacFarlane J. (2008b). Nonindexical contextualism. Synthese, doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2
MacFarlane, J. (forthcoming). Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive. In B. Weatherson & A. Egan (Eds.), Epistemic modals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Predelli S. (2005). Context: Meaning, truth and the use of language. Oxford, OUP
Recanati F. (2001). What is said. Synthese 128:75–91
Richard M. (2004). Contextualism and relativism. Philosophical Studies 119:215–242
Schlenker P. (2003). A plea for monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26:29–120
Wilson D., Sperber D. (2002). Truthfulness and relevance. Mind 111:584–632
Stanley J. (2005). Semantics in context. In: Preyer G., Peter G. (eds). Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 221–254
Wright C. (2001). On being in a quandary. Mind 110:45–98
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kölbel, M. The evidence for relativism. Synthese 166, 375–395 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9281-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9281-7