Feminist Philosophy Quarterly (Dec 2021)
On the Epistemology of Trigger Warnings
Abstract
Trigger warnings have been the flashpoints of many discussions in recent years. A prominent claim among those arguing against trigger warnings is what I will call the “coddling argument” (CA), according to which trigger warnings coddle by allowing people to avoid ideas that they disagree with or find difficult. In this paper, I try to both make sense of and refute the coddling argument from a vice epistemological perspective. As I argue, CA is best understood as an expression of concern about the encouragement of epistemic vices, specifically in higher education, which lead to people avoiding and closing themselves off from difficult or challenging topics. I argue that this is misguided: trigger warnings exist for people who need to be warned about certain contents because they already know about these issues. Demands for such warnings are usually made by those who have themselves experienced the difficult things defenders of CA purport they are trying to hide from. We do, however, need to take into account that trigger warnings might be misused by those who really do need to learn about topics that might be a trigger for others, and I will discuss how this issue could be addressed.
