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Criteria of fallacy and sophistry for use in the analysis of Platonic dialogues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

G. Klosko
G. Klosko
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

In recent years considerable attention has been focused on the question whether Plato ever uses arguments he knows to be sophistical, especially whether he puts such arguments into the mouth of Socrates. Though differing views have been held, at the present time the majority of scholars seem to believe that Plato does not. Though I disagree with this position, I will not attack it directly in this paper. Instead I will discuss what I take to be an important preliminary matter, establishing criteria that can be employed in order to assess the claim that one of Plato's characters does or does not argue sophistically. Since the case of Socrates is by far the most important, I will limit discussion here to the question whether Socrates ever uses sophistry.

Type
Research Articles
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , December 1983 , pp. 363 - 374
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1983

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References

1 See the remarks of G. Vlastos, C. C. W. Taylor, M. A. Stewart and I. M. Crombie, quoted in this paper (see below, pp. 363, 369–70, 373). For the contrary view see Sprague, R. K., Plato's Use of Fallacy (London, 1962)Google Scholar; and Sophistry', Plato's, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 51 (1977), 45–61Google Scholar; and Klosko, G., ‘Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also note 24, below.

2 cf. the remarks of Sprague, , Plato's Use of Fallacy 81Google Scholar.

3 Vlastos, G., ‘The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras’, in Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 223 n. 5Google Scholar. Vlastos' position is endorsed by Irwin, T., Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), 293 n. 1Google Scholar.

4 In Taylor's, words (Plato: Protagoras [Oxford, 1976], 119)Google Scholar, Vlastos' interpretation ‘requires the reader to read an enormous amount into the text without any guidance’. See esp. Vlastos, , Platonic Studies 253Google Scholar, where the ‘surface grammar’ of portions of the text must be set aside.

5 It should be noted that the argument of this paper does not require that Socrates does use sophistry, but only that he could conceivably do so.

6 See , Aristotle, EE 1216b6Google Scholar; , Xenophon, Mem. 4. 2. 20Google Scholar.

7 See EN 1129a5–16; 1140b22–25; Metaph. 1025a6–13.

8 Irwin, , Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1979), 127Google Scholar.

9 See Taylor, , Protagoras 150–61Google Scholar.

10 See esp. Vlastos, ‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, rpt. in R. E. Allen, ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965); a partial list of articles on this controversy is found in Vlastos, , Platonic Studies 361–2Google Scholar.

11 e.g., ‘Now if this is all we had to go by, [(1)] in the first step, and [(2)] in the second, could anyone say that the Third Man Argument was logically valid? Clearly there must have been something more in Plato's mind than the information supplied at [(1)], which made the transition to[(2)] appear to him not only permissible but plausible. What could this be?’ (Vlastos, , ‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, 236)Google Scholar. See also ‘The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras’, 242 and n. 57.

12 , Taylor sees the proof at Prt. 351b–360e along these lines (Protagoras, 191–2)Google Scholar.

13 To cite one particularly unusual construal of an argument, Vlastos holds that the third man argument is logically valid, but in ‘a very odd way’. He reads its structure as something like: (A1+A2+A3) →B, where A2 and A3 are tacit premises, which, Vlastos holds, contradict one another. And so the conclusion of the argument follows from the premises, ‘for we are working with inconsistent premises…and we should not be surprised to see them justify all kinds of contradictory conclusions’ (‘The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides’, 239).

14 Robinson, R., Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1953), 7Google Scholar.

15 Following Robinson; Robinson gives a good brief account of the elenchos (loc. cit.).

16 Ibid. Ch. 5, 49–60.

17 Ibid. 7.

18 e.g. Rep. 354a; Charm. 172a; Gorg. 507c.

19 In the following paragraphs I speak of Socrates and Charicles as having perceptions and pursuing trains of thought. It should be made clear that their ‘behaviour’ is only imputed to them by the commentator, in accordance with what he takes to be the most likely reconstruction of their debate.

20 For the sake of simplicity and clarity, I ignore various matters touching on the moral claims advanced in the proof, unless these substantially influence its logic.

21 This is a ‘tacit’ premise even though it appears in the argument. It appears in only a formal sense; the substance of (6.2a) is not stated.

22 For one set of circumstances under which the use of sophistry does not seem to be immoral, see Klosko, ‘Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras’.

23 Taylor, , Protagoras 158Google Scholar.

24 See, for example, Friedlander, P., Plato, 3 vols., Meyerhoff, H., tr. (Princeton, 1958–1969), II, 19, 181Google Scholar, and elsewhere; Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1962–1981), iv, 246, 195, 143–50Google Scholar, and elsewhere.

25 See Robinson, , Plato's Earlier Dialectic 15–17Google Scholar : ‘By addressing itself always to this person, here and now elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness, which are defects. In this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal and rational march of science axiomatized according to Aristotle's prescription’ (PED 16). See also the articles cited in n. 27, below. Cf. the different, and I believe misleading, account of elenchos in Irwin, , Plato's Moral Theory 37–41Google Scholar.

26 ⋯ γ⋯ρ ἓλεγχος σɛλλισμ⋯ς ảντιφ⋯σεως (SE168a 36–7): also 164b28–165a3; 170b1–3; 171a1–5; and in other works, e.g. An.Pr. 66b 11–12.

27 ‘Eστι δ’ ⋯ σοχστικ⋯ς ἓλεγχος οὐχ ⋯πλ⋯ς ἓλεγχος ⋯λλ⋯ π⋯ πλ⋯ς τινα κα⋯ σɛ;λλογισμ⋯ς ώσα⋯τως (SE 170a13–14); see also Top. 155b7–16; SE 170b 12 ff. On the similarities between the elenchos and the more fully developed form of dialectic discussed in Aristotle's Topics see Moraux, P., ‘La joute dialectique d'aprés le huitième livre desTopiques’ in Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Owen, G. E. L., ed. (Oxford, 1968), esp. 304, 297–8Google Scholar; Weil, E., ‘The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Thought’, in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1: Science, Barnes, J. et al. , eds., tr. by the editors (London, 1975), esp. 102–3Google Scholar; Kapp, E., ‘Syllogistic’, in Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1, tr. by the editors, esp. 40, 47Google Scholar.

28 Ale. 1 118b; see 112c–l 13a, 116d, 118b; Gorg. 472b–c, 482b–c, 516d; Euthd. 293d, 295a.

29 See esp.SE 164 b 25–27. Plato's discussion in the Sophist is similar (esp. 233a–235c, 268 d). One can surmise that Aristotle's simile, that victims of sophistry are like those ‘viewing from a distance’, is taken from Sph. 234b–c.

30 See, e.g., Top. 161 a24–31. For two specific tactics recommended by Aristotle, see Top. 108a 18 ff. (ambiguity or equivocation); 156a7–157a5 (concealment). See Grote, G., Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London, 1880), 398–403Google Scholar.

31 To fill this out a little more, in general throughout the dialogues Plato's use of language is somewhat loose and imprecise. By employing sufficiently rigorous standards, one would be able to find fault with virtually all of his proofs. Accordingly, I think fallacy should be assessed in reference to the elenctic context. Fallacious arguments are arguments capable of being objected to, or, more properly I submit, arguments objections to which would require serious restructuring. If the objection were only to the precise formulation of some premise, or something along similar lines, the questioner would be able to recast the premise and make it satisfactory, without being forced to alter his argumentative strategy.

32 Stewart, M. A., ‘Plato's Sophistry’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 51 (1977), 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. (London, 1962–1963), I, 26Google Scholar. Irwin presents a similar statement of policy in the Preface to his edition of the Gorgias.

34 e.g., the position of Sprague (references in note 1, above).

35 I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to James Whyte Stephens, Jonathan Barnes, William Gustason, and the editors, for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.