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AXIOLOGICAL HETEROGENEITY OF EVALUATIVE PREDICATES

The aim of these remarks is to consider several issues associated with a phenomenon which will be characterized in more detail below and which I have called — as the title indicates — *axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates*. On the one hand, it seems that this phenomenon seriously affects the way in which we accept or reject evaluative statements, but, on the other, it seems possible to specify conditions under which this interference would not take place; its actual occurrence could be systematically explained by showing the extent to which — in particular cases — real conditions deviate from ideal ones.

1. The first-order evaluative order

Take a finite subset S of the set of atomic and molecular sentences. Sentences from S consist of predicates constituting a finite set, say with k elements, and of singular terms constituting an l-element set; if S contains $f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$, where $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ represents an n-ary predicate (atomic or molecular), then S also contains the negation of that sentence as well as all sentences formed from the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and l^n - 1 other possible ordered n-tuples of singular terms, together with negations of these sentences. In addition, our set contains logical tautologies.

Sentences belonging to S *are semantically interpreted* so that each sentence $f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ corresponds to a sequence of denotations of the constituent expressions, $<K, a_1, \ldots, a_n>$; we will call this sequence a *state*

of affairs corresponding to the sentence $f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$. Let us also call the sequence $<K, a_1, \ldots, a_n>$ a *fact* if the sentence $f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ is true in the domain in which the sentences from S are semantically interpreted, that is, if $<a_1, \ldots, a_n> \in K$. Of course, K represents an n-ary relation which, in the special case of $n = 1$, is a set of individuals; to simplify matters, we will regard the set of individuals as a relation too, that is, as a monadic relation. In what follows, we will refer to the state of affairs corresponding to a sentence p by means of the phrase "that p."

Let A be the set of states of affairs corresponding to sentences in S. Then A need not be equinumerous to S; so, for instance, synonymy of some sentences from this set would imply smaller cardinality of S. It will be more convenient, however, to assume that the cardinality of S is identical with the cardinality of A.

Let us define a relation R which meets the following conditions:

(1) R is a partial order on A (of the $<$ type);

(2) for each state of affairs a, there is a state of affairs a' such that either aRa' or $a'Ra$;

(3) for all states of affairs a and a', if a and a' are tautological facts, then neither is in the case that aRa' nor that $a'Ra$;

(4) if a is a tautological fact, then there are states of affairs a' and a'' such that $a'Ra$ and aRa'';

(5) the relation T — such that aTa' if and only if it is neither the case that aRa' nor that $a'Ra$ — is transitive.

Accordingly, we will call the relation R a first-order *evaluative order* if there is an individual or a group of individuals for which R is co-extensional with the relation of preference.

Next, we will call all tautological facts — together with all states of affairs which are indifferent with respect to them (relative to the partial evaluative order R), that is, which stand in relation T to them — *axiologically indifferent* or *neutral* states of affairs (relative to R). States of affairs which stand in relation R to axiologically indifferent states of affairs will be called *positive values* with respect to R, while states of affairs such that indifferent states of affairs stand in relation R to them, will be called *negative values* with respect to R.

In attributing axiological neutrality to tautological facts, I take my cue from Richard C. Jeffrey, who in turn refers to Leonard J. Savage. According to Savage, the relation of preference can be intuitively considered as a particular way of ranking 'news items': a given 'news item' represented by a proposition (a set of equivalent sentences) can be desired, i.e. have the so-

called positive desirability, or unwelcome, i.e. have the negative desirability; alternatively, it can be no news at all, in the stricter sense of this word, if it concerns an obvious, trivial fact; the latter feature is characteristic of tautological propositions (Jeffrey 1965: 72).

This argumentation may be reinforced by pointing out that we always ascribe positive or negative values to states of affairs that could fail to be the case. This is the nature of values such as human actions, products, or their outcomes. In short, these are states of affairs whose actuality crucially depends on undertaking requisite actions (these actions are a necessary component of a sufficient condition for a given value being a fact). Besides, we also assess, positively or negatively, certain natural phenomena, e.g. such and such form of a landscape, or — in another respect — certain processes occurring in animal or plant organisms or in their environment. Setting aside the question whether this involves an anthropomorphic metaphor, it is enough to point out that, in any case, natural phenomena which are subject to evaluation are not tautological facts; and we are talking about axiological neutrality of the latter.

2. A condition of constructing a second-order evaluative order

Each sentence p from S such that the state of affairs that p is not axiologically indifferent will be called a *value-judgement* — under the condition that rules of the relevant culture system (Kmita 1971) ascribe the following sense to the action of stating p — it is a manifestation of endorsing an evaluative order R or a subordinate relation. Depending on whether the state of affairs that p is a positive or a negative value, we will speak of a positive or a negative value-judgement. In the former case the predicate of the value-judgement p will be called positively evaluative in the context of p, and in the latter — negatively evaluative in the context of p. Finally, in the case in which p is not an value-judgement at all, we will say that the predicate of p is axiologically indifferent in the context of p.

We must add two comments to these terminological specifications.

First, the concept of value-judgement characterized above should be understood as a relativized concept — and doubly so at that: it is relativized (1) to an evaluative order R (just like the concept of positive and negative value, as well as the notion of an axiologically indifferent state of affairs), and (2) to a culture system. Both relativizations can be joined together, e.g. by assuming that a given culture system involves a preference order which is co-extensional with the relation R, or by assuming that a relevant group of individuals who endorse a preference order is a culture group with

respect to a given system of cultural rules. Then we will only deal with one relativization — to a culture system or to a culture group, respectively. In what follows, for the sake of brevity, the relativizations in question will be assumed tacitly. Of course, it does not mean that they are irrelevant. On the contrary, applying them makes for one of the more important differences between positions such as absolutism, psychologism, or cultural relativism with respect to values. It is worth noting at this point that by the very fact of accepting the above terminological agreements I have taken an anti-psychologist position: value-judgements are sentences corresponding — by means of denotational rules — to particular states of affairs, as in the case of declarative sentences which are not value-judgements; and above all, I disregard the question whether making value-judgements is a symptom of experiencing such and such emotions; instead, I assume that it is a culturally regulated way of manifesting solidarity with an evaluative order accepted in a given culture. On the flip side, my conceptual apparatus allows room for the absolutist position, which presupposes a unique, suitably distinguished evaluative order.

Second, the notion of value-judgement introduced above does not include all statements which are usually labelled as such. First of all, I merely deal with value-judgements that may be called individual, since there are no quantified sentences in S. For similar reasons, values, as specified above, should be called individual as well. Of course, it does not follow that I would be inclined to refer terms such as "value-judgement" or "value" exclusively to atomic and molecular states of affairs; I have just specified the meaning of those terms in a particular case of their use, while leaving open the issue of their meaning in other cases.

There is another reason for not including all types of statements regarded as value-judgements. Namely, each value-judgement from the set S corresponds — by means of denotational rules — to a specific state of affairs; yet it is a well-known fact that not every value-judgement that we deploy in practice has this property. For instance, a value-judgement formed from the predicate *x stole z from y* can be assigned to a more or less definite state of affairs; such an assignment would be trickier in the case of value-judgements such as *x is dishonest*, and even trickier in the case of value-judgements such as *x is a bad man*. Thus value-judgements from the set S may be called *definite* value-judgements — so as to point out that they correspond to determinate states of affairs, while value-judgements lacking this property to a lesser or greater degree should be called *indefinite*. Accordingly, I am dealing here with individual definite value-judgements. In

what follows, however, I will employ this phrase only when it is necessary to prevent potential misunderstanding; in general I will replace it with the term "value-judgement" without any qualifications.

Let me make an additional remark about indefinite value-judgements. It seems that one might characterize them — when they are atomic or molecular sentences — as sentences not belonging to S but still serving as means of manifesting acceptance of a relevant evaluative system; in addition, they are connected with definite value-judgements via entailment relations (e.g. in English a value-judgement of the type *x stole z from y* seems to entail a value-judgement of the type *x is dishonest*), so that they presumably correspond to whole sets of (individual) positive or negative values — sets which can be defined, at least approximately.

Such a tentative explication of indefinite value-judgements can only be applied if we assume that the presence of value-judgements and evaluative predicates in a language does not preclude laying out the 'logic', i.e. deductive rules, of that language. Yet we might doubt precisely this transparency; perhaps value-judgements or evaluative predicates are applied in a way which is incompatible with any 'logic'. It is easy to find such facts: for instance, acceptance of a sentence of the type *x informed authorities about illegal activities of y* is sometimes a sufficient reason for accepting a sentence of the type *x is an informer*, but in other cases it is a sufficient reason for accepting the sentence of the type *x is not an informer*. If we were to acknowledge this situation, we would be forced to admit that one and the same language contains two analytic sentences: one of the form "For every x, y, if $f(x, y)$, then $g(x)$," and the second — "For every x, y, if $f(x, y)$, then not $g(x)$." Clearly, this would mean that the language under consideration lacks any specific 'logic'.

Nevertheless, the present problem can be viewed either *factually* or *idealizationally*.[11] When considered factually, it is not particularly interesting; practice is bristling with cases of using value-judgements or evaluative predicates which is incompatible with ordinary 'logic'; after all, it is not a distinctive feature of these expressions. What I have in mind here are the idealizational versions of the problem: whether we can find out general principles (of coordination — see Kmita 1971) that would enable a systematic account of particular cases of 'violating the logic' of language — on the basis of the idealizational claim that under certain ideal conditions value-judgements or evaluative predicates are applied in such a way as to

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[11]Both terms are used in the sense assumed in (Kmita 1971). They are employed in a similar way by Leszek Nowak (1971a).

preserve the 'logical' structure of the language. In a similar vein, a physicist justifies, for instance, introducing the idealizational concept of mathematical pendulum; her account is substantiated by the fact that she is able to explain, in a systematic fashion, the behaviour of a real pendulum by appealing to idealizational theorems non-trivially satisfied by the mathematical pendulum together with suitable principles (of coordination). It is — apparently — the only way of justifying the introduction of an idealizational concept to the conceptual apparatus of empirical sciences.

In its idealizational form, our problem is extremely complex. I will make no attempt at a thorough justification of one of two possible solutions which I have presupposed by assuming that denotational rules ascribe definite reference to expressions making up value-judgements; such an assignment implies, of course, that value-judgements are semantically interpreted in a semantic model of the relevant language, so that they are consistently accepted and rejected in accordance with the 'logic' of that language, i.e. in line with its deductive rules. Nevertheless, this assumption may be treated as provisional. By imposing such and such additional conditions on the evaluative order R, we can show that, once they are satisfied, the states of affairs partially ordered by R cannot be regarded as the reference of value-judgements in any language since sentences with a reference specified in this way would have to be applied against the rules of a given 'logic' of language. We would then deal with a special case of *reductio*.

In what follows, I wish to deal with a possible property of the order R, which would bring out one of the aspects most characteristic of the practice of evaluating; this aspect seems to be crucially involved in the 'alogicality', so to speak, of value-judgements. If it were the case, and if it turned out that the said property of the evaluative order R is sufficiently important to be taken into account in an idealizational specification of value-judgements, then it would be necessary to abandon the set of concepts introduced above and, above all, the underlying assumption that it is possible to assign definite reference to value-judgements (by means of denotational rules).

Positive and negative values in the above-defined sense are — as I have already emphasized — certain individual states of affairs. This situation is not incompatible with linguistic intuitions associated with the word "value." We often hear statements such as *The value of this novella consists in its concise nature*; the same thought can be expressed, albeit in a less neat formulation, in this way: *That this novella is concise is a positive value*. Thus value is considered as an individual state of affairs. Yet the situation changes if we join an abstract noun with a nominal object which serves as a general name

and not as an individual term. In the statement *Conciseness of a novella is its value* (or virtue), the value is not regarded as a state of affairs. Admittedly, one might think that although the statement is not about an individual state of affairs (that the novella is concise), it still concerns a general state — that all novellas are concise. Yet such a view would be a mistake. When we are talking about the concise nature of this particular novella as a value, we have an individual state of affairs in mind, which consists in the actual — in our view — instantiation of the property of conciseness by the work under consideration. By contrast, when we are talking about the conciseness of a novella (in general) as a value, we have a definite property in mind which cannot fail to be exemplified by every novella. Hence in the latter case the value is a certain property or — more generally — a relation. One might even think that construing values as relations (especially monadic ones) is the most common way of understanding this concept.

At first sight, it might seem that nothing should be easier than constructing — on the basis of the notion of first-order evaluative order — the concept of the *second-order* evaluative order. The latter would not refer to individual states of affairs but to relations denoted by the predicates of the sentences from S. The second-order evaluative order would be a relation holding between relations, say, U_1 and U_2, if the first-order evaluative order R holds between states of affairs *that $f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$* and *that $g(b_1, \ldots, b_m)$*, where the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ denotes the relation U_1, and $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m) — U_2$. By developing a conceptual apparatus parallel to the previously introduced one, we would be in a position to speak of second-order positive and negative values and about positively and negatively evaluative predicates (without a relativization to the context of particular sentences).

Yet in order to make this construction possible, it is necessary that each individual state of affairs of the type *that $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$* should be linked in the same way, by the relation R, to each individual state of affairs of the type *that $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$*. In other words, it would have to be the case that the denotation of the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ precedes in the second-order evaluative order the denotation of $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ or is preceded by it or remains indifferent with respect to it just in case — respectively — each individual state of affairs of the type $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ always precedes each individual state of affairs of the type $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$, is always preceded by it, or remains indifferent with respect to it. We could say that the set of predicates belonging to S and meeting the above condition (on account of their denotations) is *preferentially homogeneous* relative to the evaluative order R.

It is highly doubtful whether the predicates we use in actual practice to frame value-judgements could be used to construct large preferentially homogeneous sets. For instance, we could value Bolesław Prus' *The Waistcoat* more for its endeavour to discover certain truths about the world than for its conciseness, but at the same time we could wish that some celebratory speech were more concise instead of being more instructive. In this situation conciseness and informativeness cannot be incorporated into the second-order evaluative order.

Furthermore, the predicates used to formulate value-judgements often fail to meet a requirement which is even weaker than the preferential homogeneity: they fall short of satisfying *axiological homogeneity* implied by the previous condition. We will say that the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is axiologically homogeneous if every sentence from the set S formed by means of this predicate is:

(a) always a positive value-judgement, or
(b) always an axiologically neutral value-judgement, or
(c) always a negative value-judgement.

Clearly, the concept of axiological homogeneity of an evaluative predicate can also be employed outside the framework of the conceptual apparatus accepted in this article — without relativization to value-judgements from S. I will exploit this possibility below.

Although axiological homogeneity of predicates forming the sentences from S is a necessary but not sufficient condition of constructing a second-order evaluative order, it would at least allow us to divide all relevant predicates into three principal groups: positively evaluative, axiologically neutral, and negatively evaluative. However, as I have just mentioned, evaluative predicates often fail to exhibit even this weaker sort of homogeneity — given that the term "evaluative predicate" only denotes predicates which are at least sometimes used to make (individual) value-judgements. For instance, a statement of the type *x lied* — to use a stock example — will tend to serve as a negative value-judgement, but there are situations in which such a statement is a positive value-judgement or at least an axiologically neutral assertion, e.g. in a context such as *In order to spare him the suffering that would be brought about by this tragic message, x lied.*

3. The relationship between axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates and the phenomenon of 'alogicality' of value-judgements

Let us now assume that axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates

is sufficiently important to take it explicitly into account in an idealizational specification of the way of using value-judgements, or — at least — not to disregard it entirely. Will we be forced to admit, in accordance with often-expressed intuitions, that value-judgements cannot be applied 'consistently', that they must be 'alogical'?

It seems that these intuitions are based on certain accurate observations as well as on a vastly popular belief concerning value-judgements. Let us begin with the observations.

It is relatively easy to ascertain empirical phenomena such as the fact that one and the same person can accept the statement *During the battle, x eliminated y from the fight* without accepting the statement *x is the killer of y or wounded y gravely.* On the other hand, the same person, in some other cases, will tend to accept the latter sentence on the basis of the former — by appealing, perhaps, to the relation of entailment holding between the sentences. All depends, of course, on the relationship the assessing person z bears to x and y. If x is a soldier from z's country (and y is an enemy) the situation may look differently than in the reverse scenario. At any rate, it is clear that the reason for our exemplary 'alogicality' is the axiological heterogeneity of the predicate *During the battle, x eliminated y from the fight.* For some substitutions of individual terms for the individual variables, we will obtain a sentence which is a positive value-judgement, but different substitutions may result in a negative evaluation or an axiologically neutral assertion.

It might seem that a general characterization of the relevant case of 'alogicality' of value-judgements could be framed — without invoking the concept of axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates — in the following way: given two individual sentences of the type $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$, comprising the same individual terms, if the latter is a negative value-judgement and the former — a positive one or not a value-judgement at all, then the acceptance of the former does not lead to the acceptance of the latter. The point is that such an analysis would be too superficial. The case would never deserve any attention if the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ were axiologically homogeneous. For if the acceptance of a sentence of the type $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ always consisted in the act of acceptance of a positive value-judgement or an axiologically neutral sentence and never led to the acceptance of a sentence of the type $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$, which would always be a negative evaluation, then we could easily reconcile this situation with the 'logic' of language by simply assuming that there is just no inferential connection between these two sentences. The 'alogicality', however, consists

in the fact that, on account of heterogeneity of the predicate $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, the acceptance of this type of sentence sometimes constitutes a sufficient reason for accepting sentences of the type $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$, but in other cases — it falls short of providing such a reason or even serves as a sufficient reason for accepting the negation of a sentence of the type $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$.

Of course, the example under consideration is only a special case of the phenomenon which might be called 'alogicality' of value-judgements involving axiologically heterogeneous predicates. In general, the phenomenon might be presented in the following way: if $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and $g(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ are evaluative predicates such that at least one of them is axiologically heterogeneous, and it is not the case that every uniform substitution of individual terms for variables results in two sentences such that acceptance of one of them is independent from the acceptance of another, then it is impossible to establish a definite 'logical' relationship between these two predicates (between these two types of sentences).

Of course, all of this applies to well-known phenomena associated with making value-judgements. Common observation seems to teach us that axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates prevents establishing definite inferential connections which could hold between sentences made up of these predicates. The principal cause of this state of affairs is a more general fact that the acceptance of an individual sentence q on the basis of accepting an individual sentence p is possible for someone who accepts a requisite evaluative order and respects cultural rules of manifesting this acceptance just in case sentences p and q are, as value-judgements — so to speak — axiologically 'synchronized' [*równoimienne*]. Simultaneous acceptance of two axiologically 'divergent' sentences would lead to disregarding the accepted evaluative order or at least to breaking the accepted cultural rules for manifesting acceptance of this sort of evaluative order.

Alternatively, the situation can be characterized in the following way: the act of stating any value-judgement can exhibit a *twofold* sense: (a) descriptive-communicational and (b) axiological. In the case (a) the sense consists in communicating the state of affairs which is the reference of the value-judgement; in the case (b) the sense consists in manifesting the fact of accepting an evaluative order. The point is that sometimes it is impossible for a consistent speaker to satisfy both senses by way of stating the relevant value-judgement. It may happen, for example, that uttering a given evaluation would signal real acceptance of the relevant evaluative order but would be unable to convey — in the descriptive mode — the state of affairs which is the reference of the value-judgement, since from the

speaker's perspective the reference would not be a fact. The reverse scenario is also possible: in stating a given value-judgement, the speaker descriptively conveys — in accordance with her knowledge — a certain fact, but this statement commits one to the acceptance of an evaluative order which is in fact rejected by the speaker.

I submit that it is precisely because, in practice, the above-outlined conflict — which sometimes occurs between two kinds of senses of a value-judgement — is occasionally settled in favour of the axiological sense, that the axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates has a detrimental effect on the 'logic' of value-judgements.

Of course, in the framework of an idealizational specification of the way of making value-judgements, in other words — in constructing an ideal type of the speaker expressing value-judgements — we must assume that the speaker is aware of the conflict in question and in the case of its appearance refrains from satisfying the ordinary, twofold sense of a value-judgement: she either always clings to the axiological sense or always sticks to the descriptive-communicational sense. Without this assumption, the whole ideal-type construction would be inaccurate: it would fall short of satisfying the antecedent of the rationality assumption which stipulates domination of a particular purpose.

Are both possibilities equally plausible though? First, consider the second option. By assuming that the ideal speaker — in the case of a conflict between two components of the sense of a value-judgement — always sticks to the descriptive-communicational component, we guarantee that value-judgements are free of 'alogicality' so that they can correspond — due to suitable denotational rules — to a definite reference. In particular, the axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates ceases to play a destructive role, since it is not the heterogeneity itself that gives rise to 'alogicality' of evaluations (as a superficial observation would have it), but the fact that in making the value-judgement we do not limit ourselves, in the case of a conflict, to actualizing the descriptive-communicational sense; only then the axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates begins to be detrimental to the 'logic' of evaluations.

Let us now turn to the second possibility. Is it possible to assume that — in the cases of conflict — the ideal type of a speaker making value-judgments always clings to the axiological component of the complete sense of a value-judgement? Note that the very notion of the axiological sense of a value-judgement, consisting — as we have seen — in manifesting the fact of acceptance of an evaluative order, implies that the value-judgements are

previously assigned certain states of affairs encompassed by this order. This assignment, in turn, is possible only if in the cases of a conflict one respects the descriptive-communicational sense alone. Hence the two accounts are not on a par: one of them implies the other, is cognitively prior with respect to it.

A further elaboration of this claim — in outline — might run as follows. A more abstract ideal type of the speaker making value-judgements is an individual I_1 who meets, in particular, the condition that in the case of a conflict between the descriptive-communicational and axiological senses I_1 is aware of that conflict and consistently clings to the descriptive-communicational sense. On the other hand, a less abstract ideal type, an ideal type of a lower level (Nowak 1971a), is an individual I_2 who has a less perfect knowledge at her disposal and is unaware of the occasional conflict between the descriptive-communicational and axiological components of the sense of value-judgements, so that in her desire to do justice to both components she effectively actualizes the axiological component alone. The logical transition from I_1 to I_2 would obtain in accordance with a suitable principle of coordination, while the accompanying concretization of a relevant idealizational theorem[12] would constitute a mandatory step in explaining the actually observed, often 'alogical' ways of making value-judgements.

Without performing a detailed analysis of the issue of selecting adequate principles of coordination which enable a transition from the idealizational theorem non-trivially satisfied by the ideal type I_1 to the theorem non-trivially satisfied by the ideal type I_2, we will now put forward a more explicit response to the main question of this section: the question about the relationship between axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates and the phenomenon of 'alogicality' of value-judgements.

Let us call the value-judgements made by the ideal type I_1 — *objectual* value-judgements [*oceny przedmiotowe*] and the value-judgments made by the ideal type I_2 — *purely axiological* value-judgements.[13] Then: *the more 'purely*

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[12]The theorem would be labelled *the effectiveness assumption.* I discuss this notion a bit more broadly in (Kmita 1972).

[13]This distinction corresponds to my previous division of value-judgements into objectual judgements and emotional judgements (Kmita 1964). The present sketch picks up the main strands of the earlier paper, yet differs from it whenever the latter exhibits psychologist inclinations (illustrated for instance by the notion of individual language; today I would agree with the critique of this view put forward by Zdzisław Najder, see Najder 1971). In this regard, an account closer to my present position is set out in the English, corrected version of the said article (Kmita 1966). I would like to add that Nowak (1971b), in reference to the distinction between objectual and emo-

axiological' and less 'objectual' is the character of the value-judgements, the more destructive is the impact of axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates on the 'logic' of value-judgements. By contrast, the 'logic' of fully objectual value-judgements is always unscathed in this regard.

Not only can this response be reconciled with the afore-mentioned valid observations concerning the correlation between axiological heterogeneity of evaluative predicates and the 'alogicality' of value-judgements formed from them, but it also paves the way for a systematic account of this correlation. Even so, the response could not be accepted by a supporter of the popular belief that the descriptive-communicational sense of a statement and its axiological character are mutually exclusive; value-judgements only involve the latter, so the concept of objectual value-judgement is (on this view) self-contradictory.

Of course, the axiological character of a value-judgement is not equated here with the fact that it has an axiological aspect, in the sense of the term "axiological" accepted above; the latter expresses a notion which assumes, as we have seen, a cognitively prior type of objectual value-judgement. In practice, this axiological nature of a value-judgement is usually regarded as a feature of the value-judgement which makes it: (a) an exclusively emotional exclamation, (b) an implicit equivalent of a statement about the experiences of the person who makes the judgement, (c) a statement about a value considered to be an item of a special kind — indefinable in terms of any non-evaluative assertion.

Undoubtedly, the main rationale behind this view is the phenomenon of 'alogicality'. In the light of (a) and (b) the phenomenon is easily explained, since the mental states — expressed or implied — need not, or even cannot, fall under any specific 'logic'; (c), in turn, provides unlimited possibilities of rejecting intuitive acts of recognizing the 'genuine' evaluative orders as well as acts of concrete evaluation. I will not make an attempt at a critique of these ways of explaining the 'alogicality' of value-judgements; some objections immediately leap to mind, and others stem from a more general debate — present in several of my works — with psychologism and axiological absolutism.

4. The norm of methodological axiologal neutralism

tional ('purely expressive') value-judgements, gives examples of the latter statements which — in the framework of the present article — I would label 'indefinite'; nevertheless, those examples are accurate in that the indefinite evaluations indeed tend to be 'purely expressive' (purely axiological — in terms of the present sketch) more often than the definite value-judgements.

The idealizational conditions constituting the ideal type I_1 can also be regarded as a kind of norm, and the ideal type itself — as an *ideal* of a speaker making value-judgements. Are there any practical reasons for stipulating such an ideal — arguments that would show the benefits of making value-judgements in the specified way? It seems that the answer is in the affirmative, especially if we aim for the requirement of making maximally objectual value-judgements at representatives of selected domains of activity. I refer here to science and, in particular, to the humanities. The greater part of the humanist vocabulary consists of evaluative terms and, more importantly, these terms are indispensable; humanists construct their concepts — as Heinrich Rickert would put it — as a 'reference to values': the very names of human activities or their products examined by humanists usually reveal that these activities or products are singled out and classified from the perspective of senses actualized by them, while these sentences are always positive values for the acting persons and usually for the researchers themselves. Hence, if humanists wanted to take their cue from neopositivists and free their claims of value-judgements, they would simply annihilate their own discipline.

On the other hand, if value-judgements occur and must occur among humanistic statements, making them in a purely axiological sense would be detrimental, among other things, to the logical structure of particular systems of those statements; practicing humanities as science might turn out to be impossible. I have used this counterfactually since I do not believe that the actual humanistic practice of making value-judgements is utterly dominated by their axiological sense. Nevertheless, actual deviations from the ideal of making exclusively objectual value-judgements are serious enough to be regarded as one of the main difficulties faced by the project of scientific humanities. This state of affairs is even harder to overcome due to philosophers and methodologists — popular among humanists — who made a virtue out of the weakness by putting forward standards and norms which encourage making value-judgements in a purely axiological mode and by legitimizing cognitive validity of this mode by means of various absolutist conceptions of values. All in all, it is hard to judge what was more harmful to the development of the humanities: these views and attitudes or the nonchalance of positivists with psychologist inclinations, who — due to their poor acquaintance with the actual processes involved in humanistic research — hindered the recognition of the methodological nature of the humanities.

The few exceptions include thinkers who, without demanding the impossible elimination of value-judgements form the humanities, managed to

put forward rules for procedures that would secure the objectual charac-
ter of those evaluations. Presumably, these rules can be jointly expressed
by means of the following norm of *methodological axiologal neutralism*: in
the humanities (a) evaluative statements are allowed, (b) value-judgements
should be controlled only with respect to their descriptive-communicational
sense, (c) the axiological adequacy of a value-judgement — relative to any
evaluative order (i.e. due to the fact that the judgement manifests the actual
acceptance of a given evaluative order) — should not affect its acceptance
or rejection.

Clearly, with respect to the above norm secures the objectual character
of value-judgements and, in particular, rules out the possibility that using
axiologically heterogenous evaluative predicates would lead to 'alogicality'
of value-judgements.

As a final point, I should mention the names of thinkers who endorsed
the norm of methodological axiological neutralism and show that invoking
these names is justified. Namely, the most celebrated supporters of this norm
(albeit less known or even totally unknown in this regard) include Max Weber
and the creators of Marxism: Karl Marx and Friederich Engels. However, I
will not adduce the relevant argumentation here since, on the one hand, I have
already had the opportunity to discuss Weber's views from this perspective
(Kmita and Nowak 1968), and, on the other, the relevant positions of
the classics of Marxism have been comprehensively presented by Nowak
(1971b).[14] What Nowak calls the 'directive of antipositivist descriptivism'
roughly corresponds to the norm of methodological axiological neutralism.

I will therefore limit myself to presenting an example which shows that
the norm of methodological axiological neutralism was not merely an example
of wishful thinking on the part of its supporters but they actually deployed
it in practice. The statement *The entire social product belongs* (*is due*) *to
the workers* can be treated either as a norm or as a value-judgement, i.e. a
grammatically declarative sentence. Engels assumes the latter reading. Of
course, with respect to the well-known evaluative order of the co-author
of *The Communist Manifesto*, the state of affairs corresponding to this
value-judgement is a positive value, so the judgement itself is also positive.
Clearly, there is a conflict between the descriptive-communicational sense
and the axiological one: by making the judgement, Engels would express his
acceptance of the evaluative order he endorsed and, at the same, he would
convey information about a state of affairs which is not a fact (in the second

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[14]Let me add that I have arrived at similar conclusions in (Kmita 1973).

half of the 19th century); the reverse situation would take place in asserting the negation of the value-judgement under consideration. Now, Engels, in accordance with the norm of methodological axiological neutralism, states that our evaluative statement is:

formally falsefor it is simply an application of morality to economics. According to the laws of bourgeois economics, the greatest part of the product does not belong to the workers who have produced it. If we now say: that is unjust, that ought not to be so, then that has nothing immediately to do with economics. (Engels 1885)

It is worth adding that the norm of methodological axiological neutralism would be much better known and would have exerted a much greater impact on the practise of humanistic research, if it was not repeatedly interpreted — under the influence of positivism — as a prohibition of any value-judgements in the humanities. It is precisely this interpretation that became wide-spread in the case of Weber's well-known 'requirement of a value-free science', which was just a particular version of our norm. Even such an accomplished expert as Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski endorses this interpretation, which forces him to recognize "an internal split in Weber's thought" (Kozyr-Kowalski 1967: 104f). Of course, if we assume that Weber imposed a ban on value-judgements in the humanities and at the same time thought, together with Rickert, that the object of these disciplines consists in phenomena distinguished by means of concepts obtained via reference to values — then it is difficult not to diagnose Weber with a peculiar kind of doublethinking. Even more puzzling is the fact that so many interpreters of Weber's methodological views fail to notice that his *Wertfreiheit* does not refer to science free of any value-judgements but to science free of *purely axiological* judgements.

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