Abstract
If patriotism is morally unacceptable, as some philosophers believe, then also education for patriotism cannot be tolerated, although some other non-moral reasons might be in favour of such education. However, it seems that not all types of patriotism can be convincingly rejected as morally unacceptable. Even more, if MacIntyre’s claim is correct that patriotism is not only a virtue but also the foundation of morality (since we can understand and adopt moral rules only in the particular version in which they are endorsed by our community), then schools ought to cultivate patriotism. For, in this context, patriotism (understood as a moral duty, a duty to show special concern for one’s country and compatriots) is morally required. But if this claim is mistaken and some sorts of patriotism are at best only morally allowed, as Primoratz argues, then schools are not obliged to cultivate patriotism. Although they are not required to cultivate it, they may promote morally acceptable types of patriotism such as “moderate patriotism” (Nathanson), “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas), “republican patriotism” (Viroli) and “cosmopolitan patriotism” (Appiah). And the contrary, extreme patriotism which leads to hostility towards other countries, international tensions and conflicts should not be promoted in schools. Therefore, the answer to the question as to whether education for patriotism is morally required, permitted or unacceptable depends on which kind of patriotism is being discussed.
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Notes
MacIntyre’s lecture “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” is seen as such a response to liberal political theory, “best represented by Rawls’s Theory of Justice” (Primoratz and Pavkovic 2007, p. 1).
Liberals reject patriotism, “partly because their allegiance is to values which they take to be universal and not local or particular, and partly because of a well-justified suspicion that in the modern world patriotism is often a facade behind which chauvinism and imperialism are fostered” (MacIntyre 1996, p. 254).
The rise of nationalism in Europe was, according to Brock and Brighouse (2007, p. 1), the consequence of “the break-up of the former Soviet Union, … the dissolution of the barrier between Western and Eastern Europe [and] increased immigration from former communist and Muslim countries” into Western Europe. However, this explanation does not seem to be sufficient for explaining the dramatic resurgence of nationalism in my former country: Yugoslavia. It was mainly the consequence of other reasons: the Yugoslav federation which was becoming increasingly Serb-dominated, the demand for greater democratisation and liberation in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, the revival of the idea of Great Serbia, economic discontent, cultural and religious divisions, the introduction of free, multi-party elections which permitted the more or less nationalist government to be established in new constitutive republics of the Yugoslav federation, etc. But, in any case, the rise of nationalism and revival of patriotism were, and still are, an evident fact in all new States that came into being with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. One of the recent signs of the revival of patriotism (closely connected with the rise of nationalism) in my country (Slovenia) was the renaming of the former school subject “civic education and ethics” to “civic and patriotic education and ethics”. This change is not only a terminological one; it is conceptual as well. The key question which arises at this point is whether civic and patriotic education can be combined in a coherent concept of civic and patriotic education, and if so, whether any concept of patriotic education is acceptable for a modern pluralistic society and liberal democracy, or if only some are.
This happened, for example, in Bosnia and in Kosovo.
Patriotism in this view has, according to Henry A. Giroux, “also produced a growing sentiment on the part of the American public that people who suggest that terrorism should be analyzed, in part, within the context of American foreign policy should not be allowed ‘to teach in the public schools, work in the government, and even make a speech at a college’ (Giroux 2008). As a result, a number of professors across the United States “have been either fired or suspended for speaking out critically about post-September eleventh events” (ibid.).
Similar argumentation is used by John White when he says that “a liberal democracy based on such ideas as justice, equality of respect, personal autonomy and liberty depends on attachments between citizens strong enough to reinforce a common allegiance to these values” (White 2001, p. 144). For this reason “the proper virtue of patriotism can help to bind a liberal democracy together in pursuit of its ideals (p. 146).
The same can be said for some similar, although more general (not related only to moral reasons), questions such as: “Should schools teach patriotism?” (Brighouse 2006, p. 95), “Should we teach patriotism?” (Archard 1999), and “Should we educate for patriotism?” (White 2001), which have been used in discussions in the field of philosophy of education during the last two decades.
Teaching about patriotism seems to be acceptable even for critics of patriotism, if the aim is to help students understand patriotism and not to promote it. Amy Gutmann, for instance, agrees that “democratic education should teach students the history and philosophy of patriotism—along with that of cosmopolitanism”, on condition that “its aim in this regard should be to help students understand these internally complex sentiments of attachment to people and places” (Gutmann 1987, p. 314).
MacIntyre distinguishes patriotism from the liberal commitment to certain universal values and principles because, according to the liberal understanding of morality, where and from whom I learn the principles of morality is and must be just as irrelevant both to the content of morality and to the nature of my commitment to it, as where and from whom I learn the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to “the content of mathematics and the nature of my commitment to mathematical truths”. By contrast, in MacIntyre’s communitarian understanding of morality, where and from whom I learn my morality is of crucial importance both for the content and the nature of my commitment (MacIntyre 1984, p. 48).
This claim is because of its universalizability (which means that we are not allowed to make different moral judgements about two situations which we agree to be identical), a legitimate moral judgment. For, universalizability is a necessary feature of moral judgment.
If this description of moderate patriots is correct, then it seems that there is no big difference between them and liberals in relation to their own country. See, for example, Appiah (2002).
At first glance it seems that this assertion contradicts the previously mentioned assertion that “a duty to love is an absurdity”, because “love is a matter of feeling, not of willing” (Kant 2003, p. 161). However, in this case, Kant does not mean “love as feeling” but “practical love” as “the maxim of benevolence” (Kleingeld 2003, p. 314).
“An individual is normally in a much better position to identify, criticize and try to change immoral policies and practices in his own country, among his people, then in a foreign country, among strangers. The acceptance of benefits resulting from immoral policies and practices of one’s own country, or from membership in one’s polity, generates a certain kind of collective moral responsibility. Democracy, too, imposes a certain kind of collective responsibility for the laws passed and enforced and policies devised and implemented on behalf of all full-fledged citizens. In these ways, the moral identity and integrity of the individual are bound up with the moral identity and integrity of his country and polity” (Primoratz and Pavkovic 2007, pp. 6–7).
Examples include one’s concern that one’s country lives “up to moral requirements”; promotes “moral values, both at home and internationally”; acts “justly at home and beyond its borders”; shows “common human solidarity towards those in need”. In addition to these duties, one should “not deny, justify, excuse or belittle” his county’s unjust or inhumane practices, laws or policies” (Primoratz 2006, pp. 99–100).
But such a way of teaching patriotism is, according to Brighouse, problematic even if it is successful, because it “runs a serious risk of violating the liberal principle of legitimacy” (Brighouse 2006, p. 114).
In his persuasive critique of such a use of history Brighouse gives good reasons for thinking that “history is a particularly inappropriate discipline with which to convey” patriotism in schools (Brighouse 2003, p. 158).
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Kodelja, Z. Is Education for Patriotism Morally Required, Permitted or Unacceptable?. Stud Philos Educ 30, 127–140 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9233-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-011-9233-z