We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Although the literature on Wittgenstein's notion of criteria is extensive, it seems unsatisfactory. Most interpretations of criteria not only misrepresent Wittgenstein; more importantly, they misconstrue the relation between a mental state and the behavior characteristic of that state. If by “criteria” Wittgenstein meant what he has been taken to mean, it is unlikely that any mental states have criteria. In this paper I shall argue that a proper interpretation of Wittgenstein's notion provides an account of the relation between some mental states and the behavior characteristic of them which is at least approximately correct.
According to current interpretations of criteria the relation between a form of behavior C and the mental state of which it is a criterion, S, is such that the proposition “A person displaying C is (or: very likely is) in S” is either a necessary truth, known a priori to be true, or “true in virtue of a definition, convention, or rule of language.”
1 The basic view presented in this paper — that the role of criteria is to fix the reference of mentalistic terms— was suggested to me by Rogers Albritton in a conversation several years ago; but I am not sure that he would develop it as I have here. Also, I would like to thank Jack Norman and Robert Keirn for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2 For a comprehensive bibliography of the literature on criteria see Lycan, W. Gregory “Noninductive Evidence: Recent Work of Wittgenstein's ‘Criteria',“ American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 109-125.Google Scholar
3 Canfield, John V. “Criteria and Rules Of language,” Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 See Kripke, Saul “Naming and Necessity,” in Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972).Google Scholar Other papers forming a background for the present work include Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning',” to appear in a forthcoming volume of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, and Donnellan, Keith S. “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” Philosophical Review 75 (1966), 281-304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 A well-known statement of the view that the semantic problem is dependent on the epistemic one is Malcolm, Norman's paper “Knowledge of Other Minds,“ reprinted in Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).Google Scholar
6 The Blue and Brown Books (New York, 1958), p. 25.
7 Ibid., p. 57.
8 Ibid., p. 25.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Albritton, Rogers “On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term ‘Criterion',” reprinted in Pitcher, George (ed.), Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1966), p. 234.Google Scholar
13 Philosophical Investigations, ed. by Anscombe, G. E. M. (New York, 1957).Google Scholar
14 Ibid., sees. 572-573.
15 Ibid.
16 See also Investigations, sec. 47, where he says that “an answer to the grammatical question: ‘what are here called “simple component parts” of a composite image of a tree ?’“would be “The branches.“
17 See, e.g., The Blue and Brown Books, pp. 23–24, 115.
18 Investigations, sec. 288. Of course, Wittgenstein is not suggesting that to prick him with a pin would be to give him a “private ostensive definition” of “pain”.
19 References for the papers alluded to in this section can be found in the bibliography in Lycan, op. cit.
20 Shoemaker, Sydney Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca, 1963), p. 4.Google Scholar
21 Albritton, op. cit., p. 249. Emphasis added.
22 Canfield, op. cit., pp. 78, 86. Emphasis added; lettering altered slightly.
23 See, e.g., Investigations, sec. 7.
24 Op. cit., esp. pp. 273–275.
25 Ibid., p. 275.
26 Investigations, p. 230.
27 Cavell, Stanley “Must We Mean What We Say,” Inquiry 1 (1958),CrossRefGoogle Scholar reprinted in Chappell, V. C. (ed.), Ordinary Language (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964), p. 85.Google Scholar
28 Ibid. See also Mates, Benson “On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language,” Inquiry 1 (1958),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Fodor, J. A. and Katz, J. J. “What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Language,” Inquiry 5 (1962).Google Scholar
29 Canfield, op. cit., p. 71.
30 See also Putnam's, remarks on “trivial semantic conventionalism” in “The Refutation of Conventionalism,” Nous 8 (1974), 25-40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
31 Investigations, sec. 313.
32 Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Berkeley, 1967), sec. 225.3
33 Investigations, p. 178. See also Investigations, sees. 244,281,537,647, and Zettel, sees. 220-225, 489-490, 492, 537-545, 549.
34 Investigations, sec. 288.
35 See the remark about the “pictured pot,” Investigations, sec. 297.
36 Ibid., sec. 244.
37 See, e.g., Investigations sees. 28-29.
38 For other examples of this sort see Putnam, “Brains and Behavior,” in Butler, R. J. (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, II (Oxford, 1965).Google Scholar
39 Investigations, sees. 373-374.
40 The Blue and Brown Books, p. 20. last emphasis added.
41 Albritton, op. cit., p. 241.
42 Investigations, secs. 452-453.
43 Ibid., sec. 641; see also secs. 635-638.
44 See, e.g., Lycan op. cit., p. 110, and Canfield, op. cit., p. 75.
45 Investigations, p. 198.
46 Zettel, sec. 477.
47 See, e.g., Zettel, Sec. 437.
48 On Certainty, ed. by Anscombe, G. E. M. and Wright, G. H. von (New York, 1972).Google Scholar
49 Ibid., sec. 374.
50 Ibid., sec. 450.
51 Ibid., sec. 477.
