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Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 53, Number 2, April 2015
- pp. 301-326
- 10.1353/hph.2015.0034
- Article
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It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy.