

manner. Similarly, he introduces as evidence of Hegel's superiority to Humean induction "Hegel's *a priori* derivation of the existence of magnetism in nature" (p. 257, n. 67); the reader who wonders how such a derivation could work is provided with nothing more than page references to Hegel's far from transparent accounts of it. In both these cases, readers who already accept Hegel's accounts may be satisfied, but I doubt that any others will be.

In his final chapter, Houlgate discusses Hegel and Nietzsche on tragedy. Here again, he cites broadly from a variety of texts, again to Nietzsche's detriment. Most helpful is the comparison of Hegel's treatments of the human with the grammatical subject: For Hegel, the atomic human "subject," separate and distinct from its acts, is as mythic as is the self-sufficient grammatical subject, determinant in isolation from its predicates.

On the whole, Houlgate's account is welcome, both for its decisive refutation of Deleuze's presentation of Nietzsche as an informed and reliable critic of Hegel, and for its defense of Hegel as an opponent, rather than an advocate, of transcendent metaphysics. Far less satisfactory, in my view, are the presentations of the positions Nietzsche and Hegel espouse. Although I, too, prefer Hegel to Nietzsche, I continue to find considerably more promise in the latter, and more ambiguity in the former, than Houlgate ever acknowledges.

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*Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger, and Man-Made Mass Death.* By Edith Wyschogrod. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Pp. xvi + 247. \$22.50. ISBN 0-300-03322-2.

This provocative book questions whether contemporary humanity can face death in any of the traditional ways, since the events of our century have created a new selfhood and a new death. Wyschogrod describes the "death event" and the "death world"; these refer to the Holocaust but also to the destructive bombings in World War II, and most importantly to the death-in-life of the Nazi and Stalinist concentration and labor camps. Her thesis is:

The meaning of self, time, and language are all affected by mass death; from now on the development of these themes and the meaning of man-made mass death wax and wane together. We are in the grip of immense experiential changes which both create and reflect new philosophical perspectives. These must be brought into the open if we are not to drift, metaphysically blind, from one concrete issue to another. Yet the map we still carry shows the world as flat even if we know otherwise. (p. ix)

The kind of influence exercised by the death events of our century is more than an empirical modification.

I hope to locate a new historically conditioned a priori by considering the logical and ontological structures exhibited by man-made mass death in our century. ... to bring into view a form of life, a region of being, whose manner of being is to exist as the obliteration of cultures and as the possible extinction of human life. (p. xi)

There is no sustained treatment in the book concerning just what the "historically conditioned a priori" is. Wyschogrod says that "a viable conception of the a priori as permanent mental structure has come to mean the actual contextual grid shaping our experiences. This contextual totality is itself subject to change if historical forces radically undermine it" (p. 62).

The discussion which leads to this conclusion is, however, too compressed to make clear exactly what Wyschogrod has in mind, perhaps a general analysis along the lines of the early Heidegger, adding a social dimension that she feels here is lacking. She is seeking "a specifiably unique meaning constellation which, once grasped, casts light on otherwise incomprehensible aspects of existence" (p. 57). But she intends something more than general cultural analysis, for she asserts that "we are free to use concrete data as access routes to a transcendental framework." But this theme is mentioned more than it is developed; in general the book needs more clarity and argument about its background concepts.

Perhaps as a result some topics are treated in too brief a space, and their relevance for the main themes is not always clear. The book is framed as a systematic treatise with a thesis about the nature of our historical *a priori* and a conclusion about the contemporary mode of social selfhood. But it is hard to find detailed arguments; the book is more a series of reflections than a systematic treatise. In that role it provides thoughtful and a times painful glimpses into our world.

Mass death is not new; according to Wyschogrod what is novel in this century is the linkage of mass death with systematic rational calculation, and the compressed time-span of the events. Also, what is new is the creation of the death world, a mode of existence forcing people into the zero degree of human existence. All cultural systems of meaning can be extenuated in the death world. Wyschogrod compares this to the scientific reduction of the richness of the life world discussed in Husserl, and the technological consumption of human meaning found in the later Heidegger.

But the death world is more radical: "... destruction of meaning is the telos of the death world" (p. 33); it is a state of nature embedded in a political state, a paradoxical *de jure* state of nature (p. 131). Yet the death dealers keep a token number of their victims alive to show them "the nullity of their symbolic structures" (p. 114). Presumably Wyschogrod is referring here to the Jewish experience of God failing his chosen people. In annihilating cultural meaning the death world robs the victims of the power to transcend time.

Yet the death world is not simply a blind alley off to the side of modern life. Wyschogrod states that the death world "exists to provide the global system of meaning absent in the society of technique" (p. 33); it is "a remythologizing response to the technological society" (p. 51). Although the death world is said to represent the joining of traditional human violence with modern technical rationality, it also stands as a response to that technical world.

This response is symbolized in the refusal to give laborers in the camps modern technical means of work; the goal is not production but nullity. The camps are structured according to modern myths that sort people into classes by race or ideology or some other criterion. They follow a logic Wyschogrod describes as that of Zeno's paradoxes, with an (imagined) infinitely divisible population that can be classified forever, and will furnish an infinite resource of people to keep the death world going (cf. p. 213).

Wyschogrod's continuing argument concerns the way in which we can face death today. She argues that the death world has destroyed the basis of the traditional approach to death: "Death in Western thought, despite varied articulations, has been dominated by a single pattern which depends on interpreting the self as a cognition monad and the process of dying as requiring behavior appropriate to a rational subject" (pp. x-xi). Moreover, that pattern involves the belief that "death is the wound life bears in itself; to know and accept this frees us for the pursuit of rational contemplation, integration into the cosmic whole, or more intense participation in the here-and-now, depending upon the pattern that organizes experience" (p. 2).

This approach can even be found in thinkers such as Rilke, even though he refuses to conceive persons as rational beings or to take morality as conformity to a rational principle. The notion of authenticity still dominates. But this authenticity paradigm, in all its manifoldness, is no longer tenable: "By destroying the system of meanings which rendered death-accepting behavior possible, the effect of man-made mass death has undercut the power of the authenticity paradigm which permitted mastery over death" (p. 14). The death event and the death world "overturn our previous conceptions of finitude" (p. 201).

Wyschogrod's chapters on Hegel form a series of treatments and themes, many of them short for the material treated, which explore the meaning of negation in Hegel's system and his treatments of evil and death. Wyschogrod argues that Hegel's analysis of evil as a necessary concomitant of reflection does not go deep enough, and she applies themes from the early Hegel's critique of the philosophy of reflection against the mature Hegel's own views on these matters. Her general theme, under the influence of Levinas (Wyschogrod has written a major work on Levinas), seems to be that Hegel is right to raise the problem of the intersection of eternity and time, but that in the end he fails the radicality of this problem. Wyschogrod points out that in the post-Nietzschean and post-Nazi world we have to deal not only with the death of the transcendent God but also with the death of the immanent Hegelian God who had emptied the divine out into culture (p. 144). In the face of the Holocaust we experience a "mystery, the obverse of the ontological fullness of the absolute, a negation which appears and opens up a phenomenology of nonbeing" (p. 147).

Heidegger is treated in two chapters, one that expounds his existential analytic and works to add a missing social dimension to his discussion of the structures of the person, and a second chapter that deals with his discussions of technology and poetry, and works to show how the death world carries this to its extreme.

It turns out in the final chapter that besides the historical events of the death world Wyschogrod thinks there is another more permanent flaw in the authenticity paradigm: "The self as relation to others exists prior to its en-

meshing in the nexus of things" (p. 203). This in itself undermines the authenticity paradigm, which relies on a solitary self facing death; this also shows that the world of technology "is first and foremost a negation of the relation to persons, rather than simply a consequence of objectification itself" (p. 203). What the death world has added to the transactional self is a moral emphasis: "... selfhood ... in an apocalyptic age is in transition from a psychological to an axiological or moral conception of the I pole" (p. 214). The self as communal makes a demand to persevere as community in the face of the pressures of technology and death.

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*Put' Gegelja k "Nauke logiki": Formirovanie principov sistemnosti i istorizma.* By N. V. Motroshilova. Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1984. Pp. 351. 1 ruble, 80 kopecks.

What is the "correct" way to review a Russian language Hegel study? From the philosophical perspective, it is certainly insufficient to leave this task to the practicing sovietologist, whose concern is not intrinsic philosophical merit. In the present review, I shall bracket all other questions in order to focus on the philosophical contribution of the work under discussion.

The author, N. V. Motroshilova, is a well known Soviet philosopher who has been active mainly in the phenomenological discussion, widely construed. She has written a number of articles, edited at least two books, and has an earlier monograph on Husserl. At present, she holds a research position in the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

For various reasons, including the problem of linguistic competence, the Russian language Hegel debate has often proceeded in comparative ignorance of recent Western discussion. We can note that it still lacks detailed textual study of the *Jenaer Schriften* and the *Phenomenology*. This does not mean that the Russian Hegel tradition is either unsophisticated or of recent origin, although it is certainly different. Among predecessors in the Russian language Hegel debate, the author cites K. S. Bakradze, author of *Sistema i metod filosofii Gegelja* (Tbilisi: 1958) and M. F. Ovsjannikov, author of *Filosofija Gegelja* (Moscow: 1959).

This book is described as the first detailed analysis in Russian of Hegel's early writings from the beginning until the Nurnberg period, culminating in the *Science of Logic*. Officially, the double function of this work is: to study the interrelation and evolution of Hegel's concepts of systematicity and historicism, and to acquaint the Russian language reader with some results of recent Western Hegel scholarship. According to the author, interest in the problem of systematicity has been growing in Western circles since the 1960s. She refers to the 1975 Stuttgart Hegel conference of the Internationale Hegel-Vereinigung on the theme: *Ist systematische Philosophie moglich?* The central thesis expressed by a series of Western Hegel scholars, including Hans Georg Gadamer, Dieter Henrich, and Hans Wagner, can be paraphrased as