Abstract
The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative adjectives such as “tall” or “rich.” But contextualism faces various problems. I argue that in order to solve these problems we need to look for another account of the context sensitivity involved in knowledge attributions and I sketch an alternative proposal.
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Kompa, N. The semantics of knowledge attributions. Acta Anal 20, 16–28 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1001-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1001-7