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An Instrumental Account of Deception and Reactions to Deceit in Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 January 2015

Lukas Koning ,
Eric van Dijk ,
Ilja van Beest  and
Wolfgang Steinel
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Abstract

In the current paper we present an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) will refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals. We demonstrate that different goals can lead to differences in the use of deception (Experiment 1). Furthermore, we demonstrate that reactions to deceit can also be understood from an instrumental perspective (Experiment 2).

Type
Special Issue Behavioral Ethics: A New Empirical Perspective on Business Ethics Research
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 57 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2010

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References

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