Abstract
The paper discusses Bernard Bolzano’s epistemological approach to believing and knowing with regard to the epistemic requirements of an axiomatic model of science. It relates Bolzano’s notions of believing, knowing and evaluation to notions of infallibility, immediacy and foundational truth. If axiomatic systems require their foundational truths to be infallibly known, this knowledge involves both evaluation of the infallibility of the asserted truth and evaluation of its being foundational. The twofold attempt to examine one’s assertions and to do so by searching for the objective grounds of the truths asserted lies at the heart of Bolzano’s notion of knowledge. However, the explanatory task of searching for grounds requires methods that cannot warrant infallibility. Hence, its constitutive role in a conception of knowledge seems to imply the fallibility of such knowledge. I argue that the explanatory task contained in Bolzanian knowing involves a high degree of epistemic virtues, and that it is only through some salient virtue that the credit of infallibility can distinguish Bolzanian knowing from a high degree of Bolzanian believing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baier A. (1992) Trusting people. Philosophical Perspectives 6: 137–153
Berg J. (1976) Bolzanos Metaphysik. In: Oberkofler G., Zlabinger E. (eds) Ost-West-Begegnung in Österreich: Festschrift für E. Winter. Böhlau, Wien, pp 27–33
Berg J. (2000) From Bolzano’s point of view. The Monist 83: 47–67
Bolzano, B. (1837a). Wissenschaftslehre. In L. Winter et al. (Eds.) (1969). Bernard Bolzano Gesamtausgabe. Reihe 1 (Vol. 11–14). Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann Holzboog.
Bolzano, B. (1837b). Theory of science. Attempt at a detailed and in the main novel exposition of logic with constant attention to earlier authors. R. George (Transl. & Ed.) (1972). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Bolzano, B. (1837c). Theory of science. J. Berg (Transl. & Ed.) (1973). Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel.
Bolzano, B. (1838). Athanasia oder Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva GmbH. (Unveränderter Nachdruck 1970.)
Bolzano, B. (1839). Von der mathematischen Lehrart. J. Berg (Ed.) (1981). Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog.
Bolzano, B. (1976). Ausgewählte Schriften. E. Winter (Ed.). Berlin: Union Verlag.
Carruthers P. (2006) Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In: Carruthers P., Laurence S., Stich S. (eds) The innate mind. Culture and cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 181–198
Chisholm R. (1991) Bernard Bolzano’s philosophy of mind. Philosophical Topics 19: 205–214
de Jong, W. R., & Betti, A. (2008). The classical model of science: A millennia-old model of scientific rationality. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9417-4.
Gilbert M. (2004) Collective epistemology. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 1: 95–107
Goldman A. (1999) Knowledge in a social world. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Greco J. (2003) Knowledge as credit for true belief. In: DePaul M., Zagzebski L. (eds) Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 111–134
Haack S. (1993) Evidence and inquiry: Towards reconstruction in epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford, Malden (MA)
Krause A. (2004) Bolzanos Metaphysik. Karl Alber, Freiburg/München
Lapointe, S. (2008). Bolzano, a priori knowledge and the Classical Model of Science. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9421-8.
Lehrer K. (1997) Self-trust. A study of reason, knowledge, and autonomy. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Proust J. (1989) Questions of form. Logic and the analytic proposition from Kant to Carnap. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
Rescher N. (2005) Epistemic logic. A survey of the logic of knowledge. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Sebestik J. (1992) Logique et mathématique chez Bernard Bolzano. Vrin, Paris
Swank C. (2000) Epistemic vice. In: Axtell G. (eds) Knowledge, belief, and character. Readings in virtue epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham/Boulder/NY/Oxford, pp 195–204
Tatzel A. (2002) Bolzano’s theory of ground and consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Symbolic Logic 43: 1–25
Tollefsen D. (2007) Collective epistemic agency and the need for collective epistemology. In: Psarros N., Schulte-Ostermann K. (eds) Facets of sociality. Ontos, Frankfurt etc., pp 309–329
Zagzebski L. (2000) From reliabilism to virtue epistemology. In: Axtell G. (eds) Knowledge, belief, and character. Readings in virtue epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham/Boulder/NY/Oxford, pp 113–122
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Konzelmann Ziv, A. Bolzanian knowing: infallibility, virtue and foundational truth. Synthese 183, 27–45 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9666-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9666-x