Abstract
Ted Sider argues that a binary afterlife is inconsistent with a proportionally just God because no just criterion for placing persons in such an afterlife exists. I provide a possible account whereby God can remain proportionally just and allow a binary afterlife. On my account, there is some maximum amount of people God can allow into Heaven without sacrificing some greater good. God gives to all people at least their due but chooses to allow some who do not deserve Heaven to enter out of grace. Although this model implies a precise cutoff between those who enter Heaven and those who do not, I have argued that there is a precise point where God best serves justice and some greater good. Although God’s actions may appear arbitrary and ‘whimsically generous,’ it is merely because we are ignorant of the precise cutoff point that best serves his purposes.
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Notes
See Matthew 20: 1–15.
There is at least one obvious difference between the ‘standard’ problem of evil and the problem of Hell: Hell is infinite while all worldly suffering is finite. I will address the special problem this creates in section IV.
For an excellent example of such a reply see Wykstra (1984). The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: on avoiding the evils of ‘Appearance’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73–93.
Some like Sider argue that such a ‘whimsical generosity’ is unjust. I will address this criticism in section IV.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for articulating this objection.
Of course, this may not always be possible without significant risk of performing an impermissible action. While there is not room to fully address this issue here, it seems that in general there is good reason to ‘err on the side of obligation’ when it is unclear whether an action is obligatory or merely permissible.
For an example, see Swinburne (1996).
References
Adams, M. M. (1975). Hell and the God of Justice. Religious Studies, 11, 433–447.
Kershnar, S. (2005). The Injustice of Hell. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 58, 103–123.
Sider, T. (2002). Hell and Vagueness. Faith and Philosophy, 19, 58–68.
Swinburne, R. (1996). Some Major Strands of Theodicy. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil (pp. 30–48). Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Wykstra, S. J. (1984). The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments From Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of “Appearance”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 16, 73–93.