Abstract
This paper discusses the characterization of Paul as an anti-philosopher and messianic nihilist by modern philosophers such as Badiou, Agamben and Taubes. These philosophers mainly focus on passages in Paul’s 1 Corinthians. Whereas they show themselves sensitive to philosophically relevant sections in this letter, the current article challenges their rather far-reaching interpretations. Differently from Badiou, who interprets 1 Cor. 2:1-5 (with its disapproval of “persuasive words of wisdom”) as an anti-philosophical passage, this article sees its criticism directed, not against philosophy but against the sophists who championed effective rhetoric instead of truth. Furthermore, in contrast with his interpretation of 1 Cor. 1:26-29 as an anti-onto-theological reflection about “the things that are not” that God preferred over “the things that are,” it actually seems that Paul shares the ontology of the Stoics who believe that all things emerge from God and return to God. In contrast with Taubes and Agamben, who see Paul’s “nihilism” at work in his statements in 1 Cor. 7:29-31 about performing particular actions “as if not” performing them, this article tries to understand this passage against the background of the Stoic theory of the socalled ἀδιάϕορα: the things which are morally indifferent and are located between the absolute good and the absolute wrong. Hence, it is argued, Paul is not nihilistic but just indifferent about particular things (although he does articulate his preferences). He is not anti-philosophical, but actually draws on the philosophical criticism of the sophistic movement. He is not anti-onto-theological either, but is deeply convinced that the whole of reality is grounded in God. Yet, although their interpretation of Paul can be contested, Badiou’s, Taubes’s and Agamben’s sensitivity for identifying philosophically relevant passages in Paul is confirmed by contextualizing them in their ancient philosophical context.
