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Should we replace knowledge by understanding? — A comment on Elgin and Goodman's reconception of epistemology

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Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or its supplement. I show that these are three very different options. While agreeing with the view that there may be good reasons for some revisions and supplements, I strongly disagree with Elgin and Goodman's replacement thesis.

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An earlier version of this paper was presented at a colloquium about Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin's bookReconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. It took place at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), in Bielefeld, Germany, from 18–20 March 1991. For their helpful advice, I would like to thank Peter Bieri, Catherine Z. Elgin, Nelson Goodman, Roswitha Hullmann, Oliver R. Scholz, and Robert Schwartz.

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Koppelberg, D. Should we replace knowledge by understanding? — A comment on Elgin and Goodman's reconception of epistemology. Synthese 95, 119–128 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064671

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