

Editors:
Hasan Arslan
Mehmet Ali Icbay
Sorin Mihai Stanciu

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN HUMANITIES



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD.....	v
CHAPTER- I	
SOCIAL STUDIES.....	1
AN EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL OF SELÇUK (İZMİR) FOR ALTERNATIVE TOURISM AND SUGGESTIONS FOR TOURISM PLANNING.....	3
POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY: INTERNAL MIGRATION.....	18
A NEW SOCIAL CLASS IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY: THE NEW RUSSIANS.....	30
EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY.....	37
TURKISH LITERATURE AT THE BEGINNING OF 20 TH CENTURY IN AN AZERI-TURKISH INTELLECTUAL'S EYES ...	48
THE NARRATIVE OF DIFFERENCES: REPRESENTATION OF KURDISH WOMEN IN TURKISH NOVEL.....	57
THE PERCEPTION OF WOMEN IN EARLY REPUBLICAN CARICATURE: THE CASE OF THE ZÜMRÜDÜ ANKA MAGAZINE (1923-1925).....	65
FRESHMAN EXPECTATIONS:.....	81
THE CASE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE IN A NEWLY ESTABLISHED SCHOOL OF APPLIED SCIENCES.....	81
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP AND AN EXAMINATION OF MOTHERS' AND FATHERS' NEEDS FOR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PARENT EDUCATION.....	90
CHANGING MISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION.....	97
RE-READING A MODERN ARCHITECT:.....	107
RE-THINKING THE ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY COURSE IN ARCHITECTURAL EDUCATION.....	116
IDEAL AND GEOPOLITICAL BORDERS.....	125
THE BALKAN PACT, THE BALKAN ALLIANCE AND TURKISH-BALKAN POLITICS OF THE PERIOD.....	136
EDUCATION TO GLOBALIZATION.....	160
THE EVALUATION OF THE ADULT EDUCATION SYSTEM IN TURKEY.....	172
THE ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS' REASONS OF ABSENCE.....	182
INTERCULTUREL COMPENTENCE AND LANGUAGE TEACHER EDUCATION.....	203
DEVELOPING A SCHOOL REPUTATION SCALE: TEACHERS FORM.....	214
INVESTIGATION OF CONTINUOUS ANGER AND DESPAIR LEVELS OF FAMILIES WITH HANDICAPPED CHILDREN.....	225

CHAPTER -II

HISTORY.....	233
THE SECOND CHAPTER.....	235
HISTORICAL RESEARCHES.....	235
WOMAN DURING THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY PERIOD IN TURKEY	235
VICTIMS OF WAR: EASTERN REFUGEES (1915 -1922).....	243
AN EXAMPLE TO NÜZUL IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: COLLECTION OF NÜZUL DURING THE ESTERGON (ESZTERGOM) CAMPAIGN	250
THE INTERNATIONAL SECONDARY SCHOOLS TEACHERS' CONGRESS IN PRAGUE BETÜL BATIR	257
EFFECTS OF THE RACIST MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE ON THE RIGHT-WING POLICY CURRENTS IN TURKEY BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS.....	266
TURKEY'S REFLECTION AND REACTION TO OCCUPATION OF POLAND.....	275
THE RESEARCH OF THE IMPACTS OF HISTORY CLASS ON MAKING THE HIGH SCHOOL PUPILS CONCIOUS OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (KAHRAMANMARAŞ SAMPLE).....	284
THE TENSION BETWEEN TURKEY-AZERBAIJAN AFTER THE WORLD WAR I.....	291
İZMİR'S OCCUPATION IN <i>KALPAKLILAR</i> AND <i>DOLUDIZGIN</i> NOVELS	300

CHAPTER- III

PHILOSOPHY	309
THE THIRD CHAPTER.....	311
RESEARCHES IN PHILOSOPHY	311
BETWEEN CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTICAL TRADITIONS: RECONSIDERING PHILOSOPHY TODAY IN TERMS OF ITS CONCEPT OF HUMAN BEING	311
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY CONCERNING THE METAPHORS IN ARISTOTLE'S WORK, POLITICS	318
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROBLEM-FREE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICAL	324

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROBLEM-FREE ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICAL
SONGÜL KÖSE

"Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relations that hold between humans and the natural world. The ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the Earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants that inhabit it."
(Taylor, 1986:3)

Environmental philosophy is a field of study which is concerned with nature, animals, plants, as well as human beings. This branch of philosophy examines the relation between nature and mankind constitutively: the issue of defining nature, the place of man within the nature, *modus operandi* of nature and the effect of human beings on it, meaning and importance of nature for the mankind, moral status of nonhumans in general, the issue of endangered species, restoration-conservation-preservation philosophies, the aesthetic consideration of nature, the problem of future generations, and so on.

Through the history of environmental ethics, important main concepts are composed: individualism, anthropocentrism (strong anthropocentrism and weak anthropocentrism), biocentrism, ecocentrism, holism, resourcism, preservationism, functionalism, compositionism, intrinsic value, instrumental value, etc. Environmental ethics is interested in *how* and *why* these concepts can be practiced. Otherwise, examining the concepts in themselves is an issue of meta-ethics.

Environmental ethics take shape as anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism in the light of either having instrumental value or intrinsic value: i.e. on the loci of value, mainly. The anthropocentric worldview promotes that things in the world have only instrumental value; it is a kind of human-based view. Strict forms of anthropocentrism may result in *speciesism*. According to speciesism, human beings are at the top of a hierarchy. Humans are at the center of everything and all the other things are valuable as long as they are useful for human beings and for their needs. Therefore, any nonhuman being can be sacrificed for the purpose of serving for human beings. On the other hand, the non-anthropocentric worldview supports the idea that things in the world may have intrinsic value. Non-anthropocentric theories, in extreme forms, may lead to *ecofascism*. According to eco-fascistic theories, human beings are no different from

other members of nature. Therefore, for the good of nature a human being can be sacrificed, for instance. Or, in a situation of making a choice between an endangered species and a human individual, theories accused with ecofascism vote for the endangered species in the name of integrity of biotic community.

Speciesism and ecofascism are the two fundamental constraints in environmental philosophy and environmental ethics, i.e. they determine the area of environmental philosophy. Environmental philosophers move back and forth on the environmental-approach continuum depending on their ethical theories. Some environmental philosophers try to lie somewhere toward the middle of the continuum. Some others lie somewhere closer to one of the edges. But, almost all of them try to find a way by which they can evade from these tricky restraints.

J. Baird Callicott is a typical example of the struggle from which environmental philosophers suffer. Callicott calls himself an *ecocentrist*, i.e. he puts the intrinsic value in the whole system rather than just individuals (Callicott, 1989:3). He expresses his goal as "to build, from the ground up, new ethical (and metaphysical) paradigms" (Ibid.: 4) and concerning his aim he tries to articulate Aldo Leopold and his "land ethic" especially.

Throughout his career, Callicott swings between ecofascism and speciesism with the ambition of constructing a problem-free ethical theory. Even though ecofascism or speciesism was no concern for Callicott at the beginning, together with the criticisms of his theories he has acquired the awareness of ecofascism and speciesism problems which constrained his attempts to develop a new environmental ethic.

The purpose of this study is to scrutinize the essential problems —*ecofascism and speciesism*— which can drive any environmental philosopher into a corner and that every environmental philosophy has to deal with. In this respect, the main question of this scrutiny is "is an environmental ethical theory possible without falling into the ecofascism and/or speciesism traps?" Callicott's case is a perfect example of a philosopher who has been tormented by the speciesism-ecofascism tension and he has spent all his career to produce solutions to this problem, and has, to a great extent, succeeded at the end.

I have divided Callicott's *struggle* into six turns regarding chronology, i.e. all the stages are given in a historical order, moreover they have a historical and systematic scrutiny in themselves also: holism; the unity of self and nature with the aid of quantum theoretical axiology; tree-rings model as an answer to ecofascism accusation; the unity of mixed and biotic communities; the second-order principles to manage the relation between mixed and biotic communities with regard to moral rules and obligations; and Callicott's last stand which results in a synthetic approach. Although these six stages show a continuum and development, they are

all in one arena and some of them can be considered as conflicting and fighting philosophies in the arena.

Holism

Callicott suggests that there was a need for a new environmental ethic basically, and he offers Leopold's land ethic as a solution. Callicott brings up the need for a new environmental ethic after criticizing traditional human-centered morality. He criticizes the dominant Western ethical tradition as anthropocentric, i.e. human-centered. Hence, according to Callicott, there is a need for a new environmental ethic which can solve the problems that anthropocentrism causes.

Callicott's starting point is the relation between a community and the ethical limitations: if someone is a member of a community, then s/he is subject to the rules of that community which limits her/his freedom of action. Moreover, in a group, sacrifices are done to be a part of that group. Callicott uses this correlation to assert that change in society carries with it change in ethical principles: "as a society undergoes transition from one form to another, its ethical precepts will undergo parallel transformations" (Callicott, 1989: 67). The next step is to articulate Leopold's land ethic, and in this regard Callicott tries to enlarge the concept of community as much as possible. Because: "...if one is a member of the environmental community, then one is also subject to an environmental ethic" (Ibid.). As the understanding of community expands, moral considerability accretes.

Holism, in the ecological sense, is the idea that nature is a whole with all its individual parts, processes, and relations. Hence, value is given to wholes: species, ecosystems, communities, societies, and the like. Callicott introduces the idea of holism, in order to explicate Leopold's land ethic in environmental philosophy, because the land ethic features the recognition of the whole.

The main problem here is that Leopold's land ethic is extended to consider humans as *plain members* (citizens) of the community. The extension of moral considerability from humans to nonhumans may not be that much a big problem. However, to put humans on the same status with nonhumans is very problematic. Leopold asserts that the land ethic "changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it" (Leopold, 1966: 204). In this way, people become an ordinary part of an integrated community which also includes other organisms and animals, plants, waters, rocks, etc. (Freyfogle, 2009: 21). If people are plain members of the biotic community, then sacrificing people for the integrity, stability, and beauty of the land may be permissible¹. Two things are important here: first, human beings are plain

¹ For Leopold, the land (as a whole) has a moral regard and actions are labeled as morally right or wrong according to their effects on the land: "A thing is right when it tends

members of the land or biotic community. Second, morality is extended to the whole and only attitudes toward that community are considered as morally right or wrong. Moreover, Callicott says that "if it is possible to value *people* for the sake of themselves, then it is equally possible to value *land* in the same way [for the sake of itself]" (Callicott, 1989: 26-27). These three bring the land ethic to the conclusion that community or land has greater moral considerability than individuals of *any* group, i.e. even an individual human being can be sacrificed for the good of the biotic community. (This conclusion is the source of the ecofascism accusation).

As a result, Callicott's project of expelling anthropocentrism from environmental philosophy results in holism. According to some environmental philosophers, some weak forms of holism can be defended. However, such a strong form of holism of which Callicott tries to argue in favor cannot be defended, because it carries the problem of ecofascism with it. The exclusion of the individuals from the moral scope is an incompetence of holism for which Callicott attempts to find a solution with second-order principles (SOPs) at the fourth turn in which mixed and biotic communities are united.

Quantum Theoretical Axiology

Like every other position, holism also has followers, and Callicott is one of them who tries to clear off the shortcomings (ecofascism, for instance) of Leopold's holistic land ethic. Before that, Callicott engaged in consolidating his holistic theory with quantum theoretical axiology which constitutes his second turn. The importance of the quantum theory, for Callicott, is that "quantum theory negates the subject-object, fact-value dichotomies" (Callicott, 1989: 166). Callicott wants to strengthen his holistic theory with the help of quantum theory which precludes all the dichotomies that old world view created, because there can be universal value judgments with the negation of dichotomies. The main reason why Callicott defends quantum theory is that: "The principle of axiological complementarity posits an essential unity between self and world" (Ibid.: 174). This is quite compatible with the holistic land ethic. For Callicott, "value in nature, though subjective, is not radically relative" (Ibid.: 164). Value in nature is not relative because we are continuous with (or part of) it. Because of this continuity "nature is intrinsically valuable, *to the extent* that the self is intrinsically valuable" (Ibid.: 174, Callicott's emphasis). However, there is one thing which is problematic and it is the thing Callicott presupposes that self is intrinsically valuable. Mahmut Özer, in his PhD dissertation, finds this as "a groundless presupposition" (Özer, 2012: 118). According to Özer, the claim that human

to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Leopold, 1966: 262).

beings are intrinsically valuable is showed neither by a philosophical argument nor by empirical evidence. For him, this is just a belief which has anthropocentric and religious roots. Nevertheless it is quite a well-entrenched belief that is not so implausible to presuppose. Callicott, in his latter works, does not dwell on the issue of intrinsic value of human beings. Even later, in *Beyond the Land Ethic*, he refuses to present the subject in a direct way (Callicott, 1999: 187-261).

Charge of 'Environmental Fascism'

Callicott's third turn consists of Tom Regan's critique which asserts that Leopold's land ethic is a case of "environmental fascism" and Callicott's solution to the ecofascism problem. The critique of Regan is two-fold: Leopold's holistic land ethic may be named "environmental fascism", and "environmental fascism and the rights view are like oil and water: they don't mix" (Regan, 1983: 362). That is, environmental fascism is a kind of fascism and it excludes the rights view. In Leopold's land ethic, moral value of an action is up to preserving the "integrity, stability, and the beauty of the biotic community" (Leopold, 1966: 262). Regan reviews the principal precept of the land ethic as a clear-cut implication of ecofascism. The "integrity, stability and beauty" of the biotic community outweighs the individual rights of its members. He states that "the implications of this view include the clear prospect that the individual may be sacrificed for the greater biotic good, in the name of 'the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community'." (Regan, 1983: 361). Even human beings can be sacrificed, because they are "plain members" of the community like any other member of the community.

As an answer to Regan's accusation, Callicott starts with the question "how can altruism possibly evolve by natural selection?" (Callicott, 1989: 78) and he cites different answers from different worldviews: for instance, for Darwin, "the answer lies in society" (Ibid.); or Western philosophy presents human reason as an answer; or for sociobiologists that answer lies in kinship; and the like. Altruism is a good starting point in understanding the land ethic. As Callicott states: Hume, Smith, and Darwin defends that "altruism is as fundamental and autochthonous in human nature as is egoism" (Ibid.: 85). The importance of altruism, except being as essential as egoism, is that it is (or altruistic feelings) the prerequisite for forming a society. Furthermore, for Callicott, change in society carries with it change in ethical principles: "as a society undergoes transition from one form to another, its ethical precepts will undergo parallel transformations" (Ibid.: 67). That is to say, according to Callicott, morality and society are correlative, and the starting point of ethics in a society is altruism. As the conception of human society transforms into biotic community, ethical precepts involve altruistic feelings for nonhumans as well as humans: "*once land is popularly perceived as a biotic community, a correlative land ethic will emerge in the correlative cultural*

consciousness" (Ibid.: 81-82, emphasis added). One important feature of the land ethic is the moral considerability of the community per se, as well as the moral considerability of members of that community (Ibid.: 84). So that, Callicott states, "the land ethic, thus, has a holistic as well as an individualistic cast" (Ibid.: 83).

Neither Inhuman nor Inhumane

The land ethic's holistic and individualistic features help in stating Callicott's answer to the accusation. Callicott's answer is two-fold. He rejects the ideas that: the land ethic is *inhuman* and the land ethic is *inhumane* (Callicott, 1989: 93). In rejecting the charge of being inhuman, Callicott uses two models: balloon and tree-rings. In short, for him, society and morality are correlative, and as society expands, circles of morality expand too. But, the expansion of morality is not like the expansion of a balloon. Because, as the balloon expands, it loses its old forms and generates a new homogeneous one. According to this balloon model, one's moral obligations towards his/her family and towards people in his/her state, for instance, meld. Priorities disappear. Kinship loses its significance. However, in the tree-rings model, the lines which indicate kinship do not disappear. Priorities of moral obligations do not meld. On the contrary, as society expands, new and larger tree-rings are formed and the former ones are not precluded by the new-comers. Hence, ethical rules valid for older and smaller circles do not meld either. Kinship, priorities, relatedness maintain their importance. One conclusion that can be inferred from the tree-rings model is that, in the land ethic, human morality still persists even though the community becomes a biotic one. However, in this model, the decision making procedure is always a one-way process, i.e. the innermost ring will always have the number one priority and each ring takes precedence over the embracing ring. It is true that my duties to the state I am a member of do not override my duties to my family, but my duties to my family seem to always override my duties to the state. Stated more generally, my duties to more intimate communities will always override my duties to more remote communities. In this respect, Callicott's tree-rings model steers his ethics to anthropocentrism and even to speciesism, because human beings will always have a privileged status over remaining members due to being in the center of land community.

In defending the land ethic against being inhumane, Callicott says that: "nonhuman fellow members of the biotic community" do not have the same rights as human beings do, and this is natural because they are not members of the human community. Still, they deserve respect as being members of the biotic community (Callicott, 1989: 94). Yet, 'respect' does not mean 'rights'. He ignores nonhuman individual rights, i.e. nonhuman individual rights are overridden by human rights. Human beings have rights, despite the fact that they, too, are individual members

of the land community. Again, human beings have a privileged status. Speciesism seems to seeps in again.

When Callicott's defense against the charges of inhuman and inhumane are combined, the conclusion comes: the land ethic is not a case of environmental fascism. The rights of human community do not disappear, other members of the biotic community deserve respect, and the biotic community as a whole has intrinsic value. However, Callicott's trial for relieving the land ethic from the accusation of ecofascism results in anthropocentrism and even speciesism. Furthermore, he gets into a dilemma over the status of human beings: sometimes he proposes Leopold's "plain member" status of humans, and other times he asserts that humans have a privileged status over other beings. The first proposition gives rise to the problem of ecofascism, and the second one gives rise to the problem of speciesism.

The Midgley-Leopold Biosocial Moral Theory

After Callicott attempts to reconstruct Leopold's land ethic in both theoretical and conceptual levels, he starts to divide animals into domestic and wild. In his division, his tree-rings model is very effective. He presented the tree-rings model as a solution to the environmental fascism that Leopold's land ethic faces. With this tree-rings model, the concept of intimacy becomes important. As a result of tree-rings analogy, Callicott sees that domestic animals are in a closer relation with humans than wild animals are². In this regard, with the help of Mary Midgley³, the distinction between domestic animals and wild animals appear. In the fourth turn, Callicott introduces a new theory: the union of Leopold's land ethic and Midgley's mixed community theory. According to Callicott, there is "respect" for individuals in Leopold, and in Midgley individuals "matter". Leopold's ethical theory is holistic, Midgley's ethical theory is individualistic. Moreover, for

² The ring that domestic animals are in is smaller than the ring that wild animals are in, and as a ring gets smaller it gets closer to the central ring that human beings are in.

³ For Midgley, sympathy and curiosity 'function' (her preferred term, 1983: 121) across the species-barrier, i.e. they are 'windows' that link different species to each other. The two faculties may be lost in members of nonhuman species as they grow up; but, because human beings are *neotenous*, i.e. "they prolong certain infantile characteristics into maturity" (Ibid.: 119), the faculties continue to exist throughout humans' life. The second important point in Midgley's theory is that there is a "natural, emotional preference for one's own species over others" (Ibid.: 124). The preference brings a hierarchy of priorities, duties and obligations in its wake. As Callicott states, there is a gradation in moral standings as "family members, neighbors, fellow citizens, fellow human beings, pets, and other domestic animals" (Callicott, 1989: 56). This gradation of moral standings is built based upon *intimacy*. This point is similar to Callicott's tree-rings model: both theories give way to speciesism via the principle of intimacy and hierarchy of moral standings measured by it.

Callicott, combining the theories of Midgley and Leopold results in a unified ethical theory: biosocial (animal-environmental) moral theory. Midgley's "mixed community" is for humans and domestic animals, and Leopold's "biotic community" is for wild animals. These two distinct communities are managed by peculiar first order principles⁴. The rule that manages this biosocial community comes from "the nature and organization of communities" (Callicott, 1989: 55). That is, in a sense, the rules (duties and obligations) come from the interdependence relations of this new community. The holistic dimension of environmental ethic does not ignore our duties and obligations toward members of the mixed community. Nevertheless, "the outer orbits of our various moral spheres exert a gravitational tug on the inner ones" (Ibid.: 58), i.e. our duties and obligations to biotic community may impose certain restrictions on our duties and obligations to mixed community.

Callicott proposes such a unified theory in order to avoid the problem of speciesism via Leopold's holism and to avoid the problem of ecofascism via Midgley's individualism. But, the unification of two theories causes problems concerning the relation between them. Leopold's biotic community and Midgley's mixed community do not have one coherent community concept, because of that they conflict sometimes. As a result of this, for instance, the place of a human being is still a dilemma: either is a 'plain member' or at the top of a hierarchy. Moreover, the structure and nature of communities show differences. Midgley proposes a hierarchy of priorities, duties and obligations. Callicott himself generates a hierarchy in the land ethic by way of tree-rings analogy. But, Leopold does not posit any hierarchy in his land ethic. In order to solve these conflicts, as Callicott states, "we are provided a means, in principle, to assign priorities and relative weights" (Callicott, 1989: 59). However, he does not explain the model that assigns rules, priorities and relations to solve the possible conflicts in the new biosocial moral theory. Callicott's new model composing of two distinct realms cannot solve ecofascism and speciesism problems properly due to the lack of assigning priorities, relations and rules among different species when these two approaches conflict. Furthermore, even if it is to be thought that Midgley's individualism annihilates the problem of ecofascism, it is also true that her theory results in speciesism. That is to say, the main problem with Callicott is that he cannot propose a satisfactory theory (or a unified theory) under which both holistic

⁴ First order principles are principal imperatives which organize the relations of human beings with each other and with the world. Because of multiple memberships, there are different first order imperatives depending on the community at issue and sometimes imperatives may conflict due to the lack of a higher-order principle(s) which can solve the quarrel.

and individualistic ethical rules are satisfied. The reason is that Callicott tries to unite them without a higher-order theory which can balance between the theories of Leopold and Midgley.

First and Second-Order Principles

In the biosocial moral theory some problems occurred because of multiple memberships⁵ and the lack of rules which may regulate the membership system via designated duties, obligations and priorities. As Callicott states, each membership has its own rules (Callicott, 1999: 173). But there should be other rules which organize the relationships among different community memberships. Moreover, there should be other rules which set the relation between the two communities. To find a solution, in the fifth turn, Callicott offers two second-order principles⁶: the first second-order principle (SOP-1) is "intimacy", the second second-order principle (SOP-2) is "stronger interests"⁷. According to SOP-1, the duties and obligations to intimate communities take precedence over the duties and obligations to other communities. For SOP-2, the duties or obligations generated by stronger interests preclude the duties or obligations generated by weaker interests (Callicott, 1999: 73). For Callicott, by combining the two second-order principles, he can posit a satisfying priority ranking system under which both holistic and individualistic ethical principles are sustained (Ibid.: 72). Nevertheless, it cannot be possible because the theories of Midgley and Leopold are not complementary as opposed to Callicott's consideration of them, but they are conflicting.

The second-order principles apply to the situations: community-community, community-individual, individual-individual. In regulation our duties towards the biotic community we live in, Callicott offers these second-order principles. Callicott renders the relation between SOP-1 and SOP-2: if there is harmony between SOP-1 and SOP-2, then the choice is in favor of SOP-1. But, if they

⁵ Callicott expresses the conception of multiple membership as follows:

At once, each of us is a member of a family, a civic society, a nation state, the global village, Midgleyan "mixed communities" (that include domestic animals), and local, regional, and global biotic communities. Each of these memberships generates peculiar duties and obligations (1999: 173).

⁶ He was inspired by the suggestion of Shrader-Frechette (1996), as Callicott puts it: "the land ethic must provide 'second-order ethical principles and a priority ranking system that specifies the respective conditions under which [first-order] holistic and individualistic ethical principles ought to be recognized.'" (Shrader-Frechette, 1996 quoted by Callicott, 1999: 72).

⁷ Callicott says that he uses the term "interest" due to the "lack of a better word" (1999: 73), but it is a word from the utilitarian terminology. So that, "interest" is not appropriate for Callicott's holistic environmental ethic.

contradict, then the choice is in favor of SOP-2 (Ibid.: 76). If SOP-1 is replaced with 'intimacy' and SOP-2 is replaced with 'stronger interests', then the relation between the SOPs manifests itself as: when the duties and obligations generated by them do not contradict 'intimacy' wins; but, when the duties and obligations generated by them contradict 'stronger interests' win. It is true that "SOP-2 requires an agent to give priority to the stronger interests at issue" (Ibid.), but Callicott does not propose directly that holistic environmental interests are stronger than individualistic human interests. Thus, it is not necessarily true that environmental interests are always stronger than human interests. The opposite may come true as well. Or, even the equality of interests may come into question.

In the case of a contradiction of interests, the stronger interests (either environmental or individual) take priority over the weaker interests. Callicott decides on the stronger interests according to the consequences, i.e. if the results of, say, A-oriented duties can be compensated more easily than the results of B-oriented duties, then the interests of B are stronger than the interests of A. The problem of how to calculate which interest is stronger or weaker gets complicated as the cases get harder, e.g. to try to make a decision between equally strong interests⁸. Consequently and briefly, when there is harmony between the interests of human beings and the interests of the biotic community, the choice results in favor of human beings because of the intimacy principle which may mean speciesism. Moreover, in dealing with the problems of the first-order principles, the second-order principles sometimes fall short and the method in determining which interest is stronger or weaker is inappropriate considering that the main ethical theory is duty-based.

Callicott's Last Stand

The main issue is to avoid the dangers of ecofascism and speciesism while constructing a relation between mixed and biotic communities. In his last but not the least turn, Callicott presents his last model: *a synthetic approach* - the union of compositionalist and functionalist approaches of conservation philosophy. Leopold and accordingly Callicott believed in the possibility of coexistence of human habitation and wilderness areas. Moreover, Callicott was aware of the necessity of a conservation strategy, so that he proposed 'a generalized version' of Leopold's theory as the only feasible one. For Leopold, the land health is both an implication and an objective of biological conservation. Besides, land health is a constraint on human economic activities which can endanger wilderness areas. The importance of land health comes from its being a regulator in the relationship

⁸ This is a problem of consequentialist ethic. But, the ethical theory Callicott aims to construct is deontological (duty-based) and using the method of consequentialism in deontological ethic is not true.

of human beings and nature, because to conserve the ecosystem health and accordingly the functions of ecosystem there should be some constraints in the activities of human beings. Leopold states the relation between health and conservation as follows: "Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity [health]" (Leopold, 1966: 258). We conserve nature for the persistence of land health. But, we need some indicators, at least one, with which we can control the status of the land health and evaluate the changes in nature made by any species. As Leopold asserts, *wilderness* is the base-datum for the land health (Ibid.: 274). If it is the case, then the relation of health-conservation-wilderness becomes like this: wilderness is an indicative of land health, and land health implies conservation. We conserve nature for the persistence of the land health which in turn implies conservation of nature. Moreover, in conservation theory, land health is related to human interference with nature. By following the health condition, we can make judgments about the goodness or badness of human activities in nature.

Callicott asserts that there are two basic conservation norms: health and integrity (Callicott, 1999: 368). For him, health is a concept of conservation for 'humanly inhabited and used areas'; and he posits integrity for biodiversity reserves, i.e. integrity is related to 'humanly uninhabited areas' as opposed to health. These norms belong to different conservation positions. Health is posited for humanly inhabited areas (or ecosystems) and accordingly for *the functionalist approach*⁹. Similarly, integrity is posited for humanly uninhabited areas (or "biodiversity reserves") and accordingly for *the compositionalist approach*¹⁰. It is

⁹ Functionalism is the adapted and augmented version of the old conservation school resourceism to conservation philosophy. Since functionalism is related to humanly inhabited and used areas, the rules of functionalism are determined via ecosystem health, i.e. the sustainability of the ecosystem will be controlled considering the changes made by human beings in ecosystem health. What matters for functionalism is the continuity of functions, and therefore the identity of species is not essential to it. Even if species differ, functions do not change. Fundamental entities of functionalism are, therefore, not entities but functions and processes (Callicott, 1999: 376). That's why, there is no such problem as endangered species for functionalists.

¹⁰ Compositionism is the adapted and augmented version of the old conservation school preservationism to conservation philosophy. Because compositionism is related to the 'habitat for nonhuman species', the rules of compositionism are determined via biological integrity, i.e. biodiversity reserves will be controlled considering the changes in biological integrity. What matters for compositionism is the continuity of species, because each species has a unique place in nature. In other words, a species is not replaceable with another one. Hence, individuals are important in this approach. Fundamental entities of compositionism are, therefore, not functions but organisms and species (Callicott, 1999: 375-376). That's why, there is endangered species problem for compositionists.

also proposed that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, neither are health and integrity. So then, ecosystems and biodiversity reserves can be considered as parts of a whole. As stated in Callicott et al. "one should 'not distinguish community and ecosystem as different hierarchical levels but rather as complementary ways of viewing *the same system*'." (Callicott et al., 1999: 27, emphasis added).

Functionalism and compositionism have *different ontologies* because of their *distinctive ecologies*. Functionalism has an ecosystem ecology which regards processes and functions, i.e. it is 'process-oriented'; but, compositionism has an evolutionary ecology which regards organisms in biotic communities, i.e. it is 'entity-oriented'. Therefore, functionalism is holistic, compositionism is individualistic. Moreover, ecosystem ecology allows human beings and anthropogenic impacts on environment, humans are part of energy flow: 'thermodynamical approach'. On the other hand, evolutionary ecology excludes human beings in a strict sense: 'biological approach' (Callicott et al., 1999).

In the synthetic approach, the aim is the 'fusion' of functionalist approach and compositionist approach. This new approach evades both ecofascism and speciesism problems. Advantage of functionalism is avoiding the ecofascism problem, and advantage of compositionism is avoiding the problem of speciesism. Thus, if these approaches are complementary, as Callicott argues, then the synthetic approach should also become free of both the ecofascism and speciesism problems. Although the functionalist and compositionist approaches seem to have a sharp distinction in theory, according to Callicott, they are complementary: "for purposes of conservation, neither the evolutionary nor the ecosystem orientation by itself is adequate" (Callicott et al., 1999: 31). Moreover, it is claimed that functionalism and compositionism are distinguished "only for expository purposes; they in fact constitute two ends of a continuum" (Ibid.: 24).

According to Callicott et al., both functionalists and compositionists should agree on the dependence issue with regard to "explain(ing) and predict(ing) the behavior of" ecosystems and organisms. While fulfilling their goals, the proponents of these two approaches should realize that they are dependent on each other in order to make more accurate predictions and to explain more truly the behaviors of the fundamental entities. The two approaches should be unified not only for the purpose of analyzing the changes that arise from the relation between the two approaches. That is, the success and the maintenance of each approach depends upon the other approach; therefore "neither of these approaches to conservation can effectively proceed in isolation from the other" (Ibid.: 32). When one of the approaches fell short of satisfying the conditions of conservation, the other may fill the gap. Hence, according to Callicott et al. "most conservationists lie somewhere toward the middle of the compositionism-functionalism

continuum, moving back and forth in emphasis depending on circumstances" (Ibid.: 24).

Hence, for Callicott et al., when the issue is management, they are complementary (i.e. not mutually exclusive) and dependent on each other; but when the issue is *conservation*, as proposed in Callicott et al., they form a synthetic approach which requires "cooperative and coordinated conservation strategies" and in which "reserves and other protected areas are integrated into their humanly inhabited and economically exploited matrices" (Ibid.: 32, from Figure 2). Thus, in the synthetic approach, we can use both integrity and health in the same context (Ibid.). But, this should not be understood that they are interchangeable concepts. Rather, the thing is that "together they represent complementary conservation norms" (Callicott, 1999: 364). It seems that, Callicott unites the two ontologies of functionalism and compositionism on a normative level depending upon the two complementary conservation norms: health and integrity.

Summary

In this paper, the main subject is the two significant problems of environmental ethics which are ecofascism and speciesism. This scrutiny offers an evaluative perspective on the main problems of environmental ethics and is conducted with this aim.

Most of the environmental philosophers, all the difficulties notwithstanding, try to find a middle way in the ecofascism-speciesism continuum and their theories get closer to one or the other edge of the continuum. Callicott is one of the environmental philosophers who struggle on this issue, when his theory indicates one of the problems or gets closer to one of the edges, he tries to find a new way to go. There are six turns in Callicott's philosophy starting with strong holism due to accepting Leopold's land ethic as a basis. Then, he has constructed a theory which pushes him closer to the speciesist edge, and finally he has found a way out from these fatal consequences.

However, all the environmental philosophers face with the same problems in their journey although they be either holist or individualist in the end. In constructing a holistic environmental ethical theory, for instance, they may be in ecofascism difficulty because holism requires man to be an ordinary member of the biotic community as seen in the first turn. Or, establishing a special place for human kind with the aim of ditching the ecofascism crisis may cause another equally important crisis, namely, speciesism (see the third turn). Some of the philosophers prefer to be closer one of the edges always with being on guard against the other. Some others, like Callicott, try to find a middle way equally far from the edges. However, this choice is no easier. Selecting to be a member of both human community and biotic community brings different problems, such as ranking problems between the duties and obligations toward the communities and

their members, i.e. a challenge to decision making processes. For such problems, they come up with some principles or rules like second-order principles (SOPs) as Callicott did (in the fifth turn). But, these rules or principles are not sufficient enough to solve the ranking problems of setting priorities among our duties to members of the both communities, either. Thus, either there is a need for more regulations and rules, or these two communities should be separated in a different dimension and gathered at another level. The second choice is preferred by Callicott and used as a solution to the main problem: constructing an environmental ethical theory which involves whole nature with its members and which is free from two essential problems (see the sixth turn).

As a final point, Callicott's last theory seems to point to the conclusion that an environmental ethical theory is possible without falling into the ecofascism and speciesism traps, i.e. his last stand can facilitate the attainment of the main subject of this essay.

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