Abstract
Nico Silins has proposed and defended a form of Liberalism about perception that, he thinks, is a good compromise between the Dogmatism of Jim Pryor and others, and the Conservatism of Roger White, Crispin Wright, and others. In particular, Silins argues that his theory can explain why having justification to believe the negation of skeptical hypotheses is a necessary condition for having justification to believe ordinary propositions, even though (contra the Conservative) the latter is not had in virtue of the former. I argue that Silins's explanation is unsuccessful, and hence that we should prefer either White/Wright-style Conservatism (which can explain this necessary condition) or Pryor-style Dogmatism (which denies that this is a necessary condition).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In Pryor (2000).
In White (2006).
This view is developed in Silins (2008).
Silins (2008, pp. 132–133).
I’ve slightly modified Silins’s version of the argument for clarity, but no essential role is being played by the modifications.
This latter term is Pryor’s, which I picked up from him in conversation. I prefer it to the standard “rebutting” terminology, since “opposing” correctly connotes that such defeat can be partial. See my [Kotzen] ms for a much more detailed discussion of undercutting and opposing defeat in a graded-belief context.
Thanks to Stew Cohen for suggesting this line of response.
Silins (2008, p. 114).
References
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review, 119, 187–217.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Nous, 41, 478–502.
Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 216–236). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreement. In L. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the secular life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2005). The Epistemic significance of disagreement. In S. John & G. S. Tamar (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 1, pp. 167–196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kotzen, M. (manuscript). A formal account of epistemic defeat. Available at http://matthewkotzen.net/matthewkotzen.net/Research_files/defeatersweb.pdf.
Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs, 34, 517–549.
Silins, N. (2008). Basic justification and the Moorean response to the skeptic. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 2, pp. 108–142). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, R. (2006). Problems for dogmatism. Philosophical Studies, 131, 525–557.
Wright, C. (2002). (Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2), 330–348.
Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Aristotelian Society Supplement, 78, 167–212.
Wright, C. (2008). The perils of dogmatism. In S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay (Eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New essays in epistemology and ethics (pp. 25–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Kotzen, M. Silins’s Liberalism. Philos Stud 159, 61–68 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9689-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9689-7