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HOW MORAL PRINCIPLES CAN ENTER INTO THE LAW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2001

Matthew Kramer
Matthew Kramer
Affiliation:
Churchill College, Cambridge
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Abstract

In recent times, especially in the pages of this journal, the debate between the proponents of the two principal species of legal positivism has gained new vigor. Specifically, some champions of Exclusive Legal Positivism have sophisticatedly challenged the Inclusive Legal Positivists’ claim that moral principles can figure among the criteria by which the officials of a legal system ascertain the law. The present essay attempts to parry the most formidable of those recent challenges.My focus will lie chiefly on Scott Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro, Way]. For a couple of other recent contributions to the debate, from the camp of Exclusive Legal Positivism, see Scott Shapiro, The Difference that Rules Make, in Brian Bix (ed.), ANALYZING LAW 33, 56–61 (1998); Brian Leiter, Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis, 4 LEGAL THEORY 533 (1998).

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Theory , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 83 - 108
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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