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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2012
Kratochwil argues that a social-scientific study of the behavior of regimes, and how they exercise power, is a useful method to challenge the exaggerated view of international relations as a “normless anarchy.” By showing how “expectations” dictate action in international affairs, his method asserts the existence of a universal force among nations.
2 For a good discussion of the idealist position in international relations, see Hinsley, F.H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.
3 See the once rather influential book by Clark, Grenville and Sohn, Louis, World Peace through World Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Hart, H.L.A., ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1954)Google Scholar.
4 This point has been eloquently made by Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962)Google Scholar.
5 According to the “consensus-definition” in the special issue of International Organization on international regimes, regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” See Krasner, Stephen, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed.Google Scholar, International Regimes, special issue of International Organization 36 (1982) 186Google Scholar.
6 See Kratochwil, Friedrich, “The Force of Prescriptions,” International Organization 38 (1984) 685–708CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Gerard Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Organization, op. cit., 379–417Google Scholar.
8 Jervis, Robert, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Organization, op. cit., 352–78Google Scholar. See also Lipson, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37 (Spring 1984) 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Nardin, Terry, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) chap. 1Google Scholar. See also Mosler, Hermann, The International Society as a Legal Community (Germantown: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980)Google Scholar passim.
10 Such a conceptualization of a cosmic order was provided by Stoic natural law. For a discussion of the historical development of international law and its emancipation from the natural law tradition, see Nussbaum, Arthur, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947)Google Scholar.
11 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979) chaps. 3–5Google Scholar. For a critique of Waltz's argument, see Kratochwil, Friedrich, “Errors Have Their Advantage,” International Organization 38 (1984) 305–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 For discussion of the various rule types, see Black, Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962) 261–85Google Scholar.
13 Jervis, Robert, “Security Regimes,” op. cit., 357Google Scholar.
14 I have argued elsewhere that since utility calculations become possible only against the background of such generalized attitudes, these calculations cannot be the reason for the existence of norms, as rule-utilitarianism makes it appear. To that extent certain rules are transcendental in a logical sense, since they are constitutive of the “self and therefore of the interests this self conceives and pursues. For a further discussion, see Friedrich Kratochwil, “Rules, Norms, Values and the Limits of Rationality,”Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (forthcoming)Google Scholar.
15 For a careful study of deterrence failures, see George, Alexander and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974)Google Scholar.
16 Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) chaps. 2 and 3Google Scholar.
17 Jervis, Robert, “Why Nuclear Superiority Does Not Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (Summer 1979/80) 617–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Jervis, Robert, Thelllogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.
18 Snyder, Jack, “New Methods and Old Virtues in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy,” mimeo (1986)Google Scholar.
19 Fisher, Roger and Ury, William, Getting to Yes (New York: Penguin, 1981) 10Google Scholar.
20 La Feber, Walter, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, vol. 2 of the collection of documentsGoogle Scholar edited by Schlesinger, Arthur, The Dynamics of World Power (New York: Chelsea House and McGraw-Hill, 1973) 700Google Scholar.
21 Weintal, Edward and Bartlett, Charles, Facing the Brink (New York: Scribner, 1967) 68Google Scholar.
22 Jervis, Robert, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, op. cit., 84–85Google Scholar.
23 See Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967) chap. 6Google Scholar.
24 Whether it is useful to endow these rules of the game with the dignity of some type of legal prescriptive force, as some scholars suggest, is a difficult question. On the notion of a great power see Wight, Martin, Systems of States, Bull, Hedley and Holbraad, Carsten, eds. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. In this context, see also Kratochwil, Friedrich, “On the Notion of Interest in International Relations,” International Organization 36 (1982) 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the rules of the game, see Falk, Richard, “The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal Order,” in Black, Cyril and Falk, Richard, eds., The Future of the International Legal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) vol. 1, chap. 2Google Scholar.
25 See Mayberry, Thomas, “Laws, Moral Laws and God's Commands,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (Winter 1970) 287–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Ross, Alf, Directives and Norms (London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1968)Google Scholar; Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press) chaps. 2 and 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Gottlieb, Gidon, The Logic of Choice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1968)Google Scholar.
28 Kaplan, Morton and Katzenbach, Nicholas de B., The Political Foundation of International Law (New York: Wiley, 1969) 4Google Scholar.
29 See Franck, Thomas, The Structure of Impartiality (New York: Macmillan) chap. 1Google Scholar.
30 Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence, op. cit., chap. 4Google Scholar.
31 The problems of soft law are ably discussed in Seidl-Hohenfeldern, Ignaz, “International Economic Soft Law,” Recueil de Cours 163 (1979) 169ffGoogle Scholar. See also Gold, Joseph, “Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangement,” American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983) 443–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 For a slightly different conceptualization, see Cohen, Raymond, “Rules of the Game in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 24 (March 1980) 129–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Schachter, Oscar, “The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding International Agreements,” American Journal of International Law 71 (1977) 296–304CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 Keal, Paul, Unspoken Rules and Super-Power Dominance (London: Macmillan, 1984)Google Scholar.
34 Keal, Paul, Unspoken Rules, op. cit., 50Google Scholar.
35 On the problems associated with compliance with norms, correcting the mistake that only sanctions (as opposed to discovery and authoritative decision) count, see Young, Oran, Compliance and Public Authority (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.
36 Strange, Susan, “Cave, Hic Dragones,” in Krassner, Stephen, ed., International Organization, op. cit., 479Google Scholar.
37 This point is powerfully made by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics, op. cit., 105. See also Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975) 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
38 See Axelrod, Robert, “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egotists,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981) 306–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wagner, Harrison, “The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 77 (1983) 330–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Weick, Karl, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2d ed. (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1978) 105ff.Google Scholar
39 See Dulles, John Foster's remark to that effect in Hoopes, Townsend, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 180Google Scholar.
40 In this context, it is important that a tit-for-tat strategy works only if the first round is played cooperatively. If one of the players plays uncooperatively the first time around, the players follow a clear tit-for-tat rule, and no further communication is allowed; in this case it is very doubtful whether the players can end up with a cooperative solutionGoogle Scholar.
41 Krasner, Stephen, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Organization, op. cit., 186Google Scholar.
42 I am grateful to John Ruggie for pointing out to me that in the original regime discussion free trade provided the justifying “principle” since in the postwar era decision makers believed its effects would lead to peace as well as to prosperity. “Most-favored nation” treatment and other more specific rules seemed then to follow logicallyGoogle Scholar.
43 These problems arise perhaps most forcefully in constitutional cases when liberty has to be weighed against equality, or when the protection of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” has to be defended through the fight against crime while not violating the rights of the accused. See, for example, Summers, R.S., “Naïve Instrumentalism and the Law,” in Hacker, P.S. and Rasz, J., eds., Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) chap. 6Google Scholar.
44 For a critique along these lines, see Keohane, Robert, Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)Google Scholar.
45 For a sociological critique of the “blueprint” model of society, see Blake, Judith and Davis, Kingsley, “Norms, Values and Sanctions,” in Harris, Robert, ed., Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964)Google Scholar.
46 Haas, Ernst, “Regime Decay: Conflict Management Since 1945,” International Organization 37 (1983) 189–256CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
47 For a further elaboration of this point, see Kratochwil, Friedrich, International Order and Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978) chap. 3Google Scholar.
48 See, for example, Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties (defining “material breach”). For a further discussion of the legal remedies involving unilateral countermeasures, see Zoller, Elizabeth, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1984)Google Scholar.
49 On this point, see Kratochwil, Friedrich, “Rules, Norms, and Limits of Rationality,” op. citGoogle Scholar.
50 On the importance of sentiments, see Nicole Fermon, “The Politics of Sentiment: Rousseau's Teachings on the Family and the State,” Ph.D. dissertation (in progress) at Columbia University. For a good discussion of Rousseau's political teachings, see Hoffmann, Stanley, “Rousseau on War and Peace,” in Hoffmann, Stanley, The State of War (New York: Praeger, 1965) chap. 3Google Scholar.
51 See, for example, Karl Marx's remarks on “die vergesellschafte Menscheit” in his Theses on Feuerbach, and his comments on the “new man” who is to emerge from the abolition of alienation in the German Ideology. Both are reprinted in The Marx-Engels Reader, Tucker, Robert C., ed. (New York: Norton, 1972) 107–62Google Scholar.
52 For a discussion of utopianism and its failures to admit and deal with conflict, see Manuel, Frank, ed., Utopias and Utopian Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966)Google Scholar.
53 See, for example, Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964)Google Scholar. On the importance of face-to-face contacts in primitive society, see Gluckman, Max, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (New York: Mentor, 1965)Google Scholar. For a further discussion along these lines, see Weber, Max, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)Google Scholar.
54 On the importance of stabilized “love objects” for social interaction, see Alberoni, Francesco, Movement and Institution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) chap. 4Google Scholar.
55 The solution of both problems is crucial for the establishment of a collective identity, as Rousseau realized in his teachings of the general will and in his educational projects such as Emile. See also his remarks that “a child opening his eyes should see nothing but his fatherland (patrie),” and that it should “imbibe with the mother's milk the love of the fatherland.”Rousseau's Political Writings, Vaughn, C.E., ed., 2 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) vol. 2, 437Google Scholar.
56 To that extent, reformist activists attempt to propagate the idea of a global citizenship as an alternative to the identification with only national interests. See a critique of U.S. foreign policy along these lines by Johansen, Robert, The National and the Human Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57 Hoffmann, Stanley, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981)Google Scholar.
58 See the various official certification procedures and evaluations of the human rights record of foreign governments, particularly during the Carter administration, as well as the “watch” of such private organizations as Amnesty International and The Commission of Jurists. The domestic debate on intergenerational issues is evident even in advertising: in one ad a young boy accuses an older person in front of a jury of minors of having squandered the resources and left the children with nothing but debtsGoogle Scholar.
59 For an extensive evaluation of such judicial pronouncements, see Schachter, Oscar, “Towards a Theory of International Obligation,” Virginia Journal of International Law 8 (1968) 300–10Google Scholar.
