Abstract
In Physics 2.4–6, Aristotle offers an account of things that happen “by luck” (ἀπὸ τύχης) and “spontaneously” (ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου). Many of these things are what we might think of as “lucky breaks”: cases where things go well for us, even though we don’t expect them to. In Physics 2.5, Aristotle illustrates this idea with the case of a man who goes to the market for some reason unrelated to collecting a debt he is owed (197a17–8). While he is there, this man just so happens to run into his debtor and get his money back—which is what he “wanted” all along (196a4). This case has a number of features that have proved puzzling. Most notably, Aristotle seems to think that while “it happened accidentally to him to come and to do this for the sake of getting the money”, nevertheless the man “did not come for the sake of this”—though he “would have” (196b34–6). What must such a proceeding be like to be described in these ways? Physics 2.4–6 makes several important moves towards answering this question. One of them—among the earliest and seemingly a foundational one—is the claim that “for the sake of something are as many things as could be done by thought and by nature” (196b21–2). The aim of this paper is to identify the role that this claim plays in Aristotle’s account of spontaneous proceedings. It defends two main claims. First, Aristotle’s suggestion that spontaneous proceedings could be done by nature and by thought is the product of a more general strategy. His approach is to sketch an intuitive pattern of explanation for proceedings that happen for the sake of something in the ordinary—non-spontaneous—way, and then to try to extend that model to the case of things that do so spontaneously, preserving as much of it as possible. Applying this strategy reveals that whereas nature and thought in fact function as efficient causes of ordinary proceedings that are for the sake of something, this cannot be the case in spontaneous ones. Instead, nature and thought could function as their causes. Second, I argue that Aristotle’s implementation of this strategy is rooted in his account of causation and especially Physics 2.3’s list of “modes” (τρόποι) of causes. When he claims that spontaneous proceedings “could” be done by nature and by thought, he is saying that nature (in natural cases) and thought (in practical ones) are their efficient causes in capacity. In the practical case, spontaneous proceedings are caused by agents who have certain capacities, connected with their desires and abilities. In the right circumstances, these agents would actively exercise those capacities in acting for the sake of a given end.
Funding source: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 10.13039/501100000155
Award Identifier / Grant number: 752-2014-0061
References
Allen, J. 2015. “Aristotle on Chance as an Accidental Cause.” In Aristotle’s Physics: A Critical Guide, edited by M. Leunissen, 66–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139381741.005Search in Google Scholar
Bonello, A. 2015. Aristotle on Spontaneity. PhD diss. University of Toronto.Search in Google Scholar
Charlton, W. 1970. Aristotle: Physics, Books I and II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Translated with Introduction and Notes.10.1093/actrade/9780198720263.book.1Search in Google Scholar
Charles, D. 1991. “Teleological Causation in the Physics.” In Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays, edited by L. Judson, 101–28. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/oso/9780198248446.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Charles, D. 2017. Aristotle on Agency. Oxford Handbooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.6.Search in Google Scholar
Code, Alan. 1997. “The Priority of Final Causes Over Efficient Causes in Aristotle’s PA.” In Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse, edited by W. Kullmann, and S. Föllinger, 128–43. Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag.Search in Google Scholar
Dudley, J. 2010. Aristotle’s Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.10.1353/book16130Search in Google Scholar
Freeland, C. A. 1985. “Aristotelian Actions.” Noûs 19: 397–414, https://doi.org/10.2307/2214949.Search in Google Scholar
Freeland, C. A. 1991. “Accidental Causes and Real Explanations.” In Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays, edited by L. Judson, 49–72. New York: Clarendon Press.10.1093/oso/9780198248446.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Huismann, T. 2016. “Aristotle on Accidental Causation.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2: 561–75, https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.33.Search in Google Scholar
Huismann, T. forthcoming. “Aristotle on How Efficient Causation Works.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/557f1e9ce4b0c2cc114e05fa/t/5efe4c5fb415005eed8e03f3/1593724000907/how-efficient-causation-works.pdf.10.1515/agph-2020-0078Search in Google Scholar
Johnson, M. 2005. Aristotle on Teleology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199285306.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Johnson, M. 2015. “Luck in Aristotle’s Physics and Ethics.” In Bridging the Gap Between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics, edited by D. Henry and K. Margrethe Nielsen, 254–75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511846397.014Search in Google Scholar
Judson, L. 1991. “Chance and “Always or for the Most Part” in Aristotle.” In Aristotle’s Physics: A Collection of Essays, edited by L. Judson, 73–99. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/oso/9780198248446.003.0004Search in Google Scholar
Kelsey, S. 2011. “Physics 199a8–12.” Apeiron 44: 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron.2011.002.Search in Google Scholar
Kress, E. 2019. “How Things Happen for the Sake of Something: The Dialectical Strategy of Aristotle, Physics 2.8.” Phronesis 64: 321–47, https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341980.Search in Google Scholar
Kress, E. 2020. “Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation, Spontaneity, and Natural Processes.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 58: 157–204.10.1093/oso/9780198858997.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Lennox, J. 2001. “Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation.” In Aristotle’s Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, edited by L. James, 229–49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1353/hph.1982.0040Search in Google Scholar
Lennox, J. 2001. “Aristotle on Chance.” In Aristotle’s Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Science, edited by L. James, 250–8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1515/agph.1984.66.1.52Search in Google Scholar
Lorenz, H. 2015. “Natural Goals of Actions in Aristotle.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1: 583–600, https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.25.Search in Google Scholar
Makin, S. 2006. Aristotle: Metaphysics, Book Ɵ. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Translated with Introduction and Notes.10.1093/oseo/instance.00258589Search in Google Scholar
Meyer, S. S. 1992. “Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction.” The Philosophical Review 101 (4): 791–825, https://doi.org/10.2307/2185925.Search in Google Scholar
Panayides, C. 2012. “Aristotle on Incidental Causes and Teleological Determinism: Resolving the Puzzles of Metaphysics E.3.” Journal of Philosophical Research 37: 25–50, https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2012372.Search in Google Scholar
Panayides, C. 2016a. “Aristotle on Chance Processes: A Note on Physics II 4–6.” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter 19: 21–51, https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.19.02pan.Search in Google Scholar
Panayides, C. 2016b. “Aristotle on Luck and Teleology: A Note on Physics II 5.” Philosophical Inquiry 40: 102–18, https://doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2016403/417.Search in Google Scholar
Pellegrin, P., ed. 2014. Oeuvres Complètes. Paris: Flammarion.Search in Google Scholar
Reece, B. C. 2018. “Aristotle’s Four Causes of Action.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97: 213–27.10.1080/00048402.2018.1482932Search in Google Scholar
Ross, W. D., ed. 1960. Aristotle’s Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar
Sedley, D. 2008. Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity. Berkeley: University of California Press.10.1525/california/9780520253643.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Simplicius. 1997. On Aristotle: Physics 2. Translated by Barrie Fleet. London: Duckworth.Search in Google Scholar
Sorabji, R. 1980. Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Reflections on Aristotle’s Theory. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Stein, N. 2011. “Aristotle’s Causal Pluralism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93: 121–47, https://doi.org/10.1515/agph.2011.006.Search in Google Scholar
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
