Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Game-Theoretic Rationale for Vagueness

  • Published:
Linguistics and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Aragonès, E. and Neeman, Z.: 2000, ‘Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, 183–204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aumann, R.: 1987, ‘Correlated Equilibria as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’, Econometrica 55, 1–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benthem, J. van: 2000, ‘Ariel Rubinstein: “Economics and Language”’, in A. Rubinstein, Five Essays on: Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press.

  • Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J.: 1982, ‘Strategic Information Transmission’, Econometrica 50, 1431–1451.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Jaegher, K. and Jegers, M.: 2001, ‘The Physician-Patient Relationship as a Game of Strategic Information Transmission’, Health Economics 10, 651–668.

    Google Scholar 

  • Farrell, J.: 1993, ‘Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games’, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 514–231.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, K.: 1975, ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’, Synthese 30, 265–300.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grice, H. P.: 1975, ‘Logic and Conversation’, in P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol.3, Academic Press.

  • Lewis, D.: 1969, Convention – A Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press.

  • Lewis, D.: 1975 ‘Languages and Language’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press.

  • Lipman, B. L.: 2001, ‘Why Is Language Vague’, working paper, University of Wisconsin.

  • Monderer, D. and Samet, D.: 1989, ‘Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs’, Games and Economic Behavior 1, 170–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, S. and Shin, H. S.: 1996, ‘Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory’, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6, 171–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myerson, R. B: 1991, Game Theory – Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press.

  • Parikh, R.: 1994, ‘Vagueness and Utility: the Semantics of Common Nouns’, Linguistics and Philosophy 17, 521–535.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parikh, P.: 2000, ‘Communication, Meaning and Interpretation’, Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 185–212.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubinstein, A.: 2000, Five Essays on: Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press.

  • Schelling, T. C.: 1960, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press.

  • Vanderschraaf, P.: 1995, ‘Convention as Correlated Equilibrium’, Erkenntnis – An International Journal of Analytical Philosophy 42, 65–88.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wärneryd, K.: 1993, ‘Cheap Talk, Coordination and Economic Stability’, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 532–546.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T.: 1994, Vagueness, Routledge.

  • Zadeh, L.: 1975, ‘Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning’, Synthese 30, 407–428.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Brussel Micro-economics of the profit land non-profit sectors, Vrije Universiteit, Pleinlaan, 2 B-1050, Brussel E-mail

    Kris De Jaegher

Authors
  1. Kris De Jaegher
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

De Jaegher, K. A Game-Theoretic Rationale for Vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 26, 637–659 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025853728992

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025853728992

Keywords

Search

Navigation